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1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The ' t o p i c s ' as a kind of reasoning dominated the 
process of argumentation and reasoning i n 
a n t i q u i t y . They could a l s o be found i n medieval 
thought. A f t e r a period of n e g l e c t i n which a 
r a t h e r s c i e n t i f i c way of reasoning d e r i v e d from 
Descartes was p r e v a i l i n g , the t o p i c s were r e v i v e d 
by Theodor Viehweg. Viehweg d e c l a r e d at a 
l e c t u r e i n 1950 that j u d i c i a l reasoning i n modern 
times proceeds i n a ' t o p i c a l ' way. With h i s 
t h e s i s , which he summarized i n a s m a l l book1, 
Viehweg s e t o f f a c o n t r o v e r s i a l d i s c u s s i o n among 
German j u r i s t s about the nature of j u d i c i a l 
reasoning. I t l a s t e d for more than twenty years 
a f t e r which the a t t e n t i o n f i n a l l y s h i f t e d to the 
d i s c u s s i o n of t h e o r i e s about 'new hermeneutics' . 
I n i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s t h i s 
t h e s i s w i l l s t a r t with a b r i e f o u t l i n e of the 
o r i g i n of the t o p i c s , namely the Topics of 
A r i s t o t l e , and t h e i r f u r t h e r development by 
C i c e r o (under Chapter 2 ) . Then, we w i l l present 
the l e g a l r e c e p t i o n of the t o p i c s by Viehweg and 
give a summary of the main arguments of the 
subsequent t o p i c s d i s c u s s i o n i n Germany (under 
lTh. Viehweg, Topik und J u r i s p r u d e n z , 1 s t . 
ed., Munich 1953; 5th. ed. , Munich 1974. 
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Chapter 3) . On the b a s i s of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n we 
w i l l o f f e r a wider frame of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
dealing on the one hand with t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
background, and, on the other hand, with the 
(admittedly minor) a t t e n t i o n Anglo-American 
j u r i s t s ( i n c o n t r a s t to c o n t i n e n t a l j u r i s t s ) paid 
to the t o p i c a l method (under Chapter 4 ) . 
From the p r e s e n t a t i o n of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s we w i l l 
e x t r a c t three main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which w i l l be 
employed i n the t h e s i s to compare contemporary 
E n g l i s h l e g a l theory. The f i r s t , which i s the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 'problem t h i n k i n g ' , used as 
opposed to 'system t h i n k i n g ' , w i l l be t r e a t e d 
only b r i e f l y i n order to i n d i c a t e i t s main 
i m p l i c a t i o n s on a comparative b a s i s (under 
Chapter 5 ) . 
The t h e s i s w i l l concentrate on the second 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , of f i n d i n g premises, and on the 
t h i r d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , of l e g i t i m i z i n g premises 
for the s o l u t i o n of a l e g a l problem. With the 
help of the concept of s o - c a l l e d 'hard cases' i n 
E n g l i s h l e g a l theory we w i l l c onsider for what 
kind of cases premises have to be found (under 
Chapter 6 ) . 
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Moreover, the d e s c r i p t i v e or p r e s c r i p t i v e 
c h a r a c t e r of l e g a l theories and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e 
on l e g a l p r a c t i c e w i l l be c l a r i f i e d (under 
Chapter 7 ) . 
As j u r i s t i c t o p i c s o f f e r a concept of r a t i o n a l i t y 
f o r the l e g i t i m a t i o n of premises, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
with regard to the employment of value-judgements 
i n j u d i c i a l decision-making, t h i s t h e s i s w i l l 
analyze some of the most r e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
approaches of E n g l i s h l e g a l theory to the problem 
of l e g a l r a t i o n a l i t y i n hard c a s e s (under Chapter 
8) . 
F i n a l l y , they w i l l be compared to the t o p i c a l 
approach, and, as there i s no d i r e c t r e c eption of 
the t o p i c s i n the Anglo-American l e g a l family, we 
w i l l examine to what extent the underlying 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l trend has been incorporated i n t o 
contemporary E n g l i s h l e g a l theory (under Chapter 
9) . 
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2 H i s t o r y of the t o p i c s 
The name ' t o p i c s 1 ' o r i g i n a t e s with A r i s t o t l e , 
although i t i s not c l e a r , whether the idea which 
i t denotes does as well*. But there i s no doubt 
that A r i s t o t l e shaped the t o p i c s as he i s o l a t e d 
and formulated the technique or method which 
might already have been at work i n e a r l i e r 
c o l l e c t i o n s of topoi. 
T h i s chapter w i l l give an o u t l i n e of A r i s t o t l e ' s 
Topics showing the aims of h i s t r e a t i s e (under 
s e c t i o n 2.2) and the means he employs to achieve 
t h i s aim (under s e c t i o n 2.3). We w i l l then 
examine the Topics of C i c e r o to demonstrate that 
A r i s t o t l e ' s conception of the t o p i c s has not been 
followed but that i t was given a d i f f e r e n t 
lThe term ' t o p i c s ' i s used to s i g n i f y the 
theory or method which i s presented subsequently; 
' t o p i c a l ' i s employed as an a d j e c t i v e to t o p i c s ; 
Topics denotes the p a r t i c u l a r t r e a t i s e e i t h e r of 
A r i s t o t l e or C i c e r o ; and topos or topoi ( p l u r a l ) 
are means of t o p i c a l reasoning which may be 
equated with viewpoints u n t i l f u r t h e r explanation 
(under s e c t i o n 2.3). 
! c f . W. Grimaldi, The A r i s t o t e l i a n Topics 
(1958) XIV T r a d i t i o 4, and Th. Viehweg, Topik und 
Jurisprudenz, 5th. ed., Munich 1974, p.29 i n 
support of the argument that the t o p i c s do not 
o r i g i n a t e with A r i s t o t l e ; and M. K r i e l e , Theorie 
der Rechtsqewinnunq, 2nd. ed. , B e r l i n 1976, p.133 
for the argument that they do. 
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emphasis which shaped the f u r t h e r understanding 
of the t o p i c s (under s e c t i o n 2.4). 
2.1 B a s i s of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Topics 
I n h i s eig h t books of Topics A r i s t o t l e f i r s t 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s between d i a l e c t i c a l reasoning, 
which i s the concern of h i s t r e a t i s e , and 
a p o d e i c t i c or demonstrative reasoning. 
The l a t t e r s t a r t s from premises which are 'true' 
and 'primary', while the former reasons from 
endoxa, which has been t r a n s l a t e d as opinions 
that are g e n e r a l l y accepted': 
"Things are 'true' and 'primary' which 
are b e l i e v e d on the s t r e n g t h not of 
anything e l s e but of themselves: f o r i n 
regard to the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s of 
s c i e n c e i t i s improper to ask any 
f u r t h e r f o r the why and wherefore of 
them; each of the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s 
should command b e l i e f i n and by i t s e l f . 
On the other hand, those opinions are 
•generally accepted' which are accepted 
by every one or by the m a j o r i t y or by 
the philosophers - i . e . by a l l , or by 
the m ajority, or by the most notable 
and i l l u s t r i o u s of them." 
The knowledge of metaphysics i n a n t i q u i t y , for 
example, was regarded as t r u e and primary and 
beyond question by the Greeks. 4 Another example 
of demonstrative premises are those which are 
'cf. the Oxford e d i t i o n by W.D. Ross: 
A r i s t o t l e , The works, t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h 
under the e d i t o r s h i p of W.D. Ross, Vol. 1, Oxford 
1926, Topica, (book) I , (ch.) 1, 100a30-100b24. 
'Cf. Grimaldi, op. c i t . supra n.2, p.2. 
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l a i d down to b u i l d up a l o g i c a l axiomatic system 
as i t i s known i n mathematics. On the other hand 
d i a l e c t i c a l reasoning from endoxa i s concerned 
with problems about the nature of j u s t i c e , 
goodness, v i r t u e , or r e a l i t y . ' The d i s t i n c t i o n 
A r i s t o t l e makes i s one between probable knowledge 
and c e r t a i n knowledge. D i a l e c t i c a l reasoning 
y i e l d s only p r o b a b i l i t i e s of t r u t h , while 
a p o d e i c t i c reasoning y i e l d s f u l l c e r t a i n t y of 
t r u t h . 
For A r i s t o t l e the t o p i c s are the methodology of 
d i a l e c t i c s , the area of probable knowledge, j u s t 
as i n h i s A n a l y t i c s we are given a methodology 
for the area of c e r t a i n knowledge.' These two 
ways of reasoning d i f f e r e s s e n t i a l l y i n the 
nature of t h e i r premises, but the way i n f e r e n c e s 
are drawn from premises i s much the same f o r 
both. T h i s i s s t a t e d i n A r i s t o t l e ' s A n a l y t i c s : 
"The demonstrative premiss d i f f e r s from 
the d i a l e c t i c a l , because the 
demonstrative premiss i s the a s s e r t i o n 
of one of two c o n t r a d i c t o r y statements 
(the demonstrator does not ask f o r h i s 
premiss, but l a y s i t down), whereas the 
d i a l e c t i c a l premiss depends on the 
adversary's choice between two 
c o n t r a d i c t o r i e s . But t h i s w i l l make np 
d i f f e r e n c e to the production of a 
s y l l o g i s m i n e i t h e r case; for both the 
demonstrator and the d i a l e c t i c i a n argue 
s y l l o g i s t i c a l l y a f t e r s t a t i n g that 
' i b i d . , p.2. 
' i b i d . , p.3. 
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something does or does not belong to 
something e l s e . " ' 
I f one takes, for i n s t a n c e , the demonstrative 
premise or b a s i c t r u t h 8 that 'every man i s i n 
e x i s t e n c e ' and i f i t i s s t a t e d as a minor premise 
that ' A r i s t o t l e i s a man', the conclusion i s that 
' A r i s t o t l e i s i n e x i s t e n c e ' . I f the premise that 
'every man i s good and s e n s i b l e ' i s accepted by 
means of d i a l e c t i c s , i t f o l l o w s from ' A r i s t o t l e 
i s a man' that ' A r i s t o t l e i s good and s e n s i b l e * . 
I t may be seen that the s y l l o g i s m remains the 
same although the nature of the premises i s 
d i f f e r e n t . Thus, the statement that ' A r i s t o t l e 
i s i n e x i s t e n c e ' was based on c e r t a i n knowledge, 
whereas ' A r i s t o t l e i s good and s e n s i b l e ' 
belonged to the area of probable knowledge. 
Summing up, i t may be s a i d that A r i s t o t e l i a n 
Topics b a s i c a l l y deal with reasoning from endoxa, 
which are opinions held by the majority or the 
most notable of them. 
' A r i s t o t l e , op. c i t . supra n.3, A n a l y t i c a 
P r i o r a I I , 24a21. 
'As true and primary premises cannot 
themselves be demonstrated, t h e i r o r i g i n a t i v e 
source i s according to A r i s t o t l e i n t u i t i o n , so 
e.g. the knowledge of metaphysics r e s t e d i n the 
l a s t r e s o r t upon i n t u i t i o n i n c o n t r a s t to 
g e n e r a l l y accepted opinions; c f . A r i s t o t l e , op. 
c i t . supra, n.3., A n a l y t i c a P o s t e r i o r a I I 19, 
100b6. 
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2.2 Uses and aims of the t r e a t i s e 
A r i s t o t l e ' s t r e a t i s e was meant to serve three 
purposes: i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g , c a s u a l 
encounters, and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c i e n c e s . 1 
I n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g was a common p r a c t i c e i n 
a n t i q u i t y among the philosophers and t h e i r 
d i s c i p l e s . I t followed c e r t a i n r u l e s which can 
p a r t l y be found i n Book V I I I of the Topics. I n 
an a r t i f i c i a l dispute the defender had to put 
forward a t h e s i s (e.g. a d e f i n i t i o n of man) while 
i t was the task of the opponent to disprove t h i s 
t h e s i s . By means of asking questions the 
opponent t r i e d to force the defender to make 
concessions which once they had been made, could 
not be withdrawn. When the opponent managed to 
disprove the defender's t h e s i s by means of 
i n f e r r i n g the opposite from the defender's 
admissions he had won the dispute. 1 0 I n that 
context the e a s i e s t way to fo r c e the defender to 
accept p r o p o s i t i o n s was to base the questions on 
g e n e r a l l y accepted opinions, as i t was l i k e l y 
that those opinions would be accepted by the 
' A r i s t o t l e , op. c i t . supra n.3, Top. 12, 
101a26. 
H c f . K r i e l e , op. c i t . supra n.2, p.136 and 
G. Otte, Zwanzig Jahre Topik-Diskussion: E r t r a g 
und Aufgaben (1970) I Rechtstheorie 183, p. 189 
on i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g . 
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defender as w e l l . I n the l a s t Book of the Topics 
A r i s t o t l e g i v e s f u r t h e r advice on how to 
formulate questions and how to answer them. 
These in c l u d e the concealment of the opponent' s 
plan: 
"Formulate your premiss as though i t 
were a mere i l l u s t r a t i o n : f o r people 
admit the more r e a d i l y a p r o p o s i t i o n 
made to s e r v e some other purpose, and 
not r e q u i r e d on i t s own account. 
Moreover, do not formulate the very 
p r o p o s i t i o n you need to secure, but 
r a t h e r something from which that 
n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s : f o r people are 
more w i l l i n g to admit the l a t t e r , 
because i t i s not so c l e a r from t h i s 
what the r e s u l t w i l l be, and i f the one 
has been secured, the other has been 
secured a l s o . " 1 1 
Besides the main purpose of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
t r a i n i n g , A r i s t o t l e considered the Topics to be 
u s e f u l f o r any i n t e l l i g e n t d i s c u s s i o n of the 
innumerable s i g n i f i c a n t problems which face man, 
and a l s o as an a s s i s t a n t d i s c i p l i n e to enlarge 
where p o s s i b l e the s u b j e c t of s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge. 1 1 For the purposes of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
t r a i n i n g , c a s u a l encounters, and p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
s c i e n c e s A r i s t o t e l i a n Topics aim to provide a way 
to proceed i n order to have an i n t e l l i g e n t 
d i s c u s s i o n and to t a l k sense. According to 
A r i s t o t l e d i a l e c t i c a l reasoning i s de a l i n g with 
l l A r i s t o t l e , op. c i t . supra n.3, Top. V I I I 1, 
156b26. 
M c f . G r i m a l d i , op. c i t . supra n.2, p p . I f f . 
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problems. 1' So i t i s the f i r s t task of h i s Topics 
to enable one to grasp the problem, i . e . the 
s u b j e c t of i n q u i r y , and to examine i t s m a t e r i a l 
i n order to determine i t with accuracy. The next 
step i s to develop and enlarge t h i s m a t e r i a l to 
f u r t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s . To do t h i s , one must form 
and secure p r o p o s i t i o n s i n order to make them 
probable and f r u i t f u l for the f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . 
As a p r o p o s i t i o n needs to be accepted by the 
i n t e r l o c u t o r , i t i s a d i s c u r s i v e way of 
reasoning. 1 4 I f none of the a v a i l a b l e means i s 
omitted, i t may be s a i d that one's grasp of the 
s u b j e c t of i n q u i r y i s adequate. 1 1 
2.3 Means of achieving the aim - e s p e c i a l l y 
topoi 
I n the Topics A r i s t o t l e r e s t r i c t s the f u r t h e r 
e l u c i d a t i o n of problems and p r o p o s i t i o n s to four 
p r e d i c a b l e s : d e f i n i t i o n , property, genus, and 
a c c i d e n t . " 
These c o n s t i t u t e the framework w i t h i n which 
a n a l y s i s , c r i t i c i s m , and e v a l u a t i on of something 
" A r i s t o t l e , op. c i t . supra n.3, Top. I 4, 
101bl5. 
l 4 c f . Grimaldi, op. c i t . supra n.2, p. 3. 
" A r i s t o t l e , op. c i t . supra n.3, Top. I 3, 
101b9. 
" i b i d . , Top. I 4, 101bl7. 
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takes p l a c e , f o r according to A r i s t o t l e every 
p r o p o s i t i o n and every problem i n d i c a t e s one of 
the four p r e d i c a b l e s and i t i s from these that 
problems and p r o p o s i t i o n s are formed. 
A d e f i n i t i o n i s a phrase s i g n i f y i n g a thing's 
essence, such as "an animal that walks on two 
f e e t i s the d e f i n i t i o n of man."1' 
"A property", A r i s t o t l e w r i t e s , " i s a p r e d i c a t e 
which does not i n d i c a t e the essence of a thing, 
but yet belongs to that thing alone, and i s 
p r e d i c a t e d c o n v e r t i b l y of i t . Thus, i t i s a 
property of man to be capable of l e a r n i n g 
grammar. " l ! 
"A genus i s what i s predicated i n the category of 
essence of a number of things e x h i b i t i n g 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n kind." 1' Animal, for i n s t a n c e , i s 
the genus of man. 
As not e v e r y t h i n g can be grasped by those three 
p r e d i c a b l e s , an accident i s something which 
belongs to the thing, though i t i s n e i t h e r a 
" i b i d . , Top. I 4, 101b30. 
l 8 i b i d . , Top. I 5, 102al7. 
l , i b i d . , Top. I 5, 102a31. 
12 
d e f i n i t i o n nor a property nor a genus. 2 0 For 
example the colour of a thing i s an a c c i d e n t . 
A r i s t o t l e ' s Topics then examine what has to be 
considered to determine d e f i n i t i o n , property, 
genus, and accident of something or whether 
something has got the q u a l i t y of one of the 
p r e d i c a b l e s . So, for example, the genus of 
whiteness i s that i t i s a colour, but whiteness 
i t s e l f can be an accident of something e l s e . 
T his examination i s done by s o - c a l l e d topoi which 
are employed, for example, to give a d e f i n i t i o n 
of something, or to determine, for i n s t a n c e , the 
genus of horse or of man. A c l e a r e x p l a n a t i o n of 
the term topos cannot be found i n A r i s t o t l e ' s 
Topics. One has therefore to c o n s u l t h i s 
R h e t o r i c . Although the R h e t o r i c s e r v e s a 
d i f f e r e n t purpose from the T o p i c s , " the meaning 
" i b i d . , Top I 5, 102b4. 
" R h e t o r i c i s the counterpart of d i a l e c t i c s . 
I t must adapt i t s e l f to an audience of u n t r a i n e d 
t h i n k e r s who cannot follow a long t r a i n of 
reasoning and i t employs pe r s u a s i v e arguments 
r a t h e r than demonstrative ones. According to 
A r i s t o t l e , argumentative persuasion i s , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , a s o r t of demonstration. (See 
A r i s t o t l e , The works, t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h 
under the e d i t o r s h i p of W.D. Ross, V o l . X I , 
Oxford 1924; Rhetorica (book) I (ch.) 1, 1 3 5 4 a l ) . 
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of the term topos remains the same i n both 
t r e a t i s e s 
Topoi i s t r a n s l a t e d by ' l i n e s of argument' i n the 
Rhetoric and 'commonplace r u l e s ' i n the T o p i c s . 
They may be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as ways to c l a s s i f y or 
group t h i n g s , or terms, or arguments. 
A r i s t o t l e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between general and 
p a r t i c u l a r t o p o i . The general topoi have no 
s p e c i a l s u b j e c t - m a t t e r and apply e q u a l l y to a l l 
c l a s s e s of things and science a l i k e , such as 
analogy, or argumentum e c o n t r a r i o , or arqumentum 
a f o r t i o r i . " The task of the p a r t i c u l a r topoi i s 
to i n c r e a s e the understanding of any p a r t i c u l a r 
c l a s s of t h i n g s . For instance to c h a r a c t e r i z e a 
man i n comparison with a horse i t may be s a i d 
that a man i s a biped," i n which case the 
comparison i s a general topos, while 'biped' i s 
a p a r t i c u l a r topos. 
Many of the topoi are 'f o c a l p o i n t s ' f o r the 
a n a l y s i s , c r i t i c i s m , and e v a l u a t i o n of terms 
" c f . G r i m a l d i , op. c i t . supra n.2, p.4 and 
Viehweg, op. c i t . supra n.2, p.23. 
" A r i s t o t l e , op. c i t . supra n.21, Vol X I , 
Rhet. I 2, 1358a2-30. 
"idem., op. c i t . supra n.3, Vol. 1, Top. V 
1, 129a8. 
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w i t h i n the framework of the four p r e d i c a b l e s and 
can only be understood with regard to the purpose 
of i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g the Topics was meant to 
s e r v e . For example concerning the d i s c u s s i o n of 
d e f i n i t i o n s A r i s t o t l e presents us with c e r t a i n 
topoi i n order to help to proceed and to examine 
i f something has been defined i n c o r r e c t l y : 
"One commonplace r u l e , then, i n regard 
to o b s c u r i t y i s , See i f the meaning 
intended by the d e f i n i t i o n i n v o l v e s an 
ambiguity with any other," or "Another 
r u l e i s , See i f he has used a 
metaphorical expression, as, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , i f he has defined knowledge 
as 'unsupplantable*, or the e a r t h as a 
'nurse', or temperance as a 'harmony'. 
For a metaphorical expression i s always 
obscure."" 
These are the means by which A r i s t o t l e aims to 
enable the disputants to examine the s u b j e c t 
under d i s c u s s i o n and to form and secure 
p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t h e i r arguments and i n g e n e r a l to 
enable anyone to speak i n t e l l i g e n t l y about i t . 
2.4 Further development of the t o p i c s 
As i t has been s t a t e d A r i s t o t l e ' s T opics are 
concerned with the examination of problems and 
the formation of propositions f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l 
t r a i n i n g and a l s o for the study of the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c i e n c e s i n the area of probable 
knowledge. 
" i b i d . , Top. VI 2, 139bl9 and 32. 
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T h i s methodology began to be neglected s h o r t l y 
a f t e r A r i s t o t l e . Although there were f u r t h e r 
developments of catalogues of topoi, the t o p i c a l 
method was given a d i f f e r e n t emphasis. T h i s may 
best be exemplified by the C i c e r o n i a n 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t o p i c s , which a l s o shaped 
the medieval understanding of the t o p i c s and 
which had more in f l u e n c e i n h i s t o r y than the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n T o p i c s . " 
C i c e r o wrote h i s Topics while s a i l i n g from V e l i a 
to Rhegium as a l e t t e r to h i s f r i e n d T r e b a t i u s . 
T r e b a t i u s , who was a j u r i s t , had found a copy of 
A r i s t o t l e ' s Topics i n Cice r o ' s l i b r a r y , and had 
asked C i c e r o to explain i t to him. On h i s 
journey to Rhegium Cicero composed the t r e a t i s e 
e n t i r e l y from memory." Although C i c e r o r e f e r s 
e x p l i c i t l y to A r i s t o t l e , there seems to be only 
s l i g h t resemblance to A r i s t o t l e ' s t r e a t i s e . 
C i c e r o does not d i s t i n g u i s h between a p o d e i c t i c 
reasoning and reasoning from endoxa. His 
t r e a t i s e was meant to serve r h e t o r i c a l purposes 
r a t h e r than an i n t e l l i g e n t d i s c u s s i o n i n the area 
of probable knowledge. As Tr e b a t i u s was a Roman 
! 6 c f . Viehweg, op. c i t . supra n.2, p.25. 
" C i c e r o , Topica, t r a n s l a t e d by H.M. Hubbel, 
i n : The Loeb C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y founded by James 
Loeb, e d i t e d by T.E. Page and others, London 
1949; Top. I 1-5. 
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j u r i s c o n s u l t , the C i c e r o n i a n Topics are 
e s p e c i a l l y concerned with providing arguments for 
l e g a l procedure and r h e t o r i c . T h i s becomes 
c l e a r , when C i c e r o r e f e r s to the pleading before 
c o u r t : "Not only whole speeches, but a l s o the 
s e v e r a l parts of a speech r e c e i v e help from these 
t o p i c s ... "" 
At t h a t time j u r i s c o n s u l t s were educated as 
r h e t o r i c i a n s and r h e t o r i c a l competence was one of 
the most important s k i l l s a j u r i s c o n s u l t had to 
possess for l e g a l p r a c t i c e . I n l e g a l proceedings 
i t was a s u b s t a n t i a l technique to convert the 
p a r t i c u l a r c o n f l i c t i n t o a r h e t o r i c a l case by 
means of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g claim from d e n i a l and 
then f a c t u a l from l e g a l d e n i a l i n order to apply 
arguments from r h e t o r i c a l schemes to those 
c a t e g o r i e s 
Therefore, C i c e r o ' s Topics present us with 
r h e t o r i c a l invention ( ars i n v e n i e n d i ) and a 
catalogue of topoi that intends to provide a l l 
the important aspects of and arguments f o r the 
p r a c t i c e of argumentation. T h i s c o n t r a s t s with 
A r i s t o t l e ' s Topics which was meant to be a 
methodology of d i a l e c t i c s . 
" i b i d . , Top. XXVI 97. 
" c f . Viehweg, op. c i t . supra n.2, p.59. 
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Consequently C i c e r o does not c h a r a c t e r i z e topoi 
as f o c a l points or aspects to group and c l a s s i f y 
t h i n g s and arguments: rat h e r f o r him they are the 
regions or s e a t s of argument, from which the 
argument can be drawn and where arguments can be 
found." 
According to C i c e r o arguments may f o r example be 
d e r i v e d from s i m i l a r i t y , d i f f e r e n c e , c o n t r a r i e s , 
a d j u n c t s , antecedents, comparison and other topoi 
he enumerates. For instance, 
"an argument i s based on s i m i l a r i t y or 
analogy i n the following manner: I f one 
has r e c e i v e d by w i l l the u s u f r u c t of a 
house, and the house h a s - c o l l a p s e d or 
i s i n d i s r e p a i r , the h e i r ( i . e . the 
remainder-man) i s not bound to r e s t o r e 
or r e p a i r i t , any more than he would 
have been bound to r e p l a c e a s l a v e of 
which the usufruct had been bequeathed, 
i f the s l a v e had died." 1 1 
A f t e r the enumeration and i l l u s t r a t i o n of the 
topoi C i c e r o claims that 
" a l l the t o p i c s of argumentation have 
now been s e t f o r t h , and i t must be 
understood i n the f i r s t p l a c e t h a t 
there i s no d i s c u s s i o n i n which there 
i s not at l e a s t one t o p i c i n v o l v e d , but 
that a l l t o p i c s s c a r c e l y ever occur i n 
every i n q u i r y , and that some t o p i c s are 
b e t t e r s u i t e d to some i n q u i r i e s than to 
o t h e r s . " " 
"see C i c e r o , op. c i t . supra n.27, Top. I I 7-
8. 
" i b i d . , Top. I l l 15. 
" i b i d . , Top XXI 79. 
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This i l l u s t r a t e s that C i c e r o was i n t e r e s t e d i n 
the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of topoi as sources of 
argument with which he provided h i s f r i e n d 
T r e b a t i u s , while he neglected t h e o r e t i c a l 
a spects. A r i s t o t l e , on the other hand, was 
mainly concerned with a theory of d i a l e c t i c a l 
reasoning f o r the u n i v e r s a l examination of 
problems, which then was meant to serve the 
p r a c t i c e of i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g as w e l l . " The 
o b j e c t i v e of providing topoi as a supply of 
arguments can be found i n both A r i s t o t l e ' s and 
C i c e r o ' s t r e a t i s e s , but A r i s t o t l e does not employ 
i t as r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . Therefore i t may be 
s a i d that C i c e r o and A r i s t o t l e p a r t l y make use of 
the same means but the general conception and the 
aims the t o p i c s were meant to s e r v e are d i f f e r e n t 
ones. 
Of these two d i f f e r e n t understandings of topoi 
and the t o p i c s i t was the C i c e r o n i a n v e r s i o n 
which passed i n t o medieval thought, where i t was 
part of p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n . 1 4 T h i s t h e s i s 
w i l l not concentrate on medieval t o p i c s as they 
do not c o n t r i b u t e to the examination of the 
t o p i c s d i s c u s s i o n i n Germany. 
" c f . Viehweg, op. c i t . supra n.2, p.29. 
"see i b i d . , p.30. 
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3 Legal reception of the t o p i c s i n Germany -
e s p e c i a l l y by Theodor Viehweq 
From C i c e r o ' s Topics i t may be seen t h a t the law 
has always been a major f i e l d of t o p i c a l 
reasoning. A f t e r a period of n e g l e c t , i n which 
a deductive approach, known as conceptual 
jurisprudence, dominated c o n t i n e n t a l l e g a l 
thought, Theodor Viehweg was the f i r s t w r i t e r who 
e x p l i c i t l y r ediscovered the t o p i c s and employed 
them f r u i t f u l l y i n the area of l e g a l reasoning. 
I n h i s book 'Topik und Jurisprudenz' 1 based on a 
l e c t u r e he gave i n 1950, Viehweg f i r s t analyses 
the t o p i c s on the b a s i s of A r i s t o t l e and C i c e r o 
(see under s e c t i o n 3.1 below) and afterwards 
examines the C i v i l Law of a n t i q u i t y , of the 
Middle Ages and of modern times with regard of 
i t s t o p i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (see under s e c t i o n 
3.2) . 
However, i t w i l l be seen that t h i s a n a l y s i s i s 
not s a t i s f y i n g , because i t i s not very p r e c i s e 
LTh. Viehweg, Topik und J u r i s p r u d e n z , ( 1 s t . 
ed. 1953) , 5th. ed. Munich 1974 (see a l s o the 
reviews of t h i s book: Max R h e i n s t e i n (1954)3 
American Journal of Comparative Law 597; H.E. 
Yntema, Legal Science and Natural Law: a propos 
of Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz (1960)2 I n t e r -
American Law Review 207; L. F u l l e r (1965)10 
Natural Law Forum 236. 
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and leaves many open questions which other 
w r i t e r s have t r i e d to answer (these are d i s c u s s e d 
under s e c t i o n s 3.3 and 3.4). An example at the 
end of t h i s chapter w i l l t r y to i l l u s t r a t e how 
the t o p i c a l method may proceed to solve a 
p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l problem (see under s e c t i o n 3.5). 
3.1 Viehweg's a n a l y s i s of the t o p i c s 
According to Viehweg the t o p i c s are i n the f i r s t 
place a technique of 'problem t h i n k i n g ' i n 
c o n t r a s t to one of 'system t h i n k i n g ' . 1 A 
problem i s a question that allows more than one 
p o s s i b l e answer, so that the t o p i c s are 
i n a p p l i c a b l e where there i s unanimity about the 
answer to a question. 
I t should be s t r e s s e d t h a t i n 'Topik und 
Jurisprudenz' 'system' means the s t r i c t deductive 
and axiomatic system i n c o n t r a s t to a wider 
conception of 'system', which may mean nothing 
but a combination that makes up a whole i n a 
c e r t a i n sense. 1 
'Viehweg, op. c i t . supra n . l , p.31-32. 
'see M. K r i e l e , Theorie der Rechtsqewinnunq, 
2nd. ed., B e r l i n 1976, p.117 and concerning the 
d i f f e r e n t conceptions: Th. Viehweg, Some 
co n s i d e r a t i o n s concerning l e g a l reasoning, i n : 
Law, Reason, and J u s t i c e , ed. by Graham Hughes, 
New York, London 1969; p.266. 
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I n c o n t r a s t to system t h i n k i n g , t o p i c a l thought 
s t a r t s from problems i n s t e a d of axioms. I t i s 
therefore capable of c o n s i d e r i n g a l l the r e l e v a n t 
aspects for the s o l u t i o n of the problem, w r i t e s 
Viehweg, while the system n e c e s s a r i l y n e g l e c t s 
those aspects and problems which are not 
contained i n i t , and t h e r e f o r e cannot be solved 
s u f f i c i e n t l y . 4 When a c l o s e d system i s meant to 
cover a l l the problems which may a r i s e out of 
p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s i t u a t i o n s there are always 
c e r t a i n problems that cannot be solved by the 
system or that are simply ignored, whereas t h i s 
does not occur when the thought s t a r t s from the 
problem without r e s t r i c t i o n s of r e l e v a n t aspects 
by an underlying system. 
Viehweg d i r e c t l y follows A r i s t o t l e i n equating 
t o p i c s with problem thinking.' However, when i t 
comes to advantages of problem th i n k i n g over 
system thinking, Viehweg does not r e l y on 
A r i s t o t l e , but on the s t u d i e s of the philosopher 
N i c o l a i Hartmann on Kant.' Hartmann c o n t r a s t s 
a p o r e t i c with systematic reasoning. He accuses 
systems of denying and f a l s i f y i n g a r i s i n g 
4Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz (supra n . l ) , 
p. 33. 
' i b i d . , p.31. 
' i b i d . , p.32. 
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problems and thus of being a hindrance for t h e i r 
s o l u t i o n . Aporetic reasoning means, according to 
Hartmann, openness towards every problem that 
a r i s e s . Consequently he approves of 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n Kant's work and h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l system and p r a i s e s them as an 
attempt to overcome r i g i d systems.' 
According to Viehweg topoi are viewpoints that 
serve the examination and s o l u t i o n of problems. 
They must be determined by the problem and have 
no systematic c h a r a c t e r . A s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n of 
topoi changes t h e i r i n t e n t i o n , because i n s t e a d of 
s e r v i n g the problem they are f e t t e r e d by a 
systematic order. 
The topoi may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as points of 
o r i e n t a t i o n and guidance that help to b u i l d up an 
understanding of a problem and h i n t at i t s 
s o l u t i o n . ' They u s u a l l y c o n s i s t of r e c u r r e n t 
viewpoints which have proved to be u s e f u l for the 
examination of problems and which can be l i s t e d 
i n catalogues of topoi i n an a l p h a b e t i c a l order 
or according to the frequency of t h e i r 
occurrence. T h i s d i f f e r s from s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n as 
'N. Hartmann, D i e s s e i t s von Idealismus und 
Realismus (1924) XXIX Kant - Studien 160. 
'Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz (supra n . l ) , 
p.38 and 41. 
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catalogues of topoi are not binding. Moreover, 
the changing s i t u a t i o n s and problems always 
demand that new aspects and viewpoints have to be 
considered as w e l l , so that these catalogues are 
never complete. The topoi may occur i n the form 
of terms and phrases, such as ' l e g a l c e r t a i n t y ' 
or ' f a u l t - l i a b i l i t y ' . 
I n h i s t r e a t i s e Viehweg does not present us with 
a c l e a r e r concept of the term topos, but he 
i n d i c a t e s t h at h i s conception of topoi i s a very 
wide one,' so that one may say that i t contains 
a l l the viewpoints which may become somehow 
re l e v a n t f o r the examination of a problem. 
For t h i s purpose of examination Viehweg d i v i d e s 
the t o p i c a l method i n t o two procedures. The 
f i r s t one ('Topik e r s t e r Stufe') i s an i n v e n t i v e 
procedure, i n which s u i t a b l e viewpoints are taken 
up more or l e s s a c c i d e n t a l l y whereas the second 
one ('Topik z w e i t e r Stufe') operates with 
catalogues of topoi, which already provide a 
repertory of viewpoints for the examination of a 
problem. 1 0 
' i b i d . , p.36. 
" i b i d . , p.35. 
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Furthermore, Viehweg c h a r a c t e r i z e s the t o p i c s as 
a procedure that i s seeking for premises. I n 
c o n t r a s t to a method that can draw long and 
continuous i n f e r e n c e s from a small number of 
premises, the t o p i c s allow only short i n f e r e n c e s 
i n order not to d e v i a t e from the problem and must 
the r e f o r e always seek fo r new premises. 1 1 I t i s 
from the topoi that premises are formed for the 
s o l u t i o n of a problem, but they are not binding 
upon the court at that stage and can always be 
r e p l a c e d by o t h e r s . Premises have only got 
binding fo r c e and are l e g i t i m i z e d when they are 
accepted by the i n t e r l o c u t o r . T h i s i s another 
very important point of Viehweg's a n a l y s i s of the 
t o p i c s , that the only a u t h o r i t y of c o n t r o l and 
l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of premises i s the d i s c u s s i o n . 
Viehweg does not s p e c i f y the kind of d i s c u s s i o n 
he has i n mind or whether i t i s governed by any 
procedural r u l e s . He b e l i e v e s that the 
i n t e r l o c u t o r u s u a l l y i s a s e n s i b l e person, and 
that r e s u l t s of the d i s c u s s i o n with r e f e r e n c e s to 
the opinions of 'the wise' (who are i d e n t i f i e d 
with reasonable persons, possessing q u a l i f i e d 
knowledge i n s e v e r a l f i e l d s ) have f u r t h e r 
a u t h o r i t y and v e r i f i c a t i o n i n those opinions, but 
he admits t h a t the r e s u l t of the d i s c u s s i o n and 
u i b i d . , p.40. 
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thus the premises depend to a high degree on the 
p a r t i e s of the discourse. 1' 
Concerning t h i s question of l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of 
premises, Viehweg r e l i e s on the Topics of 
A r i s t o t l e and t h e i r elements of d i a l e c t i c a l 
reasoning and i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i n i n g , but apart 
from that Viehweg's a n a l y s i s of the t o p i c s has 
not much i n common with the b a s i s of the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n Topics• Viehweg's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between problem t h i n k i n g and system thinking i s 
not comparable to the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
d i a l e c t i c a l and a p o d e i c t i c reasoning. While the 
l a t t e r d i f f e r s only i n the nature of the 
premises, the former d i f f e r s a l s o i n the way of 
drawing i n f e r e n c e s from the premises and the 
whole process of reasoning s t a r t s from the 
problem i n s t e a d of the axioms. Although the l a s t 
aspect may be true of A r i s t o t e l i a n Topics as 
w e l l , the d i s t i n c t i o n between problem thinking 
and system t h i n k i n g was not the concern of 
A r i s t o t l e ' s T o p i c s . 
I n emphasizing the constant need to seek for 
premises Viehweg's conception seems to have a 
strong resemblance with C i c e r o ' s idea of a r s 
i n v e n i e n d i and r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . 
l ' i b i d . , p.42-43. 
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I n a l a t e r essay 1' Viehweg w r i t e s e x p l i c i t l y that 
the ' t o p i c a l system"* i s taken from r h e t o r i c . 
However, i n the same essay he speaks about the 
' t o p i c a l system' and the ' c l a s s i c a l d i a l e c t i c 
system' as the same thing. These i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s 
i n Viehweg's terminology r e l a t i n g to d i f f e r e n t 
understandings of the t o p i c s may be e x p l a i n e d by 
the f a c t t h a t he bases h i s conception of them on 
A r i s t o t l e and C i c e r o at the same time. 
3.2 Viehweg's a n a l y s i s of the C i v i l Law 
I n a f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s Viehweg comes to the r e s u l t 
t h a t l e g a l reasoning i n a n t i q u i t y and i n the 
Middle Ages was a t o p i c a l method of reasoning. 
He a l s o argues that t h i s i s s t i l l t r u e of the 
C i v i l Law i n modern times. 
Viehweg points out that j u r i s p r u d e n c e always 
d e a l s with the question of what i s j u s t i c e and 
how to f i n d j u s t i c e i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . I t i s 
the task of the l e g a l order, he s t a t e s , to serve 
t h i s question of j u s t i c e with regard to a 
"Viehweg, Some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s concerning 
l e g a l reasoning, i n : Law, Reason, and J u s t i c e 
(supra n.3), p.268. 
"'system' i n that context i s meant to be a 
combination that makes up a whole i n a c e r t a i n 
sense. 
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p a r t i c u l a r problem." Therefore l e g a l thought 
must s t a r t from the p a r t i c u l a r problem and 
proceed j u s t as the problem t h i n k i n g does, which 
i s the procedure of the t o p i c s . 1 ' Thus, i t i s a 
n e c e s s i t y f o r l e g a l reasoning to be t o p i c a l , and 
Viehweg d e c l a r e s that i t cannot proceed w i t h i n a 
l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d and c o n s i s t e n t system. Even i f 
there was such a system, he c l a i m s , one could not 
dispense with the t o p i c s i n choosing the axioms, 
which c o n s t i t u t e the system and to which a l l 
f u r t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s can be reduced. 1 7 
Thus, he concludes, the t o p i c s are p a r t of the 
l e g a l order. He i l l u s t r a t e s h i s a n a l y s i s with a 
few examples to s p e c i f y the points of e n t r y of 
the t o p i c s i n t o l g g a l orders g e n e r a l l y . " These 
a r e : the process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , which 
f r e q u e n t l y r e q u i r e s the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and the adjustment of s e t l e g a l 
formulations to changing circumstances; the 
constant need to apply l e g a l r u l e s to c a s e s which 
do not f a l l n e a t l y under any e x i s t i n g r u l e ; and, 
f i n a l l y , the problems a r i s i n g from the use of 
"see Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz (supra 
n . l ) , p.96, but he f a i l s to s p e c i f y a concept of 
j u s t i c e (see a l s o i n f r a under s e c t i o n 4.3). 
" i b i d . , p.97. 
" i b i d . , p.84. 
" i b i d . , p.88-90. 
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common language with i t s ple n i t u d e of 
understandings to express l e g a l concepts and 
p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
According to Viehweg the t o p i c a l nature of l e g a l 
reasoning leads to the f o l l o w i n g three 
consequences or requirements that must be met by 
the l e g a l order: 
F i r s t , the s t r u c t u r e of the l e g a l order must be 
determined by the problem." T h i s means that 
l e g a l thought has always to bear i n mind the 
question of j u s t i c e and therefore to s t a r t from 
the p a r t i c u l a r problem with regard to that 
question, whereas i t must not s t a r t from any r u l e 
of law. The topoi must be o r i e n t a t e d to the 
problem and the premises for i t s s o l u t i o n must be 
questioned and adapted c o n t i n u a l l y . Thus, the 
l e g a l order must always be i n motion and kept 
open t o new points of view." 
Secondly, the l e g a l elements, such as l e g a l terms 
and p r i n c i p l e s , must be o r i e n t a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y 
to the problem and may only be understood i n 
" i b i d . , p.97 and 100-101. 
"idem., Some considerations concerning l e g a l 
reasoning, i n : Law, Reason, and J u s t i c e (supra 
n.3), p.268. 
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r e l a t i o n to the problem." A l e g a l term i s , for 
i n s t a n c e , the term 'property', and a l e g a l 
p r i n c i p l e the p r i n c i p l e that 'nobody s h a l l p r o f i t 
from h i s own wrong. ' As there i s not only one 
meaning or d e f i n i t i o n of a l e g a l term t h a t can be 
employed throughout the whole l e g a l order with 
the same sense concerning a l l d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of 
problems, the meaning of l e g a l terms has to be 
determined by the p a r t i c u l a r problem. I n other 
words i t may be s a i d that l e g a l terms are 
e q uivalent to topoi, because they only h i n t at 
the s o l u t i o n of a problem." 
T h i r d l y , the understanding of l e g a l terms and 
p r i n c i p l e s must therefore follow the p a r t i c u l a r 
problem, while other understandings have to be 
avoided." Legal p r i n c i p l e s , f o r i n s t a n c e , tend 
towards absolute dominance, without l i m i t a t i o n s 
of t h e i r underlying ideas. As t h e r e are many 
c o n f l i c t i n g p r i n c i p l e s , such as f a u l t - l i a b i l i t y 
and the p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n of l o s s e s , or 
p r i n c i p l e s of equity, they have to be balanced. 
T h i s must be done by means of o r i e n t a t i o n of the 
p r i n c i p l e s to the p a r t i c u l a r problem. I n other 
"idem., Topik und Jurisprudenz (supra n . l ) , 
p.97 and 101-104. 
" i b i d . , p.104. 
" i b i d . , p.97 and 105-110. 
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words i t may be s a i d again that l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s , 
l i k e l e g a l terms, have topoi c h a r a c t e r . 
These are, according to Viehweg, the requirements 
which the s t r u c t u r e of the l e g a l order must 
f u l f i l . 
From t h i s l a s t i s s u e the question a r i s e s whether 
Viehweg b e l i e v e s that l e g a l reasoning i s t o p i c a l , 
or whether i t i s d i f f e r e n t from the t o p i c s but 
ought to be t o p i c a l i n h i s opinion. On the one 
hand the expression 'requirement' and the 
formulation of h i s 'requirements' on the l e g a l 
order seem to imply a demand f o r a methodology 
r a t h e r than a d e s c r i p t i o n of the present s t a t u s 
of the process of l e g a l reasoning. On the other 
hand he e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s t h a t the t o p i c s are 
p a r t of the C i v i l Law and that the l e g a l order 
cannot dispense with them." On the b a s i s of the 
l a t t e r statements, Viehweg's demands may be 
considered as an attempt to i l l u m i n a t e the 
present r o l e of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and to a d v e r t i s e 
the need f o r problem t h i n k i n g i n c a s e s where 
there are s t i l l d i f f e r i n g t h e o r i e s of conceptual 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e at work, which t r y to proceed by 
means of deduction and system t h i n k i n g and 
, 4 i b i d . , p.7,14,94. 
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therefore employ an u n s u i t a b l e method i n h i s 
opinion. 
3.3 E v a l u a t i o n of Viehweg's a n a l y s i s 
Viehweg's a n a l y s i s i s r a t h e r u n s a t i s f a c t o r y as i t 
i s not very p r e c i s e and i s i n the main w r i t t e n on 
a very a b s t r a c t l e v e l without concrete 
i l l u s t r a t i o n s , so that i t l e a v e s many questions 
open. 
As he analyses the t o p i c s and the C i v i l Law 
sep a r a t e l y , one does not know e x a c t l y which of 
the elements of h i s conception of the t o p i c s 
matches with l e g a l thought i n the C i v i l Law. 
Thus, the question i s , whether a l l the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the t o p i c s apply to t h e i r 
l e g a l r e c e p t i o n , the j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , as w e l l . 
There i s no doubt about the f a c t and Viehweg l a y s 
s t r e s s on i t , that j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , l i k e the 
t o p i c s i n general, are a method of problem 
thi n k i n g . I n h i s a n a l y s i s of the C i v i l Law one 
can a l s o f i n d the process of f i n d i n g premises 
which i s expressed i n the need to question and 
adopt premises, such as s e t l e g a l formulations, 
permanently to changing circumstances and new 
problems. Furthermore, one may assume that h i s 
conception of a topos i n h i s a n a l y s i s of the 
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t o p i c s i s the same for j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , that i s 
to say a very wide one i n c l u d i n g , f o r in s t a n c e , 
l e g a l terms and p r i n c i p l e s . But i n the a n a l y s i s 
of the C i v i l Law Viehweg does not deal with the 
question of l e g i t i m i z a t i o n or v a l i d i t y of 
premises i n the l e g a l order, whereas i n the 
a n a l y s i s of the t o p i c s i n ge n e r a l he r e l i e s on 
the s p e c i a l r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n Topics and d e c l a r e s t h a t premises 
have to be l e g i t i m i z e d by the i n t e r l o c u t o r . So 
the question a r i s e s whether Viehweg intends to 
apply t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c element of the t o p i c s 
a l s o to j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , or not. I f the answer 
i s yes, one must examine the f u r t h e r question of 
who i s i n the r o l e of the i n t e r l o c u t o r i n the 
l e g a l order, or g e n e r a l l y speaking: where do the 
premises derive t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n from? 
Some authors" have i n t e r p r e t e d Viehweg's t r e a t i s e 
to the e f f e c t that premises, i . e . l e g a l r u l e s , 
p r i n c i p l e s , and standards, r e q u i r e the 
l e g i t i m i z a t i o n by the i n t e r l o c u t o r , and, 
re g a r d l e s s of what Viehweg intended, many of them 
"e.g. U. Diederichsen, Topisches und 
systematisches Denken i n der Jurisprudenz (1966) 
Neue J u r i s t i s c h e Wochenschrift 697 (esp. p..702) 
and C.W. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff 
i n der Jurisprudenz, B e r l i n 1969, p.144. 
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have d e a l t with the s p e c i a l r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n 
of premises as an aspect of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s . " 
Viehweg himself does not c l a r i f y t h i s i s s u e i n 
l a t e r p u b l i c a t i o n s . " There he l a y s s t r e s s on the 
aspect of problem thinking and the f a c t t h a t the 
l e g a l order must be open for new p o i n t s of view 
and ought to be i n permanent motion, but he 
n e g l e c t s the i s s u e of the v a l i d i t y of premises. 
One may a t l e a s t say that Viehweg's t r e a t i s e 
remains very vague concerning the point i n 
question. I t seems l i k e l y t h a t h i s aim with h i s 
fundamental work was the r e v i v a l of a forgotten 
model of reasoning and to draw a t t e n t i o n again to 
the remaining p o t e n t i a l of the t o p i c s a f t e r a 
period of conceptual jurisprudence, but that he 
d i d not intend to present us with a complete 
model of l e g a l reasoning or a thoroughgoing 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the C i v i l Law i n modern times. 
Viehweg c e r t a i n l y achieved one of h i s aims; h i s 
t r e a t i s e s e t o f f an extensive d i s c u s s i o n about 
the nature of l e g a l reasoning and the law-making 
process i n g e n e r a l . 
" t h i s w i l l be expounded i n the f o l l o w i n g 
s e c t i o n 3.4. 
"Viehweg, Some con s i d e r a t i o n s concerning 
l e g a l reasoning, i n : Law, Reason, and J u s t i c e , 
(supra n.3), p.268. 
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3.4 F u r t h e r development and c r i t i c i s m of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s as a r e a c t i o n t o Viehweg's 
t r e a t i s e 
T h i s s e c t i o n t r i e s to summarize t h e main i s s u e s 
r a i s e d by t h e t o p i c s d i s c u s s i o n i n Germany under 
t h e t h r e e p r i m a r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s : a) problem t h i n k i n g opposed t o system 
t h i n k i n g , b) f i n d i n g of p r e m i s e s , and c ) 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f p r e m i s e s . " But f i r s t , we s h a l l 
examine the r e c e p t i o n of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s i n t h e 
work of a n o t h e r major exponent of t h e t o p i c a l 
method; J o s e f E s s e r . 
E s s e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n of the t o p i c s i s not o n l y 
based on h i s t o r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n s of t h e T o p i c s of 
A r i s t o t l e and C i c e r o , but a l s o on s t u d i e s of 
c o m p a r a t i v e law." E s s e r a l s o i d e n t i f i e s j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s w i t h a method of problem t h i n k i n g , which 
p r o c e e d s , he s t a t e s , s i m i l a r l y t o Anglo-American 
c a s e law and judge-made law i n g e n e r a l . " I n h i s 
o p i n i o n problem t h i n k i n g and s y s t e m t h i n k i n g a r e 
" a s i m i l a r d i v i s i o n of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s 
made by G. O t t e , Zwanzig J a h r e T o p i k - D i s k u s s i o n : 
E r t r a g und Aufgaben (1970)1 R e c h t s t h e o r i e 183; 
on p. 184; and by B.H. Oppermann, D i e R e z e p t i o n 
d e s n o r d a m e r i k a n i s c h e n R e c h t s r e a l i s m u s d u r c h d i e 
d e u t s c h e T o p i k d i s k u s s i o n , u n p u b l i s h e d t h e s i s , 
U n i v e r s i t y of F r a n k f u r t , 1985; p.18. 
" J . E s s e r , Grundsatz und Norm i n d e r 
r i c h t e r l i c h e n F o r t b i l d u n q des P r i v a t r e c h t s , 2nd. 
ed., Tubingen 1964. 
" i b i d . , p.52. 
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not m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e , but th e y can bot h be 
found i n t he contemporary l e g a l o r d e r and 
complement each o t h e r . As a sys t e m i s o n l y 
c a p a b l e of s o l v i n g problems t h a t a r e c o n t a i n e d i n 
i t s p r e m i s e s , i t i s dependent on e x t r a -
s y s t e m a t i c a l o r t o p i c a l p r i n c i p l e s i n o r d e r t o 
s o l v e u n f o r e s e e n problems and i n o r d e r t o e n l a r g e 
the system.' 1 E s s e r p o i n t s out t h a t by means of 
the t o p i c s t h e n o n - l e g a l o r n o n - p o s i t i v e m a t e r i a l 
becomes p r o c e s s e d i n t o l e g a l judgement. 3 1 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Viehweg, f o r E s s e r a topos i s not 
any v i e w p o i n t worth c o n s i d e r i n g f o r t he 
e x a m i n a t i o n of a problem, but t o p o i a r e 
arguments, which a r e r a i s e d and s u p p o r t e d by the 
'common s e n s e ' . 1 1 T h e r e f o r e t h e y a r e p o s s i b l e 
s u b j e c t s of a cons e n s u s i n a r h e t o r i c a l l e g a l 
argument e s p e c i a l l y b e f o r e a c o u r t , w i t h o r 
w i t h o u t r e f e r r i n g to l e g a l r u l e s and t he l e g a l 
o r d e r . Such a co n s e n s u s ( e . g . a s e t t l e m e n t ) i s 
d e s i r a b l e b e c a u s e the power of p e r s u a s i o n o f t h e 
c o n s e n s u s i s s t r o n g e r than t h a t of l o g i c a l and 
, lidem, V o r v e r s t a n d n i s und Methodenwahl i n 
der R e c h t s f i n d u n q , F r a n k f u r t 1970, p.153 and i n 
G r u n d s a t z und Norm ( s u p r a n . 2 9 ) , p.53. 
"idem, G r u n d s a t z und Norm ( s u p r a n . 2 9 ) , 
p. 61. 
" i b i d . , p.53; E s s e r employs t h e e x p r e s s i o n 
the 'common s e n s e ' h i m s e l f i n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y E n g l i s h meaning as the g e n e r a l s e n s e of 
mankind, o r of a community. 
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d e d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e . " A c c o r d i n g t o E s s e r the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n endoxa a r e formed by c o n s e n s u s . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y he i d e n t i f i e s t h e s e A r i s t o t e l i a n 
o p i n i o n s of the w i s e w i t h p u b l i c p o l i c y and 
common s e n s e i n modern t i m e s . 3 5 L i k e most w r i t e r s 
on the t o p i c a l method E s s e r c o n c e n t r a t e s on t h e 
a s p e c t t h a t the t o p i c s a r e a method of problem 
t h i n k i n g . 
As a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the t o p i c s t h e element of 
problem t h i n k i n g has been i n t r o d u c e d f o r t he 
f i r s t time by Viehweg," who c o n s i d e r e d i t t o be 
s p e c i f i c to l e g a l r e a s o n i n g a t t h e same ti m e . 
Viehweg was s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i s e d f o r both p o i n t s . 
At f i r s t h i s c r i t i c s argue t h a t Viehweg confounds 
problem t h i n k i n g and t he t o p i c s u n j u s t l y and t h a t 
t h i s i s h i s t o r i c a l l y unsound, b e c a u s e n e i t h e r 
A r i s t o t l e nor C i c e r o made the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
problem and system t h i n k i n g , b ut i n t e n d e d 
d i f f e r e n t p urposes w i t h t h e i r t r e a t i s e s . 1 7 
A l t h o u g h Viehweg might have adopted t h e t o p i c s i n 
"idem., V o r v e r s t S n d n i s ( s u p r a n . 3 1 ) , p.152. 
"idem., G r u n d s a t z und Norm ( s u p r a n . 2 9 ) , 
p. 53. 
"Viehweg, Topik und J u r i s p r u d e n z ( s u p r a 
n . 1 ) , p.31. 
" c f . K r i e l e , op. c i t . s u p r a n.3, p.117 i n 
n.16 and p p . H 9 f f . and J . B l i i h d o r n , K r i t i s c h e 
Bemerkungen zu Theodor Viehwegs S c h r i f t : T opik 
und J u r i s p r u d e n z , (1970)38 T i j d s c h r i f t voor 
R e c h t s g e s c h i e d e n i s 269. 
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a h i s t o r i c a l l y unsound f a s h i o n t h i s does not 
a f f e c t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s s i m p l y 
b e c a u s e he g i v e s i t a d i f f e r e n t e m p h a s i s from the 
t r a d i t i o n a l t o p i c s . Secondly, Viehweg's c r i t i c s 
a l l e g e t h a t l e g a l t h o u g h t p r o c e e d s 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y , as the l e g a l o r d e r makes up a 
whole i n s t e a d of c o n s i s t i n g of many l o o s e 
q u e s t i o n s and v i e w p o i n t s w i t h o u t any c o n n e c t i o n 
t o e a c h o t h e r , which i s a t r a i t of t h e t o p i c s i n 
t h e i r e y e s . " They c l a i m t h a t a p r o o f o f t h e f a c t 
t h a t t h e l e g a l o r d e r i s not based on an a x i o m a t i c 
and d e d u c t i v e system does not n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d t o 
th e t o p i c a l method, but r a t h e r t o an 'open 
s y s t e m ' . An open system i s meant t o be a system 
t h a t a l l o w s new s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and new 
b a s i c l e g a l v a l u e s t o e n t e r the s y s t e m a t some 
p o i n t . I t i s noteworthy t h a t Viehweg a l s o t a k e s 
an open s y s t e m as an example of t o p i c a l p r o c e d u r e 
and even u s e s the term ' t o p i c a l s y s t e m ' . " 
T h e r e f o r e t h e d i f f e r i n g use of t h e same 
t e r m i n o l o g y l e a d t o s e v e r a l m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s i n 
a sometimes v e r y p o l e m i c d i s c u s s i o n . 
, ! c f . D i e d e r i c h s e n , op. c i t . s u p r a n.25, 
p.698 and 700; and C a n a r i s , op. c i t . s u p r a n.25, 
p.136. 
"Viehweg, Some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g 
l e g a l r e a s o n i n g , i n : Law, Reason, and J u s t i c e 
( s u p r a n . 3 ) , p.268. 
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O v e r a l l the a d h e r e n t s of the t o p i c s conceded t h a t 
the l e g a l o r d e r c o n t a i n s s y s t e m a t i c a s p e c t s as 
w e l l , w h i l e t h e i r opponents a d m i t t e d t h a t l e g a l 
thought i s t o p i c a l i n some s i t u a t i o n s . However, 
t h e r e was no agreement about t h e dominance of one 
of t h e methods i n the l e g a l o r d e r . Thus, the 
debate y i e l d e d o n l y d i f f e r i n g c o n c l u s i o n s about 
t h e degree of problem t h i n k i n g and system 
t h i n k i n g i n the l e g a l o r d e r . 
The second major element of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , the 
f i n d i n g of p r e m i s e s , has n o t proved so 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l . The i s s u e has o n l y been c l a r i f i e d 
to t h e p o i n t t h a t i t has been argued t h a t the 
fundamental p r e m i s e s f o r t h e s o l u t i o n of a 
problem cannot be c r e a t e d by means of a l o g i c a l 
o p e r a t i o n , but t h a t t h e y a r e dependent on 
i n t u i t i o n , as t h e r e a r e no s y l l o g i s m s or 
a u t o m a t i c o p e r a t i o n s l e a d i n g t o t h o s e p r e m i s e s . 4 " 
F o r t h e f i n d i n g of the p r e m i s e s i t i s s a i d t o be 
the aim of the t o p i c s t o c o n s i d e r a l l the 
r e l e v a n t v i e w p o i n t s . * 1 The t o p i c s t r y t o p r o v i d e 
c a t a l o g u e s of t o p o i which c o n t a i n l i s t s and 
r e g i s t e r s of i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s t h a t may be 
c o n s u l t e d t o s u p p o r t the p r o c e s s of f i n d i n g 
" c f . O t t e , op. c i t . s u p r a n.28, p.185. 
n c f . G. S t r u c k , T o p i s c h e J u r i s p r u d e n z , 
F r a n k f u r t 1971, p.7. 
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p r e m i s e s and to back the i n t u i t i o n . " D e s p i t e the 
t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n about j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , 
G e r h a r d S t r u c k i s the o n l y j u r i s t who made the 
attempt to compose a c a t a l o g u e of m a t e r i a l t o p o i 
f o r the u s e of l e g a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n . " He 
i d e n t i f i e s t h e term topos m a i n l y w i t h the 
argument i t s e l f . 4 4 S t r u c k ' s c a t a l o g u e t r i e s t o 
d e s c r i b e forms of a r g u m e n t a t i o n and g i v e s a l i s t 
of t h e most common t o p o i f o r l e g a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n , 
so t h a t h i s c a t a l o g u e of t o p o i s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
f o l l o w s the t r a d i t i o n of the C i c e r o n i a n T o p i c s . " 
Without aiming a t c o m p l e t e n e s s , t h e c a t a l o g u e 
enumerates s i x t y - f o u r t o p o i , s u c h as the 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t nobody s h o u l d be condemned unheard 
( a u d i a l t e r a m p a r t e m ) , e q u a l i t y , p r a c t i c a b i l i t y , 
p u b l i c p o l i c y , s o c i a l s e c u r i t y e t c . 
The t h i r d major a s p e c t of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s i s the 
i s s u e of the v a l i d i t y of p r e m i s e s found by means 
of t h i s p r o c e d u r e . T h i s p o i n t was not c l e a r l y 
d e v e l o p e d by Viehweg but has been c o n s i d e r e d by 
s e v e r a l o t h e r a u t h o r s w i t h d i f f e r e n t emphases and 
r e s u l t s . 
" c f . O t t e , op. c i t . s u p r a n.28, p.186. 
" S t r u c k , op. c i t . s u p r a n.41, p.20-34. 
" i b i d . , p.20. 
4 5 idem., Z u r T h e o r i e j u r i s t i s c h e r 
Argumentation, B e r l i n 1977, p.62. 
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I n d i s c u s s i n g German c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law Konrad 
Hesse, 4 5 a former judge of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
c o u r t , p o i n t s out the n e c e s s i t y of f i n d i n g 
f u r t h e r p r e m i s e s by means o f the t o p i c s b e c a u s e 
of the g e n e r a l i t y of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . But, 
a c c o r d i n g t o Hesse, l e g a l argument i s not f r e e 
and o n l y c e r t a i n t o p o i a r e a d m i t t e d . The 
p r e m i s e s f o r the s o l u t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r problem 
have t o be l i m i t e d by t h e wording of t he 
c o n s t i t u t i o n T h u s , i n s t e a d of t h e primacy of 
the problem he a d v o c a t e s t h e p r i m a c y of t h e 
wording of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The t e x t of t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n i s not o n l y a topos h i n t i n g a t t h e 
s o l u t i o n of a problem, but i t has b i n d i n g f o r c e 
and, on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e t o p i c s a r e means of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i n i t s 
b o u n d a r i e s . Hesse d e r i v e s t h i s b i n d i n g f o r c e of 
the wording from t h e p u r p o s e s of r e s t r i c t i o n of 
power, s t a b i l i z a t i o n , and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . " He a r g u e s t h a t b e s i d e s i t s 
g e n e r a l i t y and openness a w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n 
c o n t a i n s a c o r e of d e c i s i o n s and meanings which 
must not be q u e s t i o n e d once t h e y have been 
4 6K. Hesse, Grundzliqe d e s V e r f a s s u n g s r e c h t s 
der B u n d e s r e p u b l i k D e u t s c h l a n d , 1 6 t h . ed. , 
H e i d e l b e r g 1988, p.25. 
" i b i d . , p.29. 
4 8 i b i d . , p.17. 
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d e c i d e d and l a i d down. T h e r e f o r e , t h e y a r e not 
a t the j u d g e ' s d i s p o s a l and must not be a l t e r e d 
by means of t o p i c a l r e a s o n i n g . However, Hesse 
concedes t h a t the r e a l i z a t i o n and t he nor m a t i v e 
f o r c e of the c o n s t i t u t i o n depends on t h e c o n c r e t e 
p o s s i b i l i t y and p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t e n t s c a n become r e a l i t y and on 
the a c t u a l w i l l of t h e i n t e r p r e t e r s t o r e a l i z e 
i t s c o n t e n t s . T h i s w i l l depends on t h e o t h e r 
hand on a g e n e r a l c o n s e n s u s about t h e c o n t e n t s 
and v a l u e s which a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t he 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . 4 ' 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Hesse, H o r s t Ehmke 5 0 does not 
i n t e n d t o r e s t r i c t t h e t o p i c a l method t o the 
b o u n d a r i e s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , but he s u p p o r t s 
the primacy o f the problem o v e r t h e wording of 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n and o v e r a dogmatic s y s t e m when 
i t f a i l s t o c o n t a i n s u i t a b l e v i e w p o i n t s f o r the 
s o l u t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r problem. Thus, f o r 
Ehmke t h e r e i s no l i m i t a t i o n o f j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
imposed by a n o t h e r a u t h o r i t y . He b e l i e v e s t h a t 
the o n l y s o u r c e of v a l i d i t y o f p r e m i s e s i s the 
co n s e n s u s among the w i s e , namely i n t h e f i r s t 
" i b i d . , p.12 and 13. 
" H . E h m k e , P r i n z i p i e n d e r 
V e r f a s s u n g s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( 1 9 6 3 ) 2 0 
Verb'f f e n t l i c h u n q e n d e r V e r e i n i q u n g D e u t s c h e r 
S t a a t s r e c h t s l e h r e r 53; a t p.55 and 60. 
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p l a c e p r o f e s s o r s of j u r i s p r u d e n c e and j u d g e s , and 
i n the second p l a c e the whole community as a 
f u r t h e r c o n t r o l . " A c c o r d i n g t o Ehmke t h e s e a r e 
the a u t h o r i t i e s which d e c i d e whether a p r e m i s e i s 
p e r s u a s i v e and can t h e r e f o r e be a c c e p t e d o r n o t . 
However, he does not i l l u m i n a t e where the w i s e 
d e r i v e t h e i r a u t h o r i t y from. 
P e t e r H a b e r l e " goes a s t e p f u r t h e r : he s t a t e s 
t h a t p r e m i s e s must be l e g i t i m i z e d by the w i s e , 
and he a l s o e x t e n d s the r o l e o f the i n t e r l o c u t o r 
t o a l l o r g a n s of t h e s t a t e , p u b l i c a u t h o r i t i e s , 
c i t i z e n s and groups - i n o t h e r words t o the 
g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n and e v e r y i n s t i t u t i o n . 
H a b e r l e j u s t i f i e s t h i s view w i t h h i s 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of democracy, under which the 
c i t i z e n does not o n l y d e l e g a t e h i s power on the 
e l e c t i o n day, but he c o n t i n u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e s i n 
i t s e x e c u t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y the p r o c e s s of 
f i n d i n g p r e m i s e s becomes an open u n i v e r s e of 
d i s c o u r s e among an open number of i n t e r l o c u t o r s . 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s g e n e r a l view c o n c e r n i n g the 
v a l i d i t y of p r e m i s e s i n German c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
law, the i s s u e of t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of p r e m i s e s may 
" i b i d . , p.71. 
n P . H a b e r l e , D i e o f f e n e G e s e l l s c h a f t d e r 
V e r f a s s u n g s i n t e r p r e t e n , (1975) J u r i s t e n z e i t u n q , 
297 . 
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a l s o be regarded from a d i f f e r e n t a n g l e . O t t e , 5 3 
f o r i n s t a n c e , l o o k s a t i t from t h e r h e t o r i c a l 
p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t y b e f o r e c o u r t . One p a r t y 
must t r y t o o b t a i n t he agreement o f the o t h e r 
p a r t y , o r i f t h i s i s i m p o s s i b l e , t h e premise must 
be accepted by the jud g e . 
The s p e c i a l r u l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n o f j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s has been d i s p u t e d vehemently. Opponents 
o f t h e t o p i c a l method a l l e g e t h a t i t does n o t 
c o n t a i n any r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l i d and 
e f f e c t i v e l e g a l o r d e r and t h a t i t i s the l e g a l 
system n o t the i n t e r l o c u t o r which l e g i t i m i z e s 
premises, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e f a c t t h a t the wise o r 
th e community approve o f t h e premises or o b j e c t 
t o them.'* 
T h i s c r i t i c i s m has been r e j e c t e d by the adherents 
o f j u r i s t i c t o p i c s . They argue t h a t i t i s one 
t a s k o f t h e t o p i c s t o c o n s i d e r a l l t he r e l e v a n t 
aspects which may l e a d t o t h e s o l u t i o n o f a 
problem and one aspect o f t h e c o n t i n e n t a l law 
t r a d i t i o n i s t h a t t he law f i n d i n g process s t a r t s 
w i t h t he wording o f s t a t u t e s and th e n t o use any 
r a t i o n a l and reasonable argument f o r the s o l u t i o n 
" O t t e , op. c i t . supra n.28, p.189. 
! 4 c f . C a n a r i s , op. c i t . supra n.25, p.144 and 
D i e d e r i c h s e n , op. c i t . supra n.25, p.702. 
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of t h e case. 5' Thus., t h e r e i s no d i f f e r e n c e 
between p r o p o n e n t s o f the t o p i c a l method and the 
t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r i e s about t h i s p o i n t . Where 
t h e r e i s u n a n i m i t y about t he d e c i s i o n o f t h e 
l e g i s l a t u r e , i t must be r e s p e c t e d , as t h e r e i s no 
room f o r the t o p i c s i n the absence o f a problem.' 6 
But problems a r i s e , f o r i n s t a n c e , when t h e 
meaning o f a s t a t u t e i s ambiguous, o r when t h e r e 
i s no s t a t u t e a t a l l . I n cases l i k e these t h e 
judge has no guidance from the l e g a l system, 
because t h e system does n ot convey b i n d i n g 
d i r e c t i v e s and under a c i v i l i a n system i t cannot 
produce them i t s e l f , so t h a t t h e judge must 
d e r i v e t he r e c o g n i t i o n o f premises from an 
a u t h o r i t y o t h e r t h a n t he system." 
I t may be c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e r e c e p t i o n o f the 
t o p i c s f o r l e g a l purposes by Viehweg has been 
shaped i n d i f f e r e n t ways. I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e r e 
are many d i f f e r e n t p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e 
q u e s t i o n o f r e c o g n i t i o n o f premises. They 
i n c l u d e t he view t h a t judges and academics are 
" c f . S t r u c k , Topische J u r i s p r u d e n z (supra 
n.41), p.7 and 8. 
5 6 c f . Esser, V o r v e r s t a n d n i s (supra n.31), 
p.155 and O t t e , op. c i t . supra n.28, p.189. 
" c f . Esser, V o r v e r s t a n d n i s (supra n.31), 
p.155. 
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i n t e r l o c u t o r s , or the requirement that judges 
consult the common sense and have recourse to 
p u b l i c p o l i c y . Another v e r s i o n i n v o l v e s the 
consent of the g e n e r a l p u b l i c and community for 
the r e c o g n i t i o n of premises. 
3.5 An example of t o p i c a l reasoning 
To i l l u s t r a t e the t o p i c a l procedure the following 
example" t r i e s to show how adherents of j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s might s o l v e a p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l problem. 
For the r e s o l u t i o n of a case where a car d r i v e r 
i n j u r e s a p e d e s t r i a n i n a c a r accident and the 
pedestrian claims damages the following aspects 
may be considered as topoi: 
At f i r s t one w i l l ask i f the c a r d r i v e r was at 
f a u l t , which i s a question of c u l p a b i l i t y . One 
may a l s o hold the d r i v e r l i a b l e independent of 
h i s f a u l t - l i a b i l i t y f o r f a u l t l e s s c a u s a t i o n , 
because c a r d r i v i n g i s a dangerous a c t i v i t y . 
I n stead of the d r i v e r the owner may be held 
l i a b l e , which i s a form of r i s k - l i a b i l i t y . 
Furthermore, one may keep i n view the f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n of both p a r t i e s , the d r i v e r and the 
pedestrian, or i f they are insured or not, or 
"a s i m i l a r example can be found i n : C a n a r i s , 
op. c i t . supra n.25, at p.143. 
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con v e r s e l y consider these f a c t s to be i r r e l e v a n t 
for a j u s t compensation of the l o s s . Moreover, 
one w i l l take any contributory conduct of the 
i n j u r e d p a r t y i n t o account, and bear i n mind t h a t 
i t could have been an i n e v i t a b l e a c c i d e n t or t h a t 
p o s s i b l y a t h i r d party has caused the a c c i d e n t 
and must t h e r e f o r e be l i a b l e independent of a 
p o t e n t i a l r i s k - l i a b i l i t y of the d r i v e r or of the 
c a r owner. A d d i t i o n a l l y , i t may be argued t h a t 
the s t a t e has to be l i a b l e , because i t allows 
dangerous a c t i v i t i e s l i k e car d r i v i n g although i t 
knows t h a t a c c i d e n t s are going to happen. 
In t h i s case the topoi are for example 
c u l p a b i l i t y or r i s k - l i a b i l i t y which are followed 
by a s h o r t explanation of t h e i r contents each 
time. Besides these topoi others may be 
consulted, i f none of the a f o r e s a i d l e a d s to a 
s u f f i c i e n t s o l u t i o n of the case. T h i s i s the 
stage of t o p i c a l reasoning where a l l the r e l e v a n t 
aspects are to be considered. From these 
viewpoints, which are p a r t l y d i f f e r i n g 
e s s e n t i a l l y as they are based on c o n t r a d i c t i n g 
p r i n c i p l e s , the f i n a l premises f o r the s o l u t i o n 
of the case w i l l be taken, but they are not 
binding u n l e s s they are agreed to. 
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We may now c o n c r e t i z e our case to the point that 
the p e d e s t r i a n i s a j o b l e s s man with family who 
f a i l e d to watch out f o r c a r s when he crossed the 
road. The w e l l - s i t u a t e d car d r i v e r drove h i s 
R o l l s Royce a t high speed n e g l e c t i n g the speed 
l i m i t , so that he was unable to stop h i s c a r i n 
time. O v e r a l l the co n t r i b u t o r y negligence of the 
pe d e s t r i a n amounts to 50%. 
For the adherents of system th i n k i n g the case has 
to be solved w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g l e g a l system 
that i s the only a u t h o r i t y from which the judge 
d e r i v e s the r e c o g n i t i o n of premises, r e g a r d l e s s 
of the g e n e r a l l y accepted opinions. I n a system 
that i s s t r i c t l y based on the p r i n c i p l e s of 
f a u l t - l i a b i l i t y and compensation of l o s s e s the 
binding premise would have to be taken from the 
a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s or precedents which would 
award the p e d e s t r i a n damages to the amount of 50% 
of h i s l o s s . 
Operating w i t h i n the same l e g a l order and the 
same a v a i l a b l e s t a t u t e s or precedents the 
adherents of the t o p i c a l method would not 
n e c e s s a r i l y a r r i v e a t a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t as they 
consider the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s and the r u l e s 
from precedent as strong and persu a s i v e topoi. 
But besides t h e i r power of persuasion there i s 
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no other source such as an underlying l e g a l 
system that makes them v a l i d , because i n the eyes 
of the adherents of the t o p i c s an e x i s t i n g system 
does not convey aut h o r i t y j u s t because i t i s a 
l e g a l system, but because i t contains reasonable 
and p e r s u a s i v e arguments. Concerning the 
v a l i d i t y of the premises one has to d i s t i n g u i s h 
between two main branches w i t h i n j u r i s t i c t o p i c s . 
From the r h e t o r i c a l angle one may (as Otte does) 
regard for example the car d r i v e r ' s o f f e r to pay 
50% of the pedestrians l o s s i n order to reach a 
settlement as a proposition for the s o l u t i o n of 
the c a s e . I f the pedestrian agrees, the premise 
i s accepted, so that the other party i s i n the 
r o l e of the i n t e r l o c u t o r . I f no s e t t l e m e n t can 
be reached between the p a r t i e s , the judge has the 
a u t h o r i t y to adopt a premise from p r o p o s i t i o n s 
made by the p a r t i e s before court and i f one party 
appeals the appeal court i s i n the r o l e of the 
i n t e r l o c u t o r c o n sidering the d e c i s i o n of the 
f i r s t i n s t a n c e judge as a p r o p o s i t i o n f o r the 
s o l u t i o n of the case. However, from the 
r h e t o r i c a l angle we do not l e a r n anything about 
the m a t e r i a l contents of the p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
For t h i s purpose another v e r s i o n of the t o p i c s 
might be more u s e f u l . Regarding the t o p i c a l 
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method as an appeal to g e n e r a l l y accepted 
opinions and the common sense the judge may f i n d 
a more e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n for our case by means 
of r e l y i n g on the general sense of j u s t i c e . I n 
c o n t r a s t to the adherents of system t h i n k i n g he 
may c o n s i d e r the a v a i l a b l e l e g a l r u l e s as not 
s u i t a b l e and inadequate f o r the s o l u t i o n of the 
case and t h e r e f o r e a l s o take the f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n of the p a r t i e s i n t o account. Thus, the 
premise the judge may choose, s h i f t s the amount 
of damages to the c r e d i t of the p e d e s t r i a n and 
reduces h i s f i n a l l o s s to a sum that he can 
a f f o r d . T h i s premise cannot be l e g i t i m i z e d by a 
system i f i t i s not contained i n the system or i f 
the system does not maintain points of entry f o r 
a s i m i l a r s o l u t i o n , which the adherents of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s claim to be t o p i c a l . 
3.6 Summary of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c elements of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
From the r e c e p t i o n of the t o p i c s i n German l e g a l 
theory the f o l l o w i n g main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s may be 
drawn: 
F i r s t l y , i n c o n t r a s t to system t h i n k i n g , the 
t o p i c s are a method of problem t h i n k i n g which 
s t a r t s from the problem rat h e r than from the r u l e 
of law. They serve to consider a l l r e l e v a n t 
aspects of a problem because the viewpoints are 
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not s u b j e c t to a r e s t r i c t i o n imposed by a system 
of r u l e s . The d i s c u s s i o n of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s i n 
Germany concentrated mainly on t h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . A f t e r the p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
t o p i c s t h i s t h e s i s w i l l deal with the i s s u e of 
problem thinking only b r i e f l y ( i n Chapter 5) to 
i n d i c a t e a few important aspects of the t o p i c s i n 
the area of comparative law. 
Secondly, j u r i s t i c t o p i c s enable the f i n d i n g of 
premises f o r the s o l u t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r problem 
by means of catalogues of top o i . These l i s t s of 
important viewpoints are supposed to support the 
i n t u i t i o n i n the process of f i n d i n g premises, as 
t h i s process cannot be systematized and i n f e r r e d 
from other axioms. 
T h i r d l y , the s p e c i a l r u l e s of r e c o g n i t i o n of 
premises form another t r a i t of the t o p i c s . They 
d i f f e r from a l l other sources of v a l i d i t y , such 
as axioms, as the premises c o n s i s t of endoxa that 
have to be accepted by the i n t e r l o c u t o r i n a 
d i s c u s s i o n . This point has caused much 
disagreement and many d i f f e r i n g v e r s i o n s of 
t o p i c a l reasoning. 
The l a s t two i s s u e s w i l l be examined i n Chapters 
6-8 i n the l i g h t of t h e o r i e s about the E n g l i s h 
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j u d i c i a r y . S t r e s s w i l l be l a i d on the aspect of 
f i n d i n g premises for the s o l u t i o n of hard c a s e s 
and on the question of how f a r the judge i s f r e e 
concerning the choice of topoi and whether the 
premises r e q u i r e the r e c o g n i t i o n of another 
a u t h o r i t y . 
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4 The background of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and f u r t h e r 
models of l e g a l reasoning which draw a t t e n t i o n to 
the t o p i c s 
Before looking at t h e o r i e s about the E n g l i s h 
j u d i c i a r y i n the l i g h t of the three main 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t o p i c a l reasoning we w i l l be 
concerned with the p h i l o s o p h i c a l background of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and with another model of l e g a l 
reasoning which draws a t t e n t i o n to the t o p i c s . 
J u r i s t i c t o p i c s have to be seen as one theory 
among others of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r e n d which forms 
a r e a c t i o n against the t h e n - p r e v a i l i n g C a r t e s i a n 
thought. One of the main movements of t h i s kind 
i s Chaim Perelman's 'new r h e t o r i c ' which he 
developed together with L u c i e O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a 
s h o r t l y a f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n of Viehweg's 
monograph and that he extended i n numerous 
a r t i c l e s (see under s e c t i o n 4.1). 
Moreover, we w i l l look at J u l i u s Stone's concept 
of l o g i c and i t s leeways i n the law (under 
s e c t i o n 4.2), and at the e v a l u a t i o n of j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s by Stone and other Anglo-American j u r i s t s 
(under s e c t i o n 4.3). From the f a c t that the 
t o p i c s have been considered by Anglo-American 
j u r i s t s as w e l l one may see t h a t the l e g a l 
r e c e p t i o n of the t o p i c s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y 
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r e s t r i c t e d to the German or a c o n t i n e n t a l l e g a l 
system but t h a t i t i s a l s o a p p l i c a b l e to a common 
law l e g a l order and i n general r e l e v a n t for many 
kinds of d i f f e r e n t l e g a l systems. The f a c t t h a t 
the i d e a of a reception of the t o p i c s f o r l e g a l 
purposes o r i g i n a t e s with a German j u r i s t may have 
been caused by the widespread notion of 
conceptual jurisprudence, otherwise known as 
l e g a l formalism, i n Germany. Although conceptual 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e had ceased to be dominant and had 
been r e p l a c e d by a more f u n c t i o n a l approach 
( j u r i s p r u d e n c e of i n t e r e s t s ) at the time 
Viehweg's t r e a t i s e was published, the idea was 
s t i l l i n h e r e n t i n the modern codes of Western 
Europe, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the German C i v i l Code 
which dates from 1900 and which t h e r e f o r e 
provoked a counter-movement a g a i n s t conceptual 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e . 
4.1 Chaim Perelman and the new r h e t o r i c 
Perelman approaches the question of l e g a l 
reasoning from the per s p e c t i v e of the philosopher 
and l o g i c i a n . 
With h i s work he aims to make a break with a 
concept of C a r t e s i a n reason and reasoning which 
has s e t i t s mark on Western philosophy f o r the 
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l a s t three c e n t u r i e s . 1 Descartes' concept was to 
take f o r f a l s e everything which was only 
p l a u s i b l e and to consider r a t i o n a l only 
demonstration by means of a p o d e i c t i c proof. 
According to h i s model (more qeometrico) a 
r a t i o n a l s c i e n c e cannot be content with more or 
l e s s probable opinions; i t must elaborate a 
system of n e c e s s a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s which w i l l 
impose i t s e l f on every r a t i o n a l being, concerning 
which agreement i s i n e v i t a b l e . T h i s means that 
disagreement i s a s i g n of e r r o r . T h i s way of 
reasoning was meant to s o l v e a l l problems known 
to man, the s o l u t i o n of which was a l r e a d y 
possessed by the d i v i n e mind.1 
Perelman seeks to overcome the C a r t e s i a n 
t r a d i t i o n and introduces d i a l e c t i c a l reasoning 
where a r e s u l t cannot be demonstrated or v e r i f i e d 
and, e s p e c i a l l y , where there i s disagreement 
about v a l u e s . T h i s often occurs i n the 
humanities, such as law and morality, which 
t h e r e f o r e become s u b j e c t to argumentation r a t h e r 
than to l o g i c a l proof.' L i k e Viehweg, Perelman 
'Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The 
new r h e t o r i c : a t r e a t i s e on argumentation, Notre 
Dame, London 1969, p . l . 
2R. De s c a r t e s , A d i s c o u r s e on method, London, 
New York 1912, pp.3-25 (esp. pp.8,16). 
'Ch. Perelman, The new r h e t o r i c and the 
humanities, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1979, p.13. 
r e l i e s concerning the concept of d i a l e c t i c a l 
reasoning on the Topics and the R h e t o r i c of 
A r i s t o t l e . ' But whereas A r i s t o t l e ' s methodology 
was meant to provide an approximation of the 
t r u t h s and to y i e l d p r o b a b i l i t i e s of the t r u t h , 
which were determined by the quest f o r c e r t a i n t y , 
Perelman makes argumentation the complement of 
formal l o g i c . He i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n c e r t a i n t y , 
but i n j o i n t a c t i v i t y and i t s r a t i o n a l i t y . 
Argumentation does not appeal to a s i n g l e t r u t h 
but to the adherence of an audience.' For the 
new r h e t o r i c i t i s not l o g i c which i s p r i o r , but 
the q u a l i t y of the audience, which may c o n s i s t of 
the s i n g l e i n t e r l o c u t o r , or an e l i t e audience, 
l i k e judges and p o l i t i c i a n s , or the u n i v e r s a l 
audience, namely "the whole of mankind, or at 
l e a s t , of a l l normal, adult persons". 5 I t i s the 
audience that decides whether to adopt a 
p e r s p e c t i v e or not. The new r h e t o r i c p r e s e n t s us 
with a method of organising and e v a l u a t i n g 
experience, because the speaker submits a 
proposal, that he has to j u s t i f y , to an audience 
which examines the proposal i n t r o d u c i n g i t s 
'which has to be seen i n c o n t r a s t to the 
understanding of d i a l e c t i c s i n the p h i l o s o p h i e s 
of Hegel and Marx. 
'cf. Perelman, The new r h e t o r i c and 
humanities (supra n.3), p.13-14. 
'cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, T r e a t i s e 
on argumentation (supra n . l ) , p.30-34. 
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knowledge and wisdom during the examination i n t o 
the d i s c o u r s e . Therefore the new r h e t o r i c i s 
a l s o c a l l e d a theory of p r a c t i c a l reasoning. 
Perelman c h a r a c t e r i z e s the way of reasoning i n 
morals as n e i t h e r deductive nor i n d u c t i v e , but 
j u s t i f i c a t i v e , as 
" i n morals absolute preeminence cannot 
be given e i t h e r to p r i n c i p l e s -which 
would make morals a deductive 
d i s c i p l i n e - or to the p a r t i c u l a r case 
- which would make i t an i n d u c t i v e 
d i s c i p l i n e . I nstead, judgements 
regarding p a r t i c u l a r s are compared with 
p r i n c i p l e s , and preference i s given to 
one or the other according to a 
d e c i s i o n that i s reached by r e s o r t i n g 
to the techniques of j u s t i f i c a t i o n and 
argumentation."' 
I n c o n t r a s t to Viehweg, Perelman presents us with 
a complete theory of argumentation. For the 
separate d i s c i p l i n e s he does not merely apply the 
general theory s e l e c t i v e l y to the d i v e r s e f i e l d s , 
but he works out s p e c i f i c arguments for each 
s p e c i a l d i s c u s s i o n (law, p o l i t i c s , m o r a l i t y e t c ) . 
Perelman's study of the f i e l d of j u s t i c e 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s a constant formal element and a 
va r y i n g m a t e r i a l element w i t h i n the complex 
s t r u c t u r e of a concept of j u s t i c e . The constant 
formal element i s the p r i n c i p l e that " l i k e 
persons be t r e a t e d a l i k e " . To determine what 
'Perelman, The new r h e t o r i c and humanities 
(supra n.3), p.33. 
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resemblances or d i f f e r e n c e s between human beings 
are to be regarded as r e l e v a n t , f u r t h e r slogans 
are supplemented, for i n s t a n c e : "To each 
according to h i s needs", "to each according to 
h i s merits", "to each according to h i s l e g a l 
e n t i t l e m e n t " . 1 These are d i f f e r e n t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (need, merit, e t c . ) to s p e c i f y 
' l i k e n e s s * . As there may a r i s e disagreement 
concerning the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n d i f f e r e n t 
s i t u a t i o n s or s u b j e c t matters, which w i l l r e s u l t 
i n d i f f e r e n t formulae of j u s t i c e l i k e the above 
slogans, the formal element of l i k e n e s s may 
c o n t a i n varying m a t e r i a l c r i t e r i a f o r i t s 
a p p l i c a t i o n . 
I n an e a r l y essay Perelman takes the view that 
such disagreements cannot be r e s o l v e d by means of 
reasoning, but only with the help of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of value which are n e c e s s a r i l y 
a r b i t r a r y . ' 
I n h i s l a t e r work he changes t h i s view, which i s 
s t i l l based on the C a r t e s i a n t r a d i t i o n of reason 
and reasoning, and points out that disagreement 
'Ch. Perelman, The idea of j u s t i c e and the 
problem of argument, London 1963, p.7. 
' i b i d . , p. 58 - the essay 'Concerning J u s t i c e ' 
(pp.1-60) o r i g i n a l l y appeared as 'De l a j u s t i c e ' 
i n 1945. 
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over values may a l s o be s u b j e c t to reasoning i n 
the form of d i a l e c t i c a l argumentation. The 
purpose of t h i s argumentation i s to o b t a i n or 
i n t e n s i f y the adherence of an audience to theses 
given to them for t h e i r approval. For the judge, 
t h i s audience i s made up by the p a r t i e s , s u p e r i o r 
c o u r t s , and enlightened p u b l i c opinion. 1 0 
Perelman co n s i d e r s i t to be p e c u l i a r t o the 
d i a l e c t i c a l method that the theses t e s t e d and the 
c o n c l u s i o n s adopted are n e i t h e r obvious nor 
f a n c i f u l , but represent opinions considered, i n 
a given m i l i e u , as the soundest. T h i s aspect of 
d i a l e c t i c a l argumentation, he c l a i m s , enables one 
to regard the i n t e r l o c u t o r s i n t h i s k i nd of 
dialogue as not merely expounding t h e i r own point 
of view, but as expressing the 'reasonable' 
opinion of t h e i r s o c i e t y . 1 1 
Thus, one may say that the judge seeks to appeal 
to common sense i n the meaning of the g e n e r a l 
sense of a community, when he j u s t i f i e s a 
d e c i s i o n that i s based on value judgements, i n 
order to obtain acceptance of h i s d e c i s i o n by the 
audience. 
l'Ch. Perelman, J u s t i c e , law and argument, 
Dordrecht, Boston, London 1980, p.151. 
uidem., The idea of j u s t i c e (supra n.8), 
p.167. 
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I n comparison with Viehweg one may f i n d that 
Perelman pays grea t e r a t t e n t i o n to the 
d i a l e c t i c a l t r a i t of h i s theory and therefore to 
the r o l e of i n t e r l o c u t o r and audience, whereas 
Viehweg a l s o r e l i e s on the C i c e r o n i a n Topics and 
i d e n t i f i e s t o p i c s with a method of problem 
thinking, which leads him to the aspect of 
f i n d i n g premises and the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l the 
r e l e v a n t viewpoints. 
4.2 J u l i u s Stone's concept of law and l o g i c and 
the leeways of l e g a l reasoning 
A f t e r a thorough r e s e a r c h of precedent and of the 
system of s t a r e d e c i s i s , J u l i u s Stone comes to 
the conclusion that the l a w - f i n d i n g process 
cannot dispense with l o g i c . 1 1 He uses the word 
l o g i c i n the sense of formal l o g i c which i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y concerned with the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
drawing conclusions as i n f e r e n c e s from c e r t a i n 
kinds of premises." 
Stone points out that a l e g a l d e c i s i o n can be 
made by means of l o g i c when there i s only one 
conclusion of law for a p a r t i c u l a r case compelled 
by a precedent that e x a c t l y covers the case i n 
" J . Stone, The province and f u n c t i o n of law, 
Sydney 1946, p .145-146; and Legal system and 
lawyers' reasonings, London 1964, p.332-333. 
l ,idem. , Legal system, p.302. 
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question within the operation of s t a r e d e c i s i s . 
So, i f one has the premise (e.g. i n a precedent) 
' A l l A i s B" and F (the i n s t a n t f a c t s i t u a t i o n ) 
i s l i k e A, the compelled c o n c l u s i o n i s that 'F i s 
B* . 
But, according to Stone, l o g i c cannot solve every 
case, because i t f r e q u e n t l y l e a v e s leeways for 
j u d i c i a l choice w i t h i n the common law system of 
precedent. A leeway l e f t open by l o g i c may be 
i l l u s t r a t e d as f o l l o w s : 1 4 Two s y l l o g i s m s are 
a v a i l a b l e . One has the premise ' A l l P i s X* and 
the other ' A l l Q i s Y'. F (the i n s t a n t f a c t 
s i t u a t i o n ) i s l i k e P i n that both have q u a l i t i e s 
a and b; but F a l s o d i f f e r s from P, i n that i t 
a l s o has q u a l i t i e s d and e, which P does not 
have. F i s l i k e Q i n that both have the 
q u a l i t i e s d and e, but F a l s o d i f f e r s from Q 
because i t a l s o has q u a l i t i e s a and b which Q 
does not have. As there i s no s y l l o g i s m i n 
i t s e l f compelled by l o g i c f o r the s o l u t i o n of the 
case, the choice between the two o f f e r i n g 
s y l l o g i s m s w i l l determine whether the c o r r e c t 
conclusion i s that 'F i s X' or t h a t 'F i s Y'. 
l 4Stone, Legal system (supra n.12) gives 
s i m i l a r examples on p.299. 
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The main sources from which, according to Stone, 
the leeways fo r j u d i c i a l choice a r i s e , are the 
nature of terms used i n r u l e s ; competing methods 
of seeking the r a t i o decidendi of a case; 
competing v e r s i o n s of the r a t i o decidendi of a 
p a r t i c u l a r case when s e v e r a l judgements are 
given; and choices a r i s i n g from the i n t e r p l a y of 
the above sources. 1 5 These sources concern only 
the choice of premises from w i t h i n the body of 
e x i s t i n g l e g a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . They i n d i c a t e cases 
of disputed law. F u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s emerge 
where there are no p r o p o s i t i o n s a v a i l a b l e . " 
Stone's sources of the leeways fo r j u d i c i a l 
choice are p a r t i c u l a r l y aimed at the system of 
precedent and the r u l e of s t a r e d e c i s i s , but they 
may be compared with and are a l s o included i n the 
groups of cases which Viehweg's points of entry 
of the t o p i c s i n t o l e g a l orders describe. 1' 
Thus, the j u d i c i a l c h o i c e occurs i n every l e g a l 
system, no matter i f c o d i f i e d or based on 
"Stone, Legal system (supra n.12), p.275. 
l 6 c f . idem.. Precedent and law, Sydney 1985, 
pp.28-30. 
"these points i n c l u d e : the process of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the use of common language e t c . , 
see s e c t i o n 3.2 at p.27 and the comparison with 
notions of hard c a s e s i n E n g l i s h l e g a l theory 
under s e c t i o n 6.6 below at p. 121. 
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precedent. From t h i s the question a r i s e s as to 
which c r i t e r i a and phenomena determine the choice 
l e f t open by l o g i c . Stone argues t h a t along with 
l e g a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , the 'non-legal' m a t e r i a l s , 
such as the question of j u s t i c e , s o c i a l 
phenomena, and p u b l i c p o l i c y , become processed 
i n t o l e g a l judgement. 1 1 He acknowledges that f o r 
t h i s kind of d e c i s i o n j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and new 
r h e t o r i c are of importance and t h a t j u d i c i a l 
reasoning proceeds t o p i c a l l y i n those cases. 1' 
One may say that concerning the r e l a t i o n between 
l o g i c and j u r i s t i c t o p i c s i n l e g a l operations 
Stone's p o s i t i o n i s s i m i l a r to Perelman's theory 
i n the way that the l a t t e r regards d i a l e c t i c a l 
reasoning as complement of formal l o g i c , where a 
s o l u t i o n or an agreement cannot be reached by 
means of demonstration. I t a l s o c o i n c i d e s with 
Viehweg's idea that the t o p i c s are only of use 
where, there i s a problem t h a t a l l o w s more than 
one p o s s i b l e answer." When, according to Stone, 
a conclusion i s compelled by l o g i c , there i s only 
one answer and no problem can a r i s e , so that the 
t o p i c s are i n a p p l i c a b l e i n such a case. 
l ,Stone, Legal system (supra n.12), p.325-
326. 
" i b i d . , p.333 and Precedent (supra n.16), 
pp.100-103. 
"see under s e c t i o n 3.1 (at p. 20.) 
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Furthermore, Stone's observation that elements of 
j u s t i c e and s o c i a l l i f e become processed i n t o 
l e g a l judgement i n cases of disputed law by means 
of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s matches with Josef E s s e r ' s 
a n a l y s i s of the t o p i c s . 1 1 
4.3 C r i t i c i s m and weaknesses of the t o p i c s i n 
the eyes of Anglo-American j u r i s t s 
Besides Stone a number of Anglo-American j u r i s t s 
has accepted the r o l e of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and the 
new r h e t o r i c to e x p l a i n d e c i s i o n making." 
However, they contend that the t o p i c s are only 
capable of e x p l a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s a f t e r they have 
been made, so t h a t they convey 'wisdom' only by 
hindsight, while they are incapable of guiding 
the judge f o r a f u t u r e d e c i s i o n . " 
The guide the t o p i c s were meant to present are 
catalogues of topoi and the general opinion or 
the consensus of the wise, but as j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
"see under s e c t i o n 3.4 (at p . 3 5 ) . 
"e.g. E. Bodenheimer, A neglected theory of 
l e g a l reasoning (1969)21 Journal of Legal 
Education 373 (at pp.381ff.); M. Rhe i n s t e i n , book 
review (1954)3 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 597; H.E. Yntema, Legal s c i e n c e and n a t u r a l 
law; apropos of Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz 
(1960)2 Inter-American Law Review 207. 
" c f . Stone, Legal system (supra n.12), 
pp.335-336 and Precedent (supra n.16), pp.104-
106; and R h e i n s t e i n , op. c i t . supra n.22, p.598. 
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do not provide any method of f i n d i n g out the 
r e l e v a n t topoi and the opinions that are 
g e n e r a l l y accepted or d i s t i n g u i s h them from 
i r r e l e v a n t topoi and other opinions, t h i s 
d i r e c t i v e for a f u t u r e d e c i s i o n f a i l s to f u l f i l 
i t s task i n the eyes of these c r i t i c s . " Another 
c r i t i c i s m r a i s e d by the German t o p i c s debate goes 
a step f u r t h e r than t h i s : i t e l u c i d a t e s not only 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the t o p i c s i n d i s c o v e r i n g 
g e n e r a l l y accepted opinions, but a l s o points out 
the i n a b i l i t y of reaching a d e c i s i o n where there 
i s no consensus i n the s o c i e t y at a l l about 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l questions or v a l u e s . " 
Those Anglo-American authors who pay a t t e n t i o n to 
Viehweg's j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and Perelman's new 
r h e t o r i c do not approve of the means provided by 
the t o p i c s as being u s e f u l and s u f f i c i e n t 
guidance fo r the judge i n h i s choice of premises. 
Even where j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and the new r h e t o r i c 
as a methodology of l e g a l reasoning seem to 
contain elements of m a t e r i a l law concerning the 
v a l i d i t y of premises (although the r o l e of the 
"Bodenheimer, op. c i t . supra n.22, at 
pp.391-394 seems to c o n s i d e r the judge apt enough 
to f i n d out the r e l e v a n t topoi and the general 
opinion. 
" c f . E.W. Bockenf orde, Die Methoden der 
V e r f a s s u n g s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (1976) Neue J u r i s t i s c h e 
Wochenschrift 2089; at p.2094. 
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i n t e r l o c u t o r has never been thoroughly c l a r i f i e d 
by the adherents of the t o p i c s ) , these elements 
are not accepted as normative, but only as 
d e s c r i p t i v e . " 
One may conclude that i n a d d i t i o n to the t o p i c s 
debate i n Germany, j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and new 
r h e t o r i c have been acknowledged as a d e s c r i p t i v e 
theory about l e g a l reasoning a l s o i n Anglo-
American law. But i n general i t i s denied that 
they f u l f i l any normative t a s k s . 
Therefore, the guide for a future d e c i s i o n has to 
be taken from t h e o r i e s about the concept of law 
and the j u d i c i a l r o l e , which t h i s t h e s i s w i l l 
d eal with l a t e r on (under Chapter 8 ) . J u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s as a theory of l e g a l thought do not aim at 
providing a guide for m a t e r i a l j u s t i c e , but a 
methodology of l e g a l reasoning. T h i s confirms 
that the t o p i c s are c o n s i s t e n t with s e v e r a l 
d i f f e r e n t concepts of law, which may determine 
, 6 c f . Stone, Legal system (supra n.12), p.336 
r e p r e s e n t i n g the Common Law system and see a l s o 
E. Kramer, Topik und Rechtsvergleichung (1969)33 
Rabels Z e i t s c h r i f t fur a u s l a n d i s c h e s und 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l e s P r i v a t r e c h t 1 a t p.12 and 16 f o r 
the same opinion but representing the C i v i l Law 
systems. Although Viehweg's t r e a t i s e makes 
f u r t h e r normative demands on i s s u e s of l e g a l 
reasoning ( i . e . that i t must be problem 
o r i e n t a t e d - c f . s e c t i o n 3.2 at p.28-30)this does 
not a f f e c t the l a c k of normative guidance 
concerning the question of the v a l i d i t y of r u l e s 
and the question of j u s t i c e . 
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the question of j u s t i c e , and t h a t they do n e i t h e r 
belong to nor are derived from t h e o r i e s l i k e 
l e g a l p o s i t i v i s m or n a t u r a l law." 
"see concerning the openness of the t o p i c s 
M. K r i e l e , Theorie der Rechtsqewinnunq, 2nd. ed., 
B e r l i n 1976, p.150; t h i s i s s u e i s f u r t h e r 
d i s c u s s e d under s e c t i o n 9.3 at p.196. 
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5 Problem t h i n k i n g i n E n g l i s h Law 
After the p r e s e n t a t i o n of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and 
t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l background the 
t h e s i s w i l l look a t E n g l i s h l e g a l theory from the 
viewpoint of the three main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s . As has already been i n d i c a t e d 1 
we w i l l not concentrate on the f i r s t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of problem thinking as opposed to 
system t h i n k i n g i n general, but we w i l l only give 
a b r i e f survey of the main i m p l i c a t i o n s connected 
to t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s . 
F i r s t l y , we w i l l look at the t r a d i t i o n a l view of 
the d i f f e r e n c e s between common law and c i v i l law 
l e g a l thought which to a c e r t a i n extent 
i d e n t i f i e s the former with problem t h i n k i n g and 
regards the l a t t e r as s y s t e m a t i c a l (under s e c t i o n 
5.1) . 
Secondly, we w i l l deal with problem t h i n k i n g as 
an attempt to do j u s t i c e i n the p a r t i c u l a r case 
i n c o n t r a s t to a concept of j u s t i c e according to 
r u l e s , and we w i l l examine whether there are 
s i m i l a r trends i n common law l e g a l thought (under 
s e c t i o n 5.2). 
'under s e c t i o n 3.6 at p.49. 
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5.1 The t r a d i t i o n a l view of l e g a l reasoning i n 
common law and c i v i l law 
As has been s t a t e d 1 Josef E s s e r , who i s one of 
the main exponents of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s besides 
Viehweg, i d e n t i f i e s ' problem t h i n k i n g with an 
i n d u c t i v e method of reasoning which proceeds 
s i m i l a r l y to Anglo-American case law. Moreover, 
he regards the c o n t i n e n t a l codes as t y p i f y i n g 
'closed' l e g a l systems and the common law systems 
as t y p i f y i n g 'open' l e g a l systems. The same 
suggestion i s made by common law j u r i s t s who 
argue that the common law i s more topoi -
o r i e n t a t e d than the c i v i l law.' 
T h i s i m p l i e s that contrary to c i v i l i a n systems 
common law l e g a l thought s t a r t s from the problem 
r a t h e r than from the r u l e of law and thus h e l p s 
to c o n s i d e r a l l the r e l e v a n t aspects of a problem 
or at l e a s t more aspects than a c i v i l law l e g a l 
order. 
These statements correspond with the t r a d i t i o n a l 
view of the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c i v i l i a n system 
and a common law system as one between 
'under s e c t i o n 3.4 at p. 34. 
'cf. I . Tammelo, On the l o g i c a l openness of 
l e g a l orders (1959)8 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 187, and J . Stone, Legal system 
and lawyers' reasonings, London 1964 at p.332. 
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r a t i o n a l i s m and empiricism or between deduction 
and i n d u c t i o n . I t i s alleged that the 
" c i v i l i a n n a t u r a l l y reasons from 
p r i n c i p l e s to in s t a n c e s , the common 
lawyer from inst a n c e s to p r i n c i p l e s . 
The c i v i l i a n puts h i s f a i t h i n 
s y l l o g i s m s , the common lawyer i n 
precedents; the f i r s t s i l e n t l y asking 
himself as each new problem a r i s e s , 
'What should we do t h i s time?' and the 
second asking aloud i n the same 
s i t u a t i o n , 'What did we do l a s t time?' 
The c i v i l i a n t h i n k s i n terms of r i g h t s 
and d u t i e s , the common lawyer i n terms 
of remedies."' 
Reasoning from i n s t a n c e s to p r i n c i p l e s and the 
c o u r t s ' method of e x t r a c t i n g a r u l e from past 
cases i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to as i n d u c t i v e 
reasoning i n c o n t r a s t to the deductive 
a p p l i c a t i o n of such a r u l e to the case i n hand: 
"The Anglo-American judge s t a r t s h i s 
process of d e c i s i o n with the i n d i v i d u a l 
precedents which counsel for the 
p a r t i e s before him have adduced as 
being most i n point. I n these 
precedents he recognises c e r t a i n 
' r u l e s ' , t h a t i s s o l u t i o n s of concrete 
l i v i n g problems. He observes how these 
' r u l e s ' have been l i m i t e d , extended and 
r e f i n e d by other 'precedents' and then 
c o n s t a n t l y keeping the p r a c t i c a l 
problems i n the fo r e f r o n t of h i s mind, 
g r a d u a l l y draws out of them h i g h - l e v e l 
' p r i n c i p l e s ' and 'standards' which he 
uses to make a t e n t a t i v e r e s o l u t i o n of 
the case before him; t h i s s o l u t i o n he 
then t e s t s f or i t s appropriateness 
a g a i n s t the background of s i m i l a r cases 
and f i n a l l y a r r i v e s at the d e c i s i o n 
i t s e l f . . . T h i s i n d u c t i v e way of 
th i n k i n g , based on the p a r t i c u l a r 
f a c t u a l problem of the case, and the 
i n t e n s i v e treatment of precedents 
4T.M. Cooper, The common and the c i v i l law 
- a Scot's view (1950)63 Harvard Law Review 468 
at p.471. 
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a s s o c i a t e d with i t are not to be found 
i n c o n t i n e n t a l law, at any r a t e not to 
anything l i k e the same extent." 5 
Besides the conventional accounts which speak of 
the e x t r a c t i o n of general r u l e s from precedents 
some l e g a l w r i t e r s claim that the kind of 
reasoning involved i n the use of precedents i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y reasoning from case to case by 
example: a court decides the present case i n the 
same way as a past case i f the l a t t e r 
' s u f f i c i e n t l y ' resembles the former i n ' r e l e v a n t ' 
r e s p e c t s , and thus makes use of the p a s t case as 
a precedent without f i r s t e x t r a c t i n g from i t and 
formulating any general r u l e . ' Hence i t i s 
argued that l e g a l reasoning n e i t h e r proceeds i n 
v e r t i c a l deductions nor i n i n d u c t i o n s , but 
' h o r i z o n t a l l y extensive' from i n s t a n c e s to 
i n s t a n c e s as " i t i s a matter of the cumulative 
e f f e c t of s e v e r a l independent premises, not of 
the repeated transformation of one or two."' 
T h i s a n a l y s i s comes c l o s e to Perelman's account 
5K. Zweigert and H. K8tz, An i n t r o d u c t i o n to 
comparative law. Vol. I , The framework, 
Amsterdam, New York, Oxford 1977, p.267. 
'see f o r the c o n t r a s t between i n d u c t i o n and 
reasoning by example, H.L.A. Hart, Problems of 
the philosophy of law, i n : E s s a y s i n 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e and philosophy, Oxford 1983 (Essay 
3, pp.88ff.) at pp.98ff., esp. p.102. 
7 J . Wisdom, Gods, from Proc. A r i s t . Soc. 
(1944), e x t r a c t s r e p r i n t e d i n : Lord Lloyd of 
Hampstead and M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd's 
i n t r o d u c t i o n to jurisprudence, 5th. ed., London 
1985, pp.H89ff. 
which c l a i m s that reasoning i n morals i s n e i t h e r 
deductive nor inductive but j u s t i f i c a t i v e . 8 
However, we w i l l not concentrate on the question 
whether l e g a l reasoning i n the common law and i n 
the c i v i l law proceeds d e d u c t i v e l y , i n d u c t i v e l y , 
or i n some way which i s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t . 
What we have presented as the t r a d i t i o n a l view of 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c i v i l i a n and a common 
law system a p p l i e s only to a minority of c a s e s 
because the great majority of contemporary 
d e c i s i o n s i n common law as w e l l as c i v i l law 
c o u n t r i e s i s concerned with the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
s t a t u t e s i n s t e a d of precedents. 5 
Furthermore, the equation of c i v i l law with 
system t h i n k i n g and common law with problem 
t h i n k i n g and the inherent d i f f e r e n c e s between 
both l e g a l f a m i l i e s are s a i d to be di m i n i s h i n g 
more and more. I n the subsequent d i s c u s s i o n of 
h i s t h e s i s E s s e r a l s o minimizes the d i f f e r e n c e by 
po i n t i n g out the extent to which the two systems 
have departed from t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e premises. 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of c o n t i n e n t a l codes, with 
the help of general c l a u s e s , p r i n c i p l e s of equ i t y 
'see under s e c t i o n 4.1 at p.56. 
'c f . W. Friedmann, Legal philosophy and 
j u d i c i a l lawmaking (1961)61 Columbia Law Review 
821, a t p.831. 
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or p u b l i c p o l i c y , and other d e v i c e s of openness, 
have moved f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r away from the 
axiomatic s t r u c t u r e of a given precept to the 
s o l u t i o n of new l e g a l problems. Moreover, i n 
c o n t i n e n t a l law d e c i s i o n s of higher c o u r t s often 
have the same e f f e c t as precedents, and, f o r 
example, i n German law cases are r e g u l a r l y c i t e d 
and considered i n judgements of higher c o u r t s , 
although the search here i s not for precedent but 
fo r examples." 
The common law systems, on the other hand, have 
proceeded from the d e c i s i o n of l e g a l questions on 
a case-by-case method conditioned by the e a r l i e r 
predominance of forms of a c t i o n , to the 
el a b o r a t i o n of general p r i n c i p l e s . I t a l s o 
happens q u i t e frequently that a common law court, 
i n s t e a d of undertaking a c a r e f u l comparison of 
f a c t s i t u a t i o n s f o r purposes of determining the 
analogous a p p l i c a t i o n of a precedent, s e i z e s upon 
the statement of a formulated r u l e i n a past 
d e c i s i o n and uses t h i s r u l e i n the case at hand 
by a process of deductive argumentation. 1 1 Hence, 
on the one hand the c o d i f i e d c i v i l law systems 
" c f . P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and theory i n 
E n g l i s h law, London 1987, at p.30. 
u c f . E. Bodenheimer, A neg l e c t e d theory of 
l e g a l reasoning (1969)21 J o u r n a l of Legal 
Education 373, a t p.374, and Hart, op. c i t . supra 
n.6, p.99. 
provide means to take e x t r a - s y s t e m a t i c a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t o account. On the other hand 
i n the common law system the i n s i s t e n c e on 
f o l l o w i n g a r u l e e x t r a c t e d from precedent may 
t h r e a t e n to exclude reasoned arguments t h a t might 
otherwise have been taken i n t o account, which i s 
an e f f e c t the c o d i f i e d systems u s u a l l y have been 
accused of producing. 
Thus, there are not n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
the degree of problem t h i n k i n g and system 
t h i n k i n g between the two l e g a l f a m i l i e s i n every 
case and o c c a s i o n a l l y they employ very s i m i l a r 
techniques i n the process of a d j u d i c a t i o n . 1 1 
5.2 The c o n f l i c t between j u s t i c e a c cording to 
r u l e s and j u s t i c e i n the p a r t i c u l a r case 
As we have seen i n the preceding chapter d e a l i n g 
with the presentation of the t o p i c s , the t o p i c a l 
procedure i s of importance where there i s not 
only one c l e a r and unanimous answer to a 
question, but where there i s a problem t h a t has 
to be r e s o l v e d . 
The a p p l i c a b i l i t y of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s depends to 
a g r e a t extent on the understanding of a problem, 
and we may d i s t i n g u i s h between two v e r s i o n s of 
"see i n support of t h i s argument, Friedmann, 
op. c i t . supra n.9, pp.828 and 829. 
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j u r i s t i c t o p i c s which depend on d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of what a problem i s . 
On the one hand Viehweg equates j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
with an unlimited technique of problem t h i n k i n g . 
He argues that i n order to s e r v e the 'basic 
aporia' which i s the continuous quest f o r j u s t i c e 
i n the p a r t i c u l a r case 1 1 every case ought to be 
t r e a t e d as a problem and r e s o l v e d by means of 
t o p i c a l reasoning. T h i s normative v e r s i o n of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s r e s u l t s i n l i m i t l e s s j u d i c i a l 
c r e a t i v i t y and continuous norm c r e a t i o n , as l e g a l 
norms and r u l e s are regarded as g u i d e l i n e s , that 
i s as non-binding topoi. On the other hand 
Viehweg concedes that l e g a l reasoning does not 
proceed i n an e n t i r e l y t o p i c a l f a s h i o n , but that 
one may a l s o f i n d l o g i c a l deductions from 
a v a i l a b l e l e g a l p r o p o s i t i o n s i n a l e g a l order. 
T h i s , r a t h e r d e s c r i p t i v e , account of l e g a l 
reasoning r e s u l t s i n a r e s t r i c t e d understanding 
of a problem. According to t h i s understanding, 
a problem occurs only where t h e r e are no premises 
a v a i l a b l e for the s o l u t i o n of a case, so that the 
t o p i c a l procedure i s only a p p l i c a b l e i n such hard 
cases. 1 4 
"Th. Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz, 5th. 
ed., Munich 1974, p.96. 
"see under Chapter 6 below where t h i s i s s u e 
i s examined f u r t h e r . 
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The d i f f e r e n c e s between problem t h i n k i n g and 
system thinking may be c l a r i f i e d f u r t h e r by 
r e f e r e n c e to Hans Kelsen's examination of the 
i s s u e . Kelsen argues that the p r i n c i p l e of 
binding d e c i s i o n s of concrete c a s e s by general 
norms that are to be c r e a t e d beforehand by a 
c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t i v e organ, r e p r e s e n t s the 
p r i n c i p l e of a s t a t e governed by law, the 
R e c h t s s t a a t T h i s system i n c o r p o r a t e s the 
p r i n c i p l e of l e g a l s e c u r i t y , which i s l e g a l 
c e r t a i n t y . He points out t h a t i n d i r e c t 
opposition to t h i s system i s the one w i t h i n which 
no c e n t r a l l e g i s l a t i v e organ e x i s t s at a l l , but 
judges and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s decide 
i n d i v i d u a l cases according to t h e i r own f r e e 
d i s c r e t i o n . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of such a system 
i s the assumption that no case i s e x a c t l y l i k e 
any other case, and t h a t t h e r e f o r e the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of general norms, which predetermine 
the j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n or the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
decree and thus prevent the r e s p e c t i v e organs 
from doing j u s t i c e to the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the 
i n d i v i d u a l case, may lead to u n d e s i r a b l e r e s u l t s . 
He c a l l s such a system 'free j u r i s d i c t i o n ' ( f r e i e 
Rechtsfindunq): 
l5H. Kelsen, Pure theory of law, Berkeley 
1967, p.252. 
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"Free j u r i s d i c t i o n that guarantees 
f l e x i b i l i t y of the law i s often 
demanded i n the name of j u s t i c e - a 
j u s t i c e presupposed to be absolute. 
'Just' i n t h i s sense i s s a i d to be the 
d e c i s i o n of a concrete case only i f i t 
takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l l 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the case. But s i n c e 
no case i s e x a c t l y l i k e any other, the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of a general norm to a 
concrete case can never - so i t i s s a i d 
- lead to a j u s t d e c i s i o n . For a 
general norm n e c e s s a r i l y presupposes 
s i m i l a r c a s e s , which i n r e a l i t y do not 
e x i s t . Therefore a l l law must have 
i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r only, and the 
d e c i s i o n of concrete cases must not be 
bound by general norms."1' 
While the system of f r e e d i s c r e t i o n has the 
advantage of f l e x i b i l i t y , i t has the disadvantage 
of l a c k i n g l e g a l s e c u r i t y and f o r e s e e a b i l i t y of 
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s . 
However, although the t o p i c a l method may be 
capable of s o l v i n g a case without having recourse 
to p r e - e x i s t i n g general norms, j u r i s t i c t o p i c s do 
not object to the e x i s t e n c e of a c e n t r a l 
l e g i s l a t i v e organ, so that they cannot be equated 
with a system of f r e e j u r i s d i c t i o n . Moreover, 
the t o p i c s would t r e a t the p r i n c i p l e s of 
f l e x i b i l i t y and l e g a l s e c u r i t y as persuasive and 
strong topoi which have to be weighed. Therefore 
one may say that t r e a t i n g l e g a l r u l e s as non-
binding topoi, the t o p i c a l approach aims at 
s h i f t i n g absolute a u t h o r i t y from r u l e s to a more 
" i b i d . , p.252. 
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f l e x i b l e treatment of a case without n e c e s s a r i l y 
ignoring the e x i s t e n c e of r u l e s . 
The t o p i c a l understanding of l e g a l r u l e s comes 
cl o s e to the c l a i m of some ' r u l e - s c e p t i c s * among 
the American r e a l i s t s that a case can hardly be 
determined by l e g a l r u l e s before a court a c t u a l l y 
decides the case. 1' But American r e a l i s t s only 
deal with the question of what for c e norms 
a c t u a l l y have according to t h e i r a n a l y s i s , 
whereas the normative account of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
p r e s c r i b e s that r u l e s ought to be t r e a t e d as 
topoi. Moreover, r e a l i s t w r i t e r s have described 
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s as v o l i t i o n a l and as being 
i n t u i t e d by the 'hunch' which suggests to the 
judge what i s r i g h t or wrong f o r the s p e c i a l 
cause. 1 1 I n c o n t r a s t to that j u r i s t i c t o p i c s aim 
to provide f a c t o r s of r a t i o n a l i t y i n j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n employing the notion of the 
i n t e r l o c u t o r . 1 ' 
" c f . O.W. Holmes, The path of the law 
(1897)10 Harvard Law Review 457, and J.C. Gray, 
The nature and sources of the law. New York 1909 
at p.101 ( s e c . 231). 
" c f . J.C. Hutcheson, The judgement 
i n t u i t i v e : the function of the 'hunch' i n 
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n (1929)14 C o r n e l l Law Quarterly 
274, at p.285. 
"see fo r the f u r t h e r examination of t h i s 
aspect of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s under Chapter 8. 
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But as both, the adherents of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and 
the American r e a l i s t s , are r u l e - s c e p t i c s , they 
face the same c r i t i c i s m . I t i s s a i d that f o r a 
system of law without r u l e s to work, the s o c i e t y 
would have to be very d i f f e r e n t from modern 
i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . And such a system would at 
l e a s t r e q u i r e r u l e s which enable persons to 
determine who the decision-makers of the s o c i e t y 
are, and which of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s are to count 
as d e c i s i o n making:" 
"The most d e v o t e d A m e r i c a n 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t must acknowledge some 
f i x e d datum p o i n t s , some firm r u l e s , i f 
every d e c i s i o n i s not to open up a l l 
p o l i t i c a l theory and philosophy f o r 
d i s c u s s i o n , indeed, i f there i s to be 
a r u l e of law at a l l . No judge i s i n 
the p o s i t i o n of being able to redesign 
the u n i v e r s e ; every search f o r a 
p r i n c i p l e or p o l i c y must take f o r 
granted c e r t a i n assumptions which are 
not, i n t h i s case, and on t h i s 
occasion, up f o r d i s c u s s i o n . " " 
I n E n g l i s h law the aspect of problem t h i n k i n g has 
often found e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e o r i e s or procedures 
of equity. According to some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of 
the h i s t o r y of e q u i t y the equitable procedure 
before the Court of Chancery was such a s p e c i a l 
procedure where the formal r u l e s of proof used i n 
the r o y a l c o u r t s d i d not apply and i n which the 
Chancellor t r i e d to d i s c o v e r whether, as the 
" c f . P.S. A t i y a h and R. Summers, Form and 
substance i n Anglo-American law, Oxford 1987, 
p.70. 
" i b i d . , p.71. 
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p e t i t i o n e r claimed, the defendant had behaved i n 
a way which was c o n t r a r y to morals and good 
conscience. Throughout the f i f t e e n t h century the 
Chancellor decided more or l e s s according to h i s 
preferences and h i s d i s c r e t i o n . During the 
s i x t e e n t h century e q u i t y j u r i s d i c t i o n began to 
follow the model of the common law and developed 
r u l e s and d o c t r i n e s and i n the eighteenth century 
the Court of Chancery was as bound by i t s 
d e c i s i o n s as the judges of the common law c o u r t s . 
I n order to s i m p l i f y the law, the common law and 
the equity procedure were therefore u n i f i e d i n 
the J u d i c a t u r e Act, 1873." 
So what had s t a r t e d i n the fourteenth century as 
an exceptional procedure which was e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t from the ordinary l e g a l procedure, 
departed from i t s o r i g i n s i n the course of 
h i s t o r y and t h e r e f o r e a l s o from i t s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r e a l i z i n g j u s t i c e i n the 
p a r t i c u l a r case by means of co n s i d e r i n g a l l 
r e l e v a n t aspects of that c a s e . " 
"For an o u t l i n e of the h i s t o r y of equity see 
H. Potter and A.K.R. K i r a l f y , H i s t o r i c a l 
i n t r o d u c t i o n to E n g l i s h law and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
4th. ed., London 1958, pp.569ff; and K.Zweigert 
and H. Kotz, op. c i t . supra n.5, pp.196-200. 
"see for f u r t h e r t h e o r i e s of equity: R. 
Wasserstrom, The j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n , Stanford, 
London 1961; Wasserstrom i s not an adherent of 
the equitable procedure but of a s o - c a l l e d 'two-
l e v e l procedure' of j u s t i f i c a t i o n which embodies 
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In contemporary w r i t i n g the tension between 
doing j u s t i c e i n the p a r t i c u l a r case and j u s t i c e 
according to r u l e s i s sometimes d e s c r i b e d as the 
c o n f l i c t between ' p r i n c i p l e s and pragmatism' 
Atiyah s t i p u l a t e s that a d e c i s i o n on p r i n c i p l e , 
i s a d e c i s i o n determined by the 'hortatory' 
e f f e c t which the court wishes i t s d e c i s i o n to 
have i n the f u t u r e , whereas a pragmatic d e c i s i o n 
i s a d e c i s i o n designed to achieve j u s t i c e i n the 
p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of the case, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of the p o s s i b l e impact of the 
d e c i s i o n i n the f u t u r e . " His t h e s i s i s that by 
1875 the extent of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n the 
E n g l i s h l e g a l system had reached i t s lowest ebb, 
and that the contemporary trend i n l e g a l 
decision-making i s one from p r i n c i p l e s to 
pragmatism. Atiyah r e j e c t s the trend towards 
pragmatism as incompatible with the s u r v i v a l of 
a t t r i b u t e s of both, the procedure of precedent 
and of e q u i t y . 
" c f . P.S. Atiyah, From p r i n c i p l e s to 
pragmatism, Oxford 1978; and see a l s o the 
c r i t i c i s m of t h i s t h e s i s by J . Stone, From 
p r i n c i p l e s to p r i n c i p l e s (1981)97 Law Q u a r t e r l y 
Review 224. 
" A t i y a h , From p r i n c i p l e s (supra n.24), p.5; 
however, the term 'pragmatism' i s not used 
homogeneously: R. Dworkin, Law's empire, 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1986 at p.95 c h a r a c t e r i z e s 
pragmatism as the theory that claims that judges 
should not consider themselves to be r e s t r a i n e d 
by p a s t d e c i s i o n , but must decide always i n the 
best i n t e r e s t s of the community's f u t u r e . 
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any r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s and with the g e n e r a l i t y 
and u n i v e r s a l i t y which the nature of law seems to 
r e q u i r e , and he argues that t h i s trend towards 
' i n d i v i d u a l i z e d j u s t i c e ' and abandonment of r u l e s 
undermines the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n and moral 
a u t h o r i t y of the judges and c a s t s doubt upon the 
l e g i t i m a c y of the j u d i c i a l r o l e . " 
A t iyah's a n a l y s i s y i e l d s the r e s u l t that c o n t r a r y 
to l e g a l reasoning as i t was about a century ago 
there i s a contemporary tendency towards problem 
t h i n k i n g i n E n g l i s h l e g a l thought. 
However, h i s t h e s i s has not been accepted by 
Stone who regards the i s s u e i n question not as a 
dichotomy of problem t h i n k i n g and system 
t h i n k i n g , or c e r t a i n t y and j u s t i c e . I n s t e a d , he 
claims that d e c i s i o n s which defy r u l e s a p p l i c a b l e 
to the circumstances of the p a r t i c u l a r case i n 
order to y i e l d a j u s t r e s u l t are not generated by 
pragmatism but by other c o n f l i c t i n g ( r u l e - ) 
p r i n c i p l e s . Thus, according to Stone, the i s s u e 
i n question i s a c o n f l i c t of e s t a b l i s h e d ( r u l e - ) 
p r i n c i p l e s favouring one s e t of claimants with 
other ( r u l e - ) p r i n c i p l e s a s s e r t e d by those 
" A t i y a h , From p r i n c i p l e s (supra n.24), pp.29 
and 30. 
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d i s s a t i s f i e d with the s t a t u s quo." Stone 
s t i p u l a t e s t h a t ( r u l e - ) p r i n c i p l e s tend, for 
in s t a n c e , to embody values espoused by 
e s t a b l i s h e d groups which c o n f l i c t with other 
values of other groups which come to wi e l d 
i n f l u e n c e with regard to the future and not only 
fo r the p a r t i c u l a r case at hand. 
From t h i s controversy one may conclude that the 
c o n f l i c t between j u s t i c e according to r u l e s and 
j u s t i c e i n the p a r t i c u l a r case, which r e f l e c t s 
one i s s u e of the t o p i c s debate, i s a l s o s u b j e c t 
of d i s c u s s i o n i n common law l e g a l t h e o r i e s . 
Moreover, the pr e s e n t a t i o n of views of the 
d i f f e r e n c e s between common law and c i v i l law 
l e g a l thought shows that conventional views 
consider the common law system to permit the 
entry of more reasoned arguments and more 
r e l e v a n t a s p e c t s of a problem than a c i v i l law 
l e g a l order. More recent accounts, however, 
cla i m that the d i f f e r e n c e s are diminishing, and 
that c i v i l law systems do not allow l e s s problem 
t h i n k i n g than the common law. 
From t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between problem t h i n k i n g 
and system t h i n k i n g i n law and a b r i e f i n d i c a t i o n 
" c f . J . Stone, Precedent and law, Sydney 
1985, p.245. 
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of i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s on a comparative b a s i s we 
w i l l now turn to the d i s c u s s i o n of the second and 
t h i r d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , the 
question of f i n d i n g and l e g i t i m i z i n g premises. 
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6 The d i s t i n c t i o n between c l e a r c a s e s and hard 
c a s e s 
I n the l a s t chapter we d e a l t with the f i r s t 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , the aspect of 
problem thinking, which cont a i n s according to 
Viehweg a d e s c r i p t i v e and a normative account of 
l e g a l reasoning, and we considered whether there 
i s any a f f i n i t y with t h i s requirement i n the 
Anglo-American l e g a l family. 
I n the following chapters we w i l l draw p a r a l l e l s 
from Viehweg's a n a l y s i s of the t o p i c s and the 
c i v i l law to t h e o r i e s about the j u d i c i a l r o l e . 
T h i s i s s u e concerns the second and t h i r d 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and i t has to 
be examined i n what kind of c a s e s according to 
E n g l i s h l e g a l t h e o r i e s of the j u d i c i a l r o l e 
premises have to be found and how or by r e f e r e n c e 
to which a u t h o r i t i e s they have to be l e g i t i m i z e d . 
I n t h i s chapter we w i l l d e a l with the 
d e s c r i p t i o n s of c l e a r and hard c a s e s i n E n g l i s h 
l e g a l theory i n order to f i n d out which ca s e s are 
regarded as not being r u l e d by an a p p l i c a b l e 
premise. 
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J u r i s t i c t o p i c s l a y s t r e s s on the f a c t that 
s u i t a b l e premises must be found f o r the s o l u t i o n 
of the case i n hand. When there i s a l e g a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n a v a i l a b l e and unanimously a p p l i c a b l e 
w i t h i n a l e g a l system, the law i s regarded as 
c l e a r and unproblematic, so that there i s no room 
fo r the t o p i c s . But when there i s more than one 
p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n of a case the t o p i c s are of 
importance and b e l i e v e d to be the method at work 
i n order to determine the s o l u t i o n of the 
problem. 
At f i r s t s i g h t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n seems to c o i n c i d e 
with the d i s t i n c t i o n between c l e a r and hard cases 
which i s u s u a l l y made by E n g l i s h t h e o r i s t s who 
d e a l with the process of l e g a l reasoning (see 
under s e c t i o n 6.1). However there are many 
d i f f e r e n t views about what makes a hard case a 
hard one and a c l e a r case a c l e a r one. We w i l l 
examine how these types of c a s e s can be 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d (under s e c t i o n 6.2), and whether 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between easy and hard c a s e s i s 
s u s t a i n a b l e (under s e c t i o n 6.3). Moreover, an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of these 
d i f f e r e n t notions w i l l be given (under s e c t i o n 
6.4) . 
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Under s e c t i o n 6.5 i t w i l l be seen that the 
question of whether premises must be found or 
whether there i s an unproblematic premise for the 
s o l u t i o n of the case does not only give r i s e to 
the question of f i n d i n g and l e g i t i m i z i n g premises 
i n a hard case. Both i s s u e s , the question of 
what cases n e c e s s i t a t e a new premise and the 
question of the v a l i d i t y of r u l e s , are 
interdependent. Thus, the determination of a 
hard case a l s o depends on the d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s 
about v a l i d i t y and r e c o g n i t i o n of r u l e s and on 
the question whether the l e g a l order i s simply a 
system of r u l e s or whether other l e g a l standards 
play a r o l e as w e l l . 
F i n a l l y (under s e c t i o n 6.6), the hard case i s s u e 
w i l l be compared to the t o p i c a l method. 
6.1 The conventional view 
Gene r a l l y speaking there are three types of cases 
which come before c o u r t s : d i s p u t e s about f a c t s 
where the law i s c l e a r ; d i s p u t e s about the law 
where the f a c t s are c l e a r , and disputes about 
both. A wide notion of c l e a r and hard cases 
regards a l l the cases i n which the law i s 
disputed as hard ones. 1 According to t h i s wide 
l c f . P.S. Atiyah, Judges and P o l i c y (1980)15 
I s r a e l Law Review, 346; J . Stone, Precedent and 
law, Sydney 1985 t r e a t s mainly the cases of 
87 
view c l e a r or easy cases are' c a s e s where the law 
i s c l e a r and indeed often undisputed by the 
p a r t i e s involved. I n these cases the premises to 
decide the p a r t i c u l a r problem are given because 
there are unambiguous r u l e s from s t a t u t e or 
precedent which c l e a r l y cover the p a r t i c u l a r 
f a c t u a l problem of the case. Hard c a s e s on the 
other hand are those i n which the law or a t l e a s t 
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i s unclear, and where no l e g a l 
s o l u t i o n c l e a r l y imposes i t s e l f on the judge from 
s t a t u t e , precedent, or other l e g a l standard. 
Often the d i s t i n c t i o n between both kinds of cases 
i s made ex post f a c t o . I n s t e a d of supplying a 
d e f i n i t i o n of c l e a r and hard c a s e s , some 
t h e o r i s t s only examine the d i f f e r e n t treatment of 
cases and c l a s s i f y them according to the 
treatment as hard or c l e a r . H a r r i s , for 
ins t a n c e , s t a t e s that the a p p l i c a t i o n of law to 
c l e a r -cases i s deductive. 1 T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n has 
a l s o been made by J u l i u s Stone who examined the 
ap p e l l a t e j u d i c i a l choicemaking as hard c a s e s ; 
the s o - c a l l e d ' f a c t - s k e p t i c s ' argue that 
a t t e n t i o n needs to be d i r e c t e d to the a c t i v i t i e s 
of t r i a l c o urts i n s t e a d of a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s , 
because u n c e r t a i n t y a r i s e s p r i m a r i l y from the 
f a c t - f i n d i n g process and the e l u s i v e n e s s of f a c t s 
(see on f a c t - s k e p t i c s and esp. on Jerome Frank: 
Lord Lloyd of Hampstead and M.D.A. Freeman, 
Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, 5th. ed., 
London 1985, at p.684.) 
'J.W. H a r r i s , Law and l e g a l s c i e n c e , Oxford 
1979, p.11. 
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l i m i t s of the proper use of l o g i c i n the law. 
But as we l e a r n from Stone t h i s observation only 
shows that a premise e x i s t s f o r c l e a r cases that 
can be ap p l i e d s y l l o g i s t i c a l l y , but i t does not 
provide an a n a l y s i s of when a premise can be 
c a l l e d c l e a r so that one can i n f e r from i t and 
when i t can be c a l l e d u n c l e a r or non-existent.' 
Moreover, i t has been argued t h a t a theory that 
employs d i f f e r e n t methods f o r the s o l u t i o n of 
c l e a r and hard cases must not d i s t i n g u i s h them ex 
post f a c t o but a l s o develop a theory i n order to 
determine what a c l e a r and a hard case i s . 
Because before making a d e c i s i o n and engaging i n 
j u d i c i a l reasoning the judge must be able to say 
whether the case before him i s an easy or a hard 
one i n order to know which kind of reasoning has 
to be employed. Designating cases as hard or 
c l e a r by hi n d s i g h t when the process of 
ad j u d i c a t i o n has been completed, i t i s s t a t e d , 
does not provide any guidance f o r the s o l u t i o n of 
hard cases and th e r e f o r e renders a theory that 
'see a l s o P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and theory 
i n E n g l i s h law, London 1987, at p.15; J . Stone 
has provided such an a n a l y s i s f o r the operation 
of precedent and s t a r e d e c i s i s , see Precedent and 
law and Legal system and lawyers' reasonings, 
London 1964 at p.275, and see above under s e c t i o n 
4.2 at p.61. 
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d i s t i n g u i s h e s d i f f e r e n t kinds of reasoning i n 
c l e a r and hard cases u s e l e s s . 4 
6.2 Notions of how c l e a r and hard cases are 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e 
I t w i l l now be examined what kind of t h e o r i e s 
there are to d i s t i n g u i s h a c l e a r from a hard 
case. We w i l l t h e r e f o r e introduce another 
d i s t i n c t i o n between p o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e law 
and s o - c a l l e d 'gaps' i n the law, because the 
problem of f i n d i n g a premise f o r a p a r t i c u l a r 
case may a r i s e e i t h e r from u n c l e a r r u l e s or from 
the f a c t that no r u l e governs the p a r t i c u l a r 
case. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s p r i m a r i l y based on the 
notion of law as a system of r u l e s and i n the 
course of the examination we w i l l see whether 
other l e g a l phenomena such as p r i n c i p l e s play a 
r o l e as w e l l . Although there i s not always a 
c l e a r d i v i d i n g l i n e between a case governed by a 
p o t e n t i a l r u l e and a no-rule case t h i s 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n seems to be n ecessary because 
t h e o r i s t s d i s t i n g u i s h those c a s e s and evaluate 
them d i f f e r e n t l y . 5 
*cf. A.C. Hutchinson and J.N. Wakefield, a 
hard look at 'Hard c a s e s ' : the nightmare of a 
noble dreamer (1982)2 Oxford J o u r n a l of Legal 
Studies 86 at p.93. 
' i t can a l s o be argued t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between p o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s and the no-
r u l e case i s a r t i f i c i a l and t h a t the problem of 
having an unclear r u l e i s j u s t another case of 
having no r u l e at a l l . T h i s i s because i n both 
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6.2.1 P o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s 
I n order to r e s o l v e a p a r t i c u l a r dispute there 
may be one r u l e from s t a t u t e or precedent which 
unambiguously covers the case. I t may a l s o occur 
that there i s doubt about the scope and so about 
the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a r u l e , or t h a t there are 
two or more r u l e s t h a t f i t the f a c t s i t u a t i o n , or 
that there i s only a r u l e a v a i l a b l e t h at does not 
pay t r i b u t e to major s o c i a l changes. U s u a l l y 
those problems are regarded as being inherent i n 
the process of applying l e g a l r u l e s to f a c t 
s i t u a t i o n s . 
According to Hans Kelsen every law-applying a c t 
i s l a w - c r e a t i n g at the same time.' As s t a t e d i n 
h i s Pure Theory of Law a l e g a l order i s a dynamic 
system of norms i n which f r e s h norms are 
c o n s t a n t l y being c r e a t e d on the a u t h o r i t y of a 
cases one may say t h a t there i s no r u l e governing 
a p a r t i c u l a r problem and i n the case of the 
unclear r u l e i t i s only attempted to extend a 
r u l e f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of a case where there i s 
v i r t u a l l y no r u l e . See f o r t h i s argument J . Raz, 
The a u t h o r i t y of law, Oxford 1979, Essay 4, 
pp.53ff, esp. p.77. 
!H. Kelsen, General theory of law and s t a t e , 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 1945, at p.132 -Kelsen 
i s not an Anglo-American but a c o n t i n e n t a l l e g a l 
philosopher with considerable i n f l u e n c e on 
E n g l i s h j u r i s t s and he a l s o taught at American 
u n i v e r s i t i e s . 
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b a s i c norm, t h e G r u n d n o r m N o r m s are c r e a t e d i n 
the process o f a p p l y i n g some g e n e r a l , o r h i g h e r , 
norm which c r e a t e s a l o w e r norm de t e r m i n e d by t h e 
h i g h e r norm. A j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
i s an a c t by which a g e n e r a l norm, e.g. a 
s t a t u t e , i s a p p l i e d b u t a t t h e same t i m e an 
i n d i v i d u a l norm i s c r e a t e d o b l i g a t i n g one o r b o t h 
p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n f l i c t . ' 
The j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n may a l s o c r e a t e a g e n e r a l 
norm, because i t may have b i n d i n g f o r c e n o t o n l y 
f o r the case a t hand b u t a l s o f o r o t h e r s i m i l a r 
cases which t h e c o u r t s may have t o d e c i d e . The 
d e c i s i o n can o n l y , however, have t h e c h a r a c t e r o f 
a precedent i f i t i s n o t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a 
p r e - e x i s t i n g g e n e r a l norm o f s u b s t a n t i v e law. 9 
As p o i n t e d o u t , a g e n e r a l norm u s u a l l y c r e a t e s a 
lower norm. The g e n e r a l d e t e r m i n e s t h e lowe r 
norm w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e organ and t h e procedure 
by which a lowe r norm i s t o be c r e a t e d , and w i t h 
r e g a r d t o t h e c o n t e n t s o f the lowe r norm, b u t as 
the h i g h e r norm cannot b i n d t h e a c t by which i t 
i s a p p l i e d i n e v e r y d i r e c t i o n , t h e r e must always 
be more o r l e s s room f o r d i s c r e t i o n . Even t h e 
' i b i d . , p.113. 
' i b i d . , p.133. 
' i b i d . , p.149. 
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most d e t a i l e d command must l e a v e t o t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l who executes t h e command some 
d i s c r e t i o n . Kelsen g i v e s t h e f o l l o w i n g 
i l l u s t r a t i o n : i f t h e organ A o r d e r s organ B t o 
a r r e s t s u b j e c t C, t h e organ B must, a c c o r d i n g t o 
i t s own d i s c r e t i o n , d e c i d e when and where and how 
t o c a r r y o u t t h e o r d e r o f a r r e s t - d e c i s i o n s t h a t 
depend on e x t r a n e o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s which t h e 
o r d e r i n g organ has n o t f o r e s e e n and t o a c e r t a i n 
e x t e n t cannot f o r e s e e . " The i n d e f i n i t e n e s s o f 
t h e l a w - a p p l y i n g a c t may, a c c o r d i n g t o Kelsen, 
a r i s e from two s i t u a t i o n s . I t can e i t h e r be 
i n t e n t i o n a l , so t h a t t h e h i g h e r norm a u t h o r i z e s 
t h e a p p l y i n g organ t o determine t h e procedure o f 
c r e a t i n g t h e l o w e r norm and t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h i s 
norm a t i t s own d i s c r e t i o n , o r i t can be 
un i n t e n d e d and, f o r example, be a r e s u l t o f 
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n which r e n d e r s t h e norm 
ambiguous. 1 1 Thus, i n " a l l these cases, t h e law 
t o b e . a p p l i e d c o n s t i t u t e s o n l y a frame w i t h i n 
w hich s e v e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e , whereby 
eve r y a c t i s l e g a l , t h a t s t a y s w i t h i n t h e 
f r a m e . " u 
H. Kel s e n , Pure t h e o r y o f law, Be r k e l e y 
1967, a t p.349. 
l l i b i d . , p.350. 
" i b i d . , p.351. 
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A l t h o u g h t he c o u r t s a p p l y e x i s t i n g r u l e s i n which 
c e r t a i n consequences are a t t a c h e d t o c e r t a i n 
c o n d i t i o n s , a new premise must, a c c o r d i n g t o 
Kelsen, be found f o r t h e s o l u t i o n o f every 
p a r t i c u l a r case, because t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l norm i s , i n the p a r t i c u l a r case, f i r s t 
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o u r t ' s a c t o f w i l l . 
One may t h e r e f o r e say t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Pure 
Theory, every a p p l i c a t i o n o f a r u l e e n t a i l s a 
ha r d case as each t i m e a l o w e r norm has t o be 
c r e a t e d . Kelsen h i m s e l f does n o t employ t h e 
e x p r e s s i o n 'hard case', and i n t h e Pure Theory 
t h e r e i s no f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between cases 
which i n v o l v e h a r d e r or l e s s h a r d d e c i s i o n s i n 
o r d e r t o de t e r m i n e what might c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e 
c l e a r case o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l view. 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Kelsen, H.L.A. H a r t l o o k s a t t h e 
phenomenon o f h a r d and c l e a r cases from a 
l i n g u i s t i c p o i n t o f view. L e g a l d e v i c e s , i . e . 
precedent o r l e g i s l a t i o n , which are chosen f o r 
the communication o f st a n d a r d s o f b e h a v i o u r , are 
expressed i n g e n e r a l language. A l t h o u g h t h e y 
work smoothly over t h e g r e a t mass o f o r d i n a r y 
cases, they w i l l a t some p o i n t prove 
i n d e t e r m i n a t e , because of an 'open t e x t u r e ' , 
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w r i t e s Hart. 1' He p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e r e must be 
a core o f s e t t l e d meaning, b u t t h e r e w i l l be, as 
w e l l , a penumbra o f d e b a t a b l e cases i n which 
words are n e i t h e r o b v i o u s l y a p p l i c a b l e nor 
o b v i o u s l y r u l e d o u t . 1 4 Besides t h e vagueness o r 
a m b i g u i t y o f r u l e s , H a r t acknowledges two f u r t h e r 
t r a d i t i o n a l sources o f t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f 
s t a t u t e s and p r e c e d e n t s : t h e case when two 
c o n f l i c t i n g r u l e s a p p l y t o a g i v e n f a c t u a l 
s i t u a t i o n and r u l e s t h a t are e x p r e s s l y formed i n 
u n s p e c i f i c terms, such as ' r e a s o n a b l e ' . 1 5 An 
example o f t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f l e g a l r u l e s would 
be a h y p o t h e t i c a l r u l e f o r b i d d i n g t h e t a k i n g o f 
a v e h i c l e i n t o a p u b l i c p a r k . A c c o r d i n g t o H a r t 
t h e c l e a r cases i n c l u d e the a u t o m o b i l e , t h e bus, 
t h e m o t o r - c y c l e , whereas t h e a p p l i c a t i o n t o 
a i r p l a n e s , b i c y c l e s , o r r o l l e r s k a t e s appears t o 
be more p r o b l e m a t i c . 1 ' 
F u r t h e r m o r e , H a r t s p e c i f i e s t h r e e sources o f 
u n c e r t a i n t y which a r i s e from t h e use o f precedent 
l,H.L.A. H a r t , The concept o f law, O x f o r d 
1961, a t p.124. 
"idem., P o s i t i v i s m and t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f law 
and morals (1958)71 Harvard Law Review 593 a t 
p.607. 
l iidem., Problems o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f law, 
i n : Essays i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y , 
O x f o r d 1983 (Essay 3, p p . 8 8 f f . ) a t p.103. 
"idem., P o s i t i v i s m (supra n . 1 4 ) , p.607. 
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i n E n g l i s h law. F i r s t l y , t h e r e i s no s i n g l e 
method o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r u l e f o r which a 
precedent i s an a u t h o r i t y . Secondly, t h e r e i s no 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e o r u n i q u e l y c o r r e c t f o r m u l a t i o n o f 
any r u l e t o be e x t r a c t e d from cases, and t h i r d l y , 
t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e s t a t u s o f a r u l e e x t r a c t e d from 
precedent depends on c r e a t i v e e x e r c i s e by c o u r t s 
t h a t narrow o r widen t h e r u l e i n t h e process o f 
' d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ' . 1 7 A p a r t f r o m t h e 
i n d e t e r m i n a c i e s s t a t e d above, H a r t does n o t 
accept f u r t h e r n o t i o n s o f h a r d cases which would 
su p p o r t 'adequate' and ' s a t i s f a c t o r y ' d e c i s i o n s 
a g a i n s t a c l e a r l y a p p l i c a b l e r u l e y i e l d i n g a 
d e t e r m i n a t e r e s u l t , f o r i n s t a n c e i n s i t u a t i o n s 
of changing s o c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 1 ' 
However, a c c o r d i n g t o H a r t , those h a r d cases form 
o n l y a m i n o r i t y a g a i n s t t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y of 
c l e a r cases where no doubts a r e f e l t about t h e 
meaning and a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f a s i n g l e l e g a l r u l e , 
and where t h e r e i s g e n e r a l agreement t h a t the 
cases f a l l w i t h i n t h e scope o f a r u l e . 
"None the l e s s , t h e l i f e o f t h e law 
c o n s i s t s t o a v e r y l a r g e e x t e n t i n t h e 
1 7 H a r t , Concept (supra n.13), p.131 - these 
sources c o r r e l a t e w i t h Stone's a n a l y s i s i n Legal 
system (supra n . 3 ) , p.275. 
1 ! c f . H a r t , Essays (supra n . 1 5 ) , p.106 where 
he argues a g a i n s t t h e r e a l i s t view t h a t c o u r t s 
always have a c h o i c e and are f r e e t o decide 
o t h e r w i s e than t h e y do. 
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guidance b o t h of o f f i c i a l s and p r i v a t e 
i n d i v i d u a l s by d e t e r m i n a t e r u l e s which, 
u n l i k e the a p p l i c a t i o n s o f v a r i a b l e 
s t a n d a r d s , do n o t r e q u i r e from them a 
f r e s h judgement from case t o case." 1' 
We can see t h a t , u n l i k e K e l s e n , H a r t makes a 
c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between c l e a r and h a r d cases 
and between l a w - a p p l y i n g and l a w - c r e a t i o n , 
whereas f o r Kelsen e v e r y j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n 
i m p l i e s l a w - c r e a t i o n and e v e r y a p p l i c a t i o n o f a 
l e g a l r u l e e n t a i l s a h a r d case. 
Another p o s i t i v i s t , N e i l MacCormick, doubts t h a t 
a c l e a r d i v i d i n g l i n e between easy and h a r d cases 
can be drawn. On h i s view, c l e a r cases are those 
i n which e i t h e r no doubt as t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
t h e r u l e o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f f a c t s c o u l d 
c o n c e i v a b l y have a r i s e n , o r no one t h o u g h t o f 
r a i s i n g them, o r t h e y were d i s m i s s e d as 
a r t i f i c i a l o r f a r - f e t c h e d by t h e c o u r t . " 
However, he s t a t e s t h a t i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
a r u l e -there i s a spectrum w h i c h ranges from t h e 
o b v i o u s l y s i m p l e t o t h e h i g h l y c o n t e s t a b l e and 
t h a t one cannot d e t e r m i n e where t h e c l e a r case 
ends and t h e hard one b e g i n s . " 
l , H a r t , Concept (supra n . 1 3 ) , p.132. 
"N. MacCormick, L e g a l r e a s o n i n g and l e g a l 
t h e o r y , Oxford 1978, a t p.199. 
" i b i d . , p.198. 
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I n a range of examples o f ' c l e a r e r ' and 'harder' 
cases o f r u l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which MacCormick 
g i v e s , we can r e c o g n i z e t h e same t r a d i t i o n a l 
sources o f i n d e t e r m i n a c i e s i n s t a t u t e s and 
precedents acknowledged by H a r t , w i t h t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e t h a t t h e sharp c a t e g o r i z a t i o n i s 
m i s s i n g i n MacCormick's t h e o r y . T h i s i s because 
he b e l i e v e s t h a t a c l e a r case r e q u i r e s t h a t f a c t s 
can be proved which a r e u n e q u i v o c a l i n s t a n c e s o f 
an e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e , b u t as t h e f a c t s o f any case 
are unique and p a r t i c u l a r , a t y p i c a l c l e a r case 
h a r d l y ever appears, and so one cannot r e c o g n i s e 
i n advance whether a case i s hard o r c l e a r , 
whether t h e a v a i l a b l e r u l e f i t s o r f u r t h e r 
premises have t o be f o u n d . " Thus, a l t h o u g h 
MacCormick's t h e o r y seems t o occupy t h e mi d d l e 
ground between H a r t and Kelsen a t f i r s t s i g h t , i t 
t u r n s p r a c t i c a l l y o u t t o be an ex p o s t f a c t o 
judgement o f what a c l e a r and what a hard case 
i s . T h i s approach i s open t o t h e c r i t i c i s m t h a t 
i f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n can o n l y be made a f t e r t h e 
d e c i s i o n o f t h e case, i t i s o f no h e l p t o t h e 
judge d u r i n g t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process, b u t 
o n l y o f a g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i v e use." 
" c f . i b i d . , pp.227,228 and Formal j u s t i c e 
and t he form o f l e g a l arguments, from Etudes de 
Loqique J u r i d i q u e , V o l 6, ed. Perelman, B r u x e l l e s 
1976, p p . l 0 3 f f . , esp. p.113. 
"see t h e c r i t i c i s m o f Hutchinson and 
W a k e f i e l d , op. c i t . s upra n.4, p.93. 
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N e v e r t h e l e s s , c o n c e r n i n g t h e scope o f p o t e n t i a l l y 
hard cases, MacCormick goes an i m p o r t a n t s t e p 
f u r t h e r t h a n H a r t . He acknowledges t h a t t h e r e 
may be a permanent t e n s i o n between f o l l o w i n g t h e 
o s t e n s i b l y o b vious meaning, and s e e k i n g t o 
e s t a b l i s h i n p a r t i c u l a r cases g e n e r i c r u l i n g s 
which s a t i s f y o t h e r d e s i r a b l e aspects of p o l i c y 
and p r i n c i p l e . " Moreover, he r e f e r s t o t h e 
c o n f l i c t between s e t t l e d law and the c o n t i n u i n g 
dynamic process o f t r y i n g t o s e t t l e o l d problems 
i n whatnow seems a more s a t i s f a c t o r y way." Thus, 
i n c o n t r a s t t o H a r t , MacCormick o b v i o u s l y accepts 
as p r o b l e m a t i c t h e f a c t t h a t r u l e s may become 
u n s u i t a b l e p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h changes i n s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s over t i m e and, hence, acknowledges 
another source o f h a r d cases. 
From H a r t and MacCormick one may conclude t h a t 
c l e a r ' cases are cases where a p o t e n t i a l l y 
a p p l i c a b l e r u l e i s expr e s s e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t 
c l a r i t y t o p r o v i d e s a t i s f a c t o r y guidance f o r t h e 
conduct o f i n d i v i d u a l s , and f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f 
d i s p u t e s , whereas i n h a r d cases r u l e s do n o t 
p r o v i d e such guidance. 
"MacCormick, L e g a l r e a s o n i n g (supra n . 2 0 ) , 
p.210. 
" i b i d . , p.245. 
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From Kelsen one may conclude t h a t t h e r e are no 
c l e a r cases w h i c h enable t h e l a w - a p p l y i n g organ 
t o reach a d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t a f r e s h judgement, 
b u t t h a t b e s i d e s t h e guidance o f r u l e s t h e law-
a p p l i e r always has t o det e r m i n e t h e d e c i s i o n t o 
a c e r t a i n e x t e n t a t h i s own d i s c r e t i o n . 
The q u e s t i o n o f what i s a s u f f i c i e n t g u i d e i s 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l and depends a l s o on t h e concept o f 
v a l i d i t y o f r u l e s . T h i s can be seen c l e a r l y 
where a d i s p u t e a r i s e s as t o whether changing 
s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s have made a r u l e o b s o l e t e . One 
s i d e may r e g a r d t h e r u l e as a s u f f i c i e n t g u i d e 
w h i l e the o t h e r r e g a r d s i t as i n s u f f i c i e n t and 
thus c o n s t i t u t i n g a h a r d case. 
6.2.2 No a v a i l a b l e r u l e s 
We w i l l now ask whether t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which no 
r u l e i s a v a i l a b l e a t a l l f o r t h e s o l u t i o n o f a 
p a r t i c u l a r case c o n s t i t u t e s a f u r t h e r h a r d case. 
T h i s s i t u a t i o n where t h e judge 'runs o u t o f 
r u l e s ' i s a l s o known as one o f 'gaps' i n the law. 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e t y p i c a l h a rd case which 
c e n t r e s on t h e e x i s t e n c e o f some r u l e , t h i s 
v a r i e t y i s o f t e n n e g l e c t e d i n the d i s c u s s i o n o f 
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l e g a l r e a s o n i n g . 1 8 H a r t , f o r i n s t a n c e , does n o t 
pay e x p l i c i t a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s k i n d o f case. 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y gaps ar e d e s c r i b e d as s i t u a t i o n s 
where no norms are found c o v e r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r 
aspect o r a s p e c t s , d e s p i t e t h e presence o f o t h e r 
norms c o v e r i n g a s i t u a t i o n , which l e a d one t o 
expect t h a t t h e l e g a l o r d e r s h o u l d cover a l l 
a s p e c t s . " 
A gap i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law would, f o r example, be 
assumed where a t r e a t y p r o v i d e s t h a t the l o c a l 
customary r u l e i s t o a p p l y , b u t t h e r e i s i n 
a c t u a l f a c t no such r u l e o f l o c a l custom." 
Adherents o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a l e g a l o r d e r 
have d e n i e d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f gaps i n t h e law 
a r g u i n g t h a t an absence o f law c o u l d o n l y e x i s t 
by v i r t u e o f t h e l e g a l o r d e r ' s own w i l l . " 
A s i m i l a r r u l e i n a n e g a t i v e sense i s proposed by 
Kelsen.. He d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e l e g a l o r d e r cannot 
" f o r t h i s aspect see Hutchinson and 
W a k e f i e l d , op. c i t . supra n.4, p.103. 
" c f . Stone, L e g a l system (supra n . 3 ) , p.188 
and I . Tammelo, On t h e l o g i c a l openness o f l e g a l 
o r d e r s (1959)8 American J o u r n a l o f Comparative 
Law 187 a t p.192. 
" t h e example i s t a k e n from Stone, Legal 
system (supra n . 3 ) , p.188. 
"see f o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s view o f 
Radbruch and o t h e r s Tammelo, op. c i t . supra n.27, 
p p . l 9 1 f f . 
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have any gaps, because i f t h e r e i s no norm whic h 
o b l i g a t e s t h e defendant t o t h e b e h a v i o u r c l a i m e d 
by t h e p l a i n t i f f , the defendant i s f r e e a c c o r d i n g 
t o p o s i t i v e law, and has not committed any d e l i c t 
by h i s b e h a v i o u r . D i s m i s s i n g t h e s u i t t h e j u d g e 
a p p l i e s t h e n e g a t i v e r u l e t h a t nobody must be 
f o r c e d t o observe conduct t o which he i s n o t 
o b l i g e d by law." - "What i s n o t l e g a l l y 
p r o h i b i t e d i s l e g a l l y p e r m i t t e d . " Thus, i n 
t h e o r y t h e s e cases are c l e a r cases a c c o r d i n g t o 
Kelsen, as t h e y can be d i s p o s e d of by t h e 
n e g a t i v e r u l e . 
An i l l u s t r a t i o n o f the n e g a t i v e r u l e may be t a k e n 
from Malone v. M e t r o p o l i t a n P o l i c e Commissioner." 
I n t h i s case t h e p l a i n t i f f was charged w i t h 
h a n d l i n g s t o l e n p r o p e r t y and p r o s e c u t e d i n a 
Crown C o u r t . The p r o s e c u t i o n a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e r e 
had been i n t e r c e p t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s 
t e l e p h p n e c o n v e r s a t i o n s on t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e 
S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e ' s w a r r a n t . The p l a i n t i f f 
c l a i m e d t h a t t h e i n t e r c e p t i o n was u n l a w f u l and 
sought r e l i e f i n the form o f a d e c l a r a t i o n . The 
c l a i m was based on r i g h t s o f p r o p e r t y , p r i v a c y , 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and breach of human r i g h t s . The 
" c f . Kelsen, General t h e o r y (supra n . 6 ) , 
p.147 and Pure t h e o r y (supra n.10), p.246. 
" [ 1 9 7 9 ] Ch.344. 
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c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e c l a i m a r g u i n g t h a t t h e r e were 
no such r i g h t s i n the p r e s e n t law a l t h o u g h 
t e l e p h o n e t a p p i n g was a s u b j e c t "which c r i e s o u t 
f o r l e g i s l a t i o n " . " P a r t i c u l a r l y t h e argument 
t h a t as no power t o t a p telephones had been g i v e n 
by e i t h e r s t a t u t e o r common law, t h e t a p p i n g was 
n e c e s s a r i l y u n l a w f u l , was r e j e c t e d : " I f t h e 
t a p p i n g o f te l e p h o n e s by the Post O f f i c e a t t h e 
r e q u e s t o f t h e p o l i c e can be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h o u t 
any breach o f t h e law, i t does n o t r e q u i r e any 
s t a t u t o r y o r common law power t o j u s t i f y i t : i t 
can l a w f u l l y be done s i m p l y because t h e r e i s 
n o t h i n g t o make i t u n l a w f u l . " " 
T h i s judgment v i r t u a l l y endorses Kelsen's 
n e g a t i v e argument i n the U n i t e d Kingdom c o n t e x t . 
However, Kels e n acknowledges t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t o r 
uses t h e n o t i o n o f gaps as a f i c t i o n i n o r d e r t o 
achiev e more s a t i s f a c t o r y , o r j u s t , o r e q u i t a b l e 
r e s u l t s . As t h e l e g i s l a t o r r e a l i z e s t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e g e n e r a l norms he en a c t s may 
i n some cases l e a d t o u n j u s t o r i n e q u i t a b l e 
r e s u l t s , because he cannot f o r e s e e a l l t h e 
c o n c r e t e cases which p o s s i b l y may o c c u r , he 
t h e r e f o r e a u t h o r i z e s t h e l a w - a p p l y i n g organ n o t 
t o a p p l y t h e g e n e r a l norms c r e a t e d by t h e 
" a t p.380. 
" a t p.367. 
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l e g i s l a t o r b u t t o c r e a t e a new norm i n case t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f the g e n e r a l norm c r e a t e d by the 
l e g i s l a t o r would have an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t . " 
The d i f f i c u l t y i s , as Kelsen s t a t e s , t h a t t h e 
l e g i s l a t o r cannot a u t h o r i z e t h e judge d i r e c t l y t o 
a c t as a l e g i s l a t o r i n those cases because i t 
would g i v e t o o much p l a y t o t h e judge's 
d i s c r e t i o n , s i n c e t h e l a t t e r m i g h t f i n d t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e norm c r e a t e d by t h e l e g i s l a t o r 
i n a d e q u a t e i n t o o many cases. Kelsen t h i n k s t h a t 
t h e l e g i s l a t o r t h e r e f o r e uses ( p r o b a b l y 
u n c o n s c i o u s l y ) t he f i c t i o n o f gaps i n t h e law 
because i t l i m i t s t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f t h e judge 
t o c e r t a i n cases and has t h e f u r t h e r 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t t h a t t h e judge i s r e l u c t a n t 
c o n c e r n i n g i t s use un l e s s i t seems t o him t h a t 
r e j e c t i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m i s so e v i d e n t l y 
u n j u s t t h a t he f e e l s h i m s e l f c o m p e l l e d t o b e l i e v e 
such a d e c i s i o n i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n s 
o f t h e l e g i s l a t o r . " Thus, a c c o r d i n g t o Kelsen, 
t h e t h e o r y o f gaps pre t e n d s t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f t h e a c t u a l l y v a l i d law i s l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e 
i n o r d e r t o a u t h o r i z e t he judge t o o r d e r a 
s a n c t i o n which has not been p r o v i d e d by a p r e -
s e t . Kelsen, General t h e o r y (supra n . 6 ) , 
p.148 and Pure t h e o r y (supra n . 1 0 ) , p.248. 
"idem., General t h e o r y (supra n . 6 ) , 
p.148,149 and Pure t h e o r y (supra n.10), 
p.248,249. 
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e x i s t i n g g e n e r a l norm, because i n f a c t t h e 
a c t u a l l y v a l i d law i s l e g a l l y - p o l i t i c a l l y 
i n a d e q u a t e . As the a p p l i c a t i o n o f a g e n e r a l norm 
i s a c c o r d i n g t o the Pure Theory n o r m a l l y a l s o a 
c r e a t i o n o f a lower norm and t h u s c o n s t i t u t e s a 
h a r d case, t h e norm which a u t h o r i z e s t h e judge t o 
d e t e c t and f i l l a gap d i f f e r s from t h e m a j o r i t y 
o f g e n e r a l norms o n l y i n s o f a r as i t a u t h o r i z e s 
t h e judge n o t o n l y t o c r e a t e a new norm b u t a l s o 
t o abandon t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a n o t h e r g e n e r a l 
norm. One may conclude t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
Pure Theory t h e n o - r u l e case does n o t e x i s t as i t 
can be s o l v e d a p p l y i n g the s o - c a l l e d n e g a t i v e 
r u l e , b u t Kelsen concedes t h a t t h i s case p l a y s a 
r o l e i n p r a c t i c e . 
A d o p t i n g a more r e a l i s t i c view o f t h e 'law i n 
a c t i o n ' and a l e s s f o r m a l i s t one t h a n K e l s e n , 
MacCormick p o i n t s out t h a t the law i s n o t g a p l e s s 
and t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n t i n u i n g dynamic pr o c e s s o f 
t r y i n g t o s e t t l e new problems s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . " 
I n t h e same way as MacCormick most o f t h e r e c e n t 
essays on l e g a l r e a soning which d e a l w i t h t h e no-
16 MacCormick, Legal r e a s o n i n g (supra n . 2 0 ) , 
p.245,246. 
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r u l e cases do accept t h a t t h e r e a r e gaps i n t h e 
law." 
I t may be concluded t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e n o - r u l e 
case i s not acknowledged as a problem b u t a t b e s t 
as a f i c t i o n by f o r m a l i s t s such as Kelsen i t 
seems t h a t t h e more r e c e n t t r e n d s o f a n a l y t i c 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e accept i t as a v a r i e t y o f a hard 
case. 
6.3 Arguments t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n between c l e a r 
and hard cases i s s u p e r f l u o u s 
The a t t e m p t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r f r o m h a r d cases 
are p r i m a r i l y made because i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t 
t he r e a s o n i n g i n h a r d cases d i f f e r s f rom t h a t i n 
c l e a r cases. The i d e a i s t o d e t e r m i n e f o r every 
case i n advance which k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g i s 
a p p r o p r i a t e t o a d j u d i c a t e a d i s p u t e . U s u a l l y i t 
i s b e l i e v e d t h a t r e a s o n i n g i n c l e a r cases 
proceeds s y l l o g i s t i c a l l y from g i v e n premises," 
whereas i n h a r d cases t h e process o f r e a s o n i n g i s 
d e s c r i b e d as a r b i t r a r y o r , as we have seen," as 
" c f . J. B e l l , P o l i c y arguments i n j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n s , O x f o r d 1983, a t p.27; H u t c h i n s o n and 
W a k e f i e l d , op. c i t . supra n.4, p.103; A. 
Paterson, The Law Lords, London and Basingstoke 
1982, a t p.128. 
" c f . H a r r i s , op. c i t . supra n.2, p.11; H a r t , 
Essays (supra n.15), p.105,106; Stone, Precedent 
(supra n . l ) , p.97. 
"see under s e c t i o n 4.2 a t p. 62. 
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t o p i c a l o r r h e t o r i c a l . S e v e r a l t h e o r i e s which 
w i l l be examined a t a l a t e r p o i n t p r e s c r i b e 
d i f f e r e n t s o r t s o f guidance i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t 
an a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n . T h i s p o s i t i o n has been 
c h a l l e n g e d by c r i t i c s who b e l i e v e t h a t t h e k i n d s 
o f r e a s o n i n g i n v o l v e d are t h e same f o r b o t h h a r d 
and easy cases. 
P e t e r G o o d r i c h " argues t h a t once i t has been 
a d m i t t e d (as i t has been i n f a c t by t h e v a s t 
m a j o r i t y o f la w y e r s " ) t h a t e x t r i n s i c , p o l i t i c a l , 
s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s p l a y a p a r t i n t h e 
semantic d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a t l e a s t some aspects 
o f t he n o r m a t i v e o r d e r , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
exclude them from o t h e r areas and f r o m t h e c l e a r 
cases. From t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , he c l a i m s , t h e 
c a t e g o r y o f c l e a r cases becomes r a t h e r 
u n r e a l i s t i c . He accuses l e g a l f o r m a l i s m o f 
c o n c e a l i n g the t r u e n a t u r e o f t h e j u d i c i a l 
process and o f f e r s " f o r those p r e p a r e d t o l o o k " 
an example which i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t what i s c l e a r 
may become opaque. The example concerns t h e 
V i s c o u n t e s s Rhondda's C l a i m " i n which the 
"P. Goodrich, The r i s e o f l e g a l f o r m a l i s m ; 
o r t h e defences o f l e g a l f a i t h (1983)3 L e g a l 
S t u d i e s 248 a t p.264; and i n L e g a l d i s c o u r s e , 
Basingstoke and London 1987, a t p.58. 
"see as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e A t i y a h , Judges and 
p o l i c y (supra n . l ) , p p . 3 5 5 f f . 
" ( 1 9 2 2 ) 2 AC 339. 
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Viscountess Rhondda, a peeress i n her own r i g h t , 
claimed e n t i t l e m e n t t o receive, as would any 
peer, a w r i t of summons t o Parliament. She based 
her claim on s e c t i o n 1 of the 1919 Sex 
D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n Removal Act which s t a t e s t h a t : 
"A person s h a l l not be d i s q u a l i f i e d by sex or 
marriage from the exercise of any p u b l i c 
f u n c t i o n . " Counsel f o r the Viscountess Rhondda 
argued t h a t the d e c i s i o n was pure l y a question of 
law and not a matter of d i s c r e t i o n . He alleged 
t h a t the m a t e r i a l words of the Act were p l a i n and 
unambiguous, and t h a t the Act was c l e a r l y 
covering the case as, but f o r her sex, the 
Viscountess Rhondda would have been e n t i t l e d t o 
receive a w r i t of summons t o Parliament. He also 
argued th a t the f u n c t i o n of s i t t i n g and v o t i n g i n 
the House of Lords was foreseen by those who 
d r a f t e d the Act and t h a t i t was comprised by the 
p o l i c y of the Act." 
The House found against the Viscountess as the 
r i g h t to a w r i t had never attached t o peerages 
held by a peeress, and the Act was one f o r 
removing d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n but not f o r c r e a t i n g a 
novel c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . By her sex the 
Viscountess was not d i s q u a l i f i e d from the 
exercise of the claimed r i g h t but she was the 
"a t p.342. 
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holder of a t i t l e which d i d not include t h i s 
r i g h t . " I n other words, a peeress i n her own 
r i g h t i s not a person who has an i n c i d e n t of 
peerage but i s d i s q u a l i f i e d from e x e r c i s i n g i t by 
her sex. She i s a person who f o r her l i f e holds 
a d i g n i t y which does not i n c l u d e the r i g h t of a 
female t o exercise t h a t f u n c t i o n at a l l . " 4 4 
Therefore a m a j o r i t y by a l l but f o u r of twenty-
s i x the House of Lords was convinced t h a t the 
i n t e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h i s 
matter could not be taken t o depart from the 
usage of centuries as the l e g i s l a t u r e would not 
have employed "such loose and ambiguous words t o 
ca r r y out so momentous a r e v o l u t i o n i n the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s House."45 So the House of 
Lords d i d not apply the Act, although, l i k e 
counsel f o r Viscountess Rhondda, Goodrich would 
have c l a s s i f i e d the case as unambiguously c l e a r . 
Goodrich t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t s the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between cl e a r and hard cases as d e c e i t f u l , 
because i t suggests t h a t i n such c l e a r cases 
e x t r i n s i c aspects are excluded and t h a t reasoning 
i n c l ear cases proceeds s y l l o g i s t i c a l l y . 
4 4Lord Birkenhead at p. 363. 
4 , a t p.375. 
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From another p h i l o s o p h i c a l angle and somewhat 
more unprecise than Goodrich, Ronald Dworkin also 
takes the view t h a t the process of reasoning i n 
c l e a r and hard cases i s of the same nature. He 
argues t h a t judges do not f i r s t consider the 
c l e a r law, and then, when t h a t runs out, set out 
on a voyage of l e g i s l a t i v e c r e a t i o n . 4 5 The 
judge's method i s e q u a l l y at work i n easy and 
hard cases, but since the answers t o the 
questions i n easy cases are obvious, or at l e a s t 
seem t o be so, one i s not aware t h a t any theory 
i s at work at a l l . " Therefore easy cases are 
only s p e c i a l instances of hard ones." However, 
t h i s has never been s t a t e d as c l e a r l y as t h i s 
before the p u b l i c a t i o n of Law's empire, and h i s 
e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s " may even suggest the opposite 
n o t i o n , namely t h a t reasoning i n hard cases i s 
d i r e c t e d by p r i n c i p l e s while i t proceeds 
s y l l o g i s t i c a l l y i n c l e a r cases." Despite h i s 
"R. Dworkin, Taking r i g h t s s e r i o u s l y , London 
1977, at p.86. 
"idem., Law's empire , Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 1986, at p.354. 
" i b i d . , p.266. 
"e.g. Taking r i g h t s s e r i o u s l y (supra n.46), 
at p.24 and 97, and see those c i t e d i n Hutchinson 
and Wakefield, op. c i t . supra n.4, p.90,91. 
"on the basis of t h i s opposite n o t i o n 
Hutchinson and Wakefield (op. c i t . supra n.4) 
have c r i t i c i z e d Dworkin's theory, because i t 
lacks a theory about the d i s t i n c t i o n between hard 
and easy cases i n order t o know when the method 
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view t h a t the method at work i s the same f o r both 
cases Dworkin makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between hard 
and easy cases i n h i s essays, and he seems t o 
take the conventional view i n d e s c r i b i n g them. 
He w r i t e s , f o r example, t h a t hard cases a r i s e 
"when no e x p l i c i t d e c i s i o n or p r a c t i c e requires 
a dec i s i o n e i t h e r way",51 or when i n both law and 
p o l i t i c s reasonable lawyers disagree about 
r i g h t s , " or "when no s e t t l e d r u l e d i c t a t e s a 
decisi o n e i t h e r way"," so t h a t one can recognize 
the two types of hard cases, i . e . the r u l e t h a t 
gives incomplete, c o n f l i c t i n g , or ambiguous 
guidance, and the no-rule case. 
At t h i s p o i n t the question a r i s e s why Dworkin 
s t i l l d i s t i n g u i s h e s between c l e a r and hard cases. 
According t o Dworkin's theory there always awaits 
the judge's discovery some p r e - e x i s t i n g law 
adequate t o dispose of the case w i t h superior 
claims^ over competing a l t e r n a t i v e s , which might 
also be regarded as i m p l i c i t i n the body of 
e x i s t i n g p o s i t i v e law, t o be best f i t t e d t o i t . 
Thus, the law i s a 'seamless web' and there i s 
f o r hard cases i s appropriate and when not, but 
the c r i t i c i s m has been deprived of i t s strength 
since Dworkin's c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the issue. 
"Dworkin, Taking r i g h t s (supra n.46), p . X I I . 
" i b i d . , p.XIV. 
" i b i d . , p.83. 
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always one r i g h t answer to every l e g a l problem." 
But while only a superhuman judge, whom Dworkin 
c a l l s Hercules, i s able t o f i n d the answer 
employing the means prescribed by Dworkin, the 
present-day judge w i t h h i s l i m i t e d power of 
discernment cannot always f i n d the e x i s t i n g law 
and the r i g h t p r i n c i p l e s when the conventional 
l e g a l m a t e r i a l does not provide guidance. Hence, 
o b j e c t i v e l y the law i s never incomplete or 
indeterminate, and the law never runs out f o r the 
cases the judge has t o decide, so t h a t every case 
can be resolved by the same means. But 
s u b j e c t i v e l y the l e g a l m a t e r i a l may be unclear 
and f o r the i n d i v i d u a l lawyer there are c l e a r and 
hard cases. According t o Dworkin the judge does 
and ought" t o resolve those cases employing the 
same method, but as he i s imperfect some cases 
which coincide w i t h the cases where no r u l e s or 
only unclear r u l e s are a v a i l a b l e are c l a s s i f i e d 
as hard cases, because they r a i s e d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f o r the judge i n f i n d i n g the r i g h t answer. 
" c f . i b i d . , p.115 and: No r i g h t answer? i n : 
Law, m o r a l i t y and s o c i e t y , ed. by P. Hacker and 
J. Raz, Oxford 1977, pp.58ff. at p.84. 
" f o r a c r i t i c i s m of Dworkin's normative and 
d e s c r i p t i v e account at the same time and the f a c t 
t h a t he confounds both i n h i s theory, see St. 
Guest, book review (1988)104 Law Quarterly Review 
155; Hutchinson and Wakefield, op. c i t . supra 
n.4, p.87; A t i y a h , Judges and p o l i c y (supra n . l ) , 
p.351. 
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We may t h e r e f o r e consider Dworkin's n o t i o n of 
clear and hard cases from the judge's s u b j e c t i v e 
point of view as equi v a l e n t t o the conventional 
view, and note the d i f f e r e n c e t h a t he considers 
the reasoning i n both cases t o be the same. At 
a l a t e r p o i n t we w i l l examine what Dworkin 
advises the judge t o do when he faces a hard case 
where lawyers disagree and where the conventional 
l e g a l m a t e r i a l does not provide guidance. 
6.4 I l l u s t r a t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t notions 
I n order t o i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f e r e n t notions of 
easy and hard cases we w i l l consider the United 
States case of Rigqs v. Palmer" which i s very 
s u i t a b l e f o r t h i s purpose. 
I n 1880, Francis Palmer made a w i l l i n which, 
a f t e r g i v i n g two small legacies t o h i s daughters, 
he l e f t h i s residuary estate t o h i s grandson, 
Elmer. The re s i d u a r y estate included 
considerable personal property and the farm on 
which Elmer Palmer and h i s grandfather l i v e d . I n 
1882, the grandfather remarried and Elmer Palmer, 
i n order to prevent the making of a new w i l l i n 
favour of hi s grandfather's second w i f e , murdered 
"115 NY 506 (1889) (Court of Appeals of New 
York) , f o r an account of the case see also 
Hutchinson and Wakefield, op. c i t . supra n.4, 
p.95, and Dworkin, Taking r i g h t s (supra n.46), 
p.23. 
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his grandfather by poisoning him. The two 
daughters, Mrs Riggs and Mrs Preston, brought an 
ac t i o n t o prevent Elmer Palmer from enjoying the 
d i s p o s i t i o n made i n h i s favour. The issue f o r 
r e s o l u t i o n was whether the s t a t u t o r y r u l e 
r e q u i r i n g t h a t e f f e c t be given t o testamentary 
i n t e n t i o n s expressed i n a v a l i d w i l l ought t o be 
applied. At f i r s t instance the c o u r t decided i n 
Elmer Palmer's favour and applied the r u l e . On 
appeal, counsel f o r the daughters had two 
p r i n c i p a l arguments: t h a t since a w i l l i s 
revocable u n t i l death, Elmer Palmer, by murdering 
hi s grandfather, had deprived him of t h i s r i g h t , 
and t h a t , as a matter of s t a t u t o r y 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t could not have been the 
l e g i s l a t o r s ' i n t e n t i o n t h a t t h i s r u l e should be 
applied i n such e x t r a o r d i n a r y circumstances. 
Counsel f o r Elmer Palmer argued simply t h a t t h i s 
was a case i n which the words of the s t a t u t e 
should receive t h e i r p l a i n and o r d i n a r y meaning. 
Also, as Elmer Palmer had been imprisoned f o r the 
murder of h i s grandfather, t o be deprived of h i s 
legacy would be t o punish him twice f o r the same 
act. 
Counsel f o r both the appellants and the 
respondent agreed t h a t there was a p o t e n t i a l l y 
a pplicable r u l e . They both regarded the r u l e as 
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the s t a r t i n g p o i n t of t h e i r arguments. While the 
appellants argued t h a t the r u l e should not apply, 
the respondent argued t h a t the r u l e should apply. 
Although there was a p o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e r u l e 
the law was disputed by the p a r t i e s w i t h regard 
t o the ' s u i t a b i l i t y ' of the r u l e . According t o 
wide versions of c l e a r and hard cases 
disagreement between the p a r t i e s about the law i s 
s u f f i c i e n t i n i t s e l f t o c o n s t i t u t e a hard case," 
but most t h e o r i e s r e q u i r e the determination by 
the judge, or o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a r a t h e r than 
claims of the p a r t i e s . 
The case was decided against Elmer Palmer on the 
grounds t h a t the general language of the s t a t u t e 
could be neglected i n favour of general 
fundamental maxims of the common law which 
c o n t r o l a l l laws and which have t h e i r foundation 
i n u n i v e r s a l law administered i n a l l c i v i l i z e d 
c o u n t r i e s . The maxim t h a t no one s h a l l take 
advantage of h i s own wrong was seen t o be one of 
those. 
However, i n a d i s s e n t i n g judgement Mr J u s t i c e 
Gray f e l t himself bound by the r i g i d r u l e s of the 
" c f . A t i y a h , Judges and p o l i c y (supra n . l ) , 
p.346. 
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s t a t u t e . He d i d not see any room f o r the 
exercise of an e q u i t a b l e j u r i s d i c t i o n by the 
court as the f a c t s f u l l y complied w i t h the r u l e . 
I n h i s o p i n i o n the m a j o r i t y judgement may indeed 
be based on p r i n c i p l e s of e q u i t y and of n a t u r a l 
j u s t i c e , but they only suggest s u f f i c i e n t reason 
f o r the enactment o f laws t o meet such cases. 
This l a t t e r view characterizes Riggs v. Palmer as 
an easy case because a r u l e i s a p p l i c a b l e and 
d i s p o s i t i v e of the case. S i m i l a r l y H.L.A. Hart 
would have c l a s s i f i e d the case as a c l e a r one 
and, although i t would be a hard case i n 
Kelsenian terms, the Pure Theory would have come 
to the same r e s u l t . 
On the other hand one may see from the m a j o r i t y 
judgement t h a t a c l e a r case can e a s i l y become a 
hard one, namely when the app l i c a b l e r u l e does 
not y i e l d a s a t i s f a c t o r y or eq u i t a b l e r e s u l t . 
This o b s e r v a t i o n has already been made and 
explained (though not appreciated) by Kelsen's 
Pure Theory, and i t confirms Goodrich's p o i n t of 
view which r e j e c t s the d i s t i n c t i o n . MacCormick 
c e r t a i n l y would have characterized the case as a 
hard one dominated by the tension between 
f o l l o w i n g the o s t e n s i b l y obvious meaning, and 
seeking t o e s t a b l i s h i n a p a r t i c u l a r case a 
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generic r u l i n g which s a t i s f i e s other desirable 
aspects of p o l i c y and p r i n c i p l e . Moreover, 
Dworkin also l i s t s Rigqs v. Palmer as an example 
of a hard case." 
6.5 Evaluation o f the hard case issue 
The preceding o u t l i n e of notions of easy and hard 
cases does not de a l w i t h every s i n g l e view of how 
a cl e a r or hard case may be cha r a c t e r i z e d , but i t 
represents the main arguments and l i n e s of the 
discussion. Moreover, not every theory t h a t 
prescribes c r i t e r i a of l e g a l v a l i d i t y lays down 
i t s own idea of a hard case or d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
clear cases from cases i n which the judge i s l e f t 
without a guide. 
At t h i s p o i n t an attempt w i l l be made t o sum 
up the d i f f e r e n t conceptions of a hard case. 
Therefore the widest range of notions w i l l be 
taken i n t o account, because when t h e o r i s t s 
disagree about the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of cases (e.g. 
the no-rule case) as hard or c l e a r , those cases 
are obviously c o n t r o v e r s i a l and t h e r e f o r e , i n the 
widest sense, hard cases. Only, f o r instance, 
the concept of law as a system of rules 
transforms the no-rule case i n t o an easy case 
"Dworkin, Taking r i g h t s (supra n.46), p.23. 
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arguing t h a t the negative r u l e a p p l i e s which 
states t h a t there i s no o b l i g a t i o n . 
I n terms of j u r i s t i c topics one may summarize the 
hard case notions i n English l e g a l theory as 
f o l l o w s . F i r s t l y , premises have t o be found f o r 
cases i n which a p o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e r u l e from 
s t a t u t e or precedent i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y or 
u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y vague or ambiguous because of the 
use of language which i s i n e v i t a b l y open-
t e x t u r e d . A s t r i c t e r version of t h i s p o i n t , 
favoured by Kelsen and t o a c e r t a i n extent by 
MacCormick, demands a new premise f o r every 
p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s i t u a t i o n . 
Secondly, the c o n f l i c t between two or more r u l e s 
r e q u i r e s the preference f o r one, or the 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of them i n a new premise. As sub-
groups of the f i r s t and the second issue one may 
regard a f u r t h e r need t o f i n d premises a r i s i n g 
from the use of precedent, namely from competing 
methods of determining a r u l e from precedent, or 
competing versions of an extracted r u l e . 
T h i r d l y , there may be a p o t e n t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e 
r u l e , but i t i s no longer f e l t t o be s u i t a b l e 
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h changes i n s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s 
over time, so t h a t i t seems more s a t i s f a c t o r y t o 
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e s t a b l i s h another premise i n neglect of the 
e x i s t i n g r u l e . 
And f o u r t h l y , the cases of so-called gaps i n the 
law, where no r u l e appears t o cover a new 
s i t u a t i o n , n e c e s s i t a t e the c r e a t i o n of premises 
i n order t o f i l l the gap. The l a s t two cases are 
not acknowledged as hard cases by f o r m a l i s t 
conceptions of the l e g a l order. This i s the 
r e s u l t of the interdependence between the hard 
case issue and t h e o r i e s about the v a l i d i t y of 
l e g a l phenomena. 
I n the end there remains some doubt about the 
usefulness of the d i s t i n c t i o n between hard cases 
and easy cases. Usually hard cases are 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from c l e a r cases i n order t o choose 
the a ppropriate type of reasoning f o r the 
r e s o l u t i o n of the case. However, when the 
question i s t o f i n d out whether a r u l e i s s t i l l 
s u i t a b l e under changed s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , or 
whether there i s a gap i n the law which has t o be 
f i l l e d or not, the d i s t i n c t i o n cannot be made i n 
advance by means of examining the indeterminacies 
of a r u l e , e.g. under l i n g u i s t i c aspects. Even 
at t h i s stage e x t r i n s i c f a c t o r s and values have 
to be considered, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
c l e a r and hard case depends on the pre-
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understanding of the judge who w i l l always have 
one eye on the outcome of the l i t i g a t i o n before 
he s t a r t s t o employ a c e r t a i n type of reasoning 
i n order t o dispose of the case. Thus, the 
determination of a case as hard or easy belongs 
to the a c t u a l process of reasoning, and so every 
case becomes a p o t e n t i a l l y hard one, because the 
outcome of a r u l e - a p p l i c a t i o n might be 
incompatible w i t h notions of j u s t i c e , or p o l i c y , 
or p r i n c i p l e i n changing s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . 
The argument t h a t every case i s a p o t e n t i a l l y 
hard one requires a r e a l i s t i c understanding of 
norms and t h e i r v a l i d i t y . I d e n t i f y i n g a case 
as a hard one according t o the s u i t a b i l i t y of the 
outcome of a r u l e - a p p l i c a t i o n implies t h a t a hard 
case can also be analyzed where the law provides 
a s o l u t i o n f o r the case and where l e g a l r u l e s are 
a p p l i c a b l e and d i s p o s i t i v e of the case. Hence, 
the judge's power t o abandon l e g a l r u l e s and t o 
make a f r e e decision i n every case and not only 
i n cases where the law does not provide a 
d e c i s i o n i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r the argument t h a t 
every case i s a p o t e n t i a l l y hard one. 
The assumption t h a t every case i s a hard one i n 
the sense t h a t the judge s c r u t i n i z e s every r u l e 
anew concerning i t s remaining a p p l i c a b i l i t y does 
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not, of course, match the r e a l i t i e s of the 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n process." The judge does not and 
cannot reconsider every a u t h o r i t y , and where he 
disregards an obvious a u t h o r i t y t h i s may not be 
accepted by the l e g a l audience and h i s a c t i o n may 
be c r i t i c i z e d as i l l e g i t i m a t e by the l e g a l 
p r o f e s s i o n , l e g a l w r i t e r s , and by higher c o u r t s . 
But, nevertheless, i t may be seen from the 
Viscountess Rhondda's Claim and Rigqs v. Palmer 
t h a t even the reco n s i d e r a t i o n of the p l a i n 
meaning of s t a t u t e s i s not u n l i k e l y . I t may 
depend t o a l a r g e extent on the consensus among 
the l e g a l audience, but, as we have already 
s t a t e d , t h i s i s a very vague concept and the 
determination of i t s scope seems as d i f f i c u l t as 
the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of cases as c l e a r and hard, so 
t h a t one can only categorize cases as appearing 
harder or less hard, or more or less d i f f i c u l t t o 
decide. I t i s not possible t o decide i n advance 
whether a case i s c l e a r or hard and then choose 
the a p p r opriate type of reasoning, as the 
de c i s i o n whether a case i s hard or c l e a r i s p a r t 
of the process of l e g a l reasoning and t h e r e f o r e 
cannot be made independent of t h i s process. 
Although the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a case as c l e a r or 
hard does not provide any guidance f o r the judge 
" t h i s i s pointed out by B e l l , op. c i t . supra 
n.37, at p.25. 
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concerning the kind of reasoning t h a t i s involved 
i n advance, i t may be of value w i t h regard t o the 
subsequent analysis of decisions as i t may make 
apparent the kinds of cases f o r which premises 
have t o be found and the sources from which 
disputes about the law a r i s e . 
This, of course, does not render t h e o r i e s about 
the j u d i c i a l r o l e i n hard cases useless. They 
may be regarded as determining f o r every case i n 
general how f a r r u l e s should be accepted as 
guidance and t o which a u t h o r i t i e s the judge must 
r e f e r when, according t o h i s view, a l e g a l r u l e 
ceases t o be a s u f f i c i e n t guide. 
6.6 The t o p i c a l method and hard cases 
As we have already stated the t o p i c a l method i s 
only of importance where there i s a problem, and 
t h a t there i s no room f o r the t o p i c s where the 
law i s unproblematic and undisputed. However, we 
are not t o l d e x a c t l y what a problem i s , and 
indeed none of the adherents of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
analyses i n depth the kinds of cases f o r which 
the t o p i c a l method i s meant t o be of use. I n 
order t o e l u c i d a t e these issues i t seems t o be 
h e l p f u l t o have recourse to the d i s c u s s i o n of 
c l e a r and hard cases i n the Anglo-American l e g a l 
f a m i l y . 
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Usually a problem i s r e f e r r e d t o by the adherents 
of the t o p i c s as a s i t u a t i o n which i s not t r e a t e d 
unanimously and where there i s no consensus among 
an u n s p e c i f i e d number of i n t e r l o c u t o r s . 
Obviously the t o p i c a l method i m p l i e s a very wide 
not i o n of a problem as t h e o r e t i c a l l y , one can 
always f i n d more than one possible s o l u t i o n f o r 
a case and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c o n t i n e n t a l l e g a l 
f a m i l i e s l e g a l t h e o r i s t s have produced a v a r i e t y 
of d i f f e r e n t approaches t o a p l e n i t u d e of 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . Consequently Viehweg 
prescribes i n h i s normative account of j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s t h a t every s i n g l e case ought t o be t r e a t e d 
as a problem and resolved by means of problem 
t h i n k i n g . This approach also includes the no t i o n 
t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l l y every case i s a hard case 
suggesting t h a t the judge w i l l always have t o 
s c r u t i n i z e the l e g a l r u l e s w i t h regard t o the 
s u i t a b i l i t y of the outcome of a r u l e - a p p l i c a t i o n . 
We have already st a t e d t h a t i n p r a c t i c e the judge 
cannot and does not reconsider every a u t h o r i t y . 
As the c o u r t s do not t r e a t every case as a 
problem Viehweg analyses the poi n t s of entry of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s i n t o the l e g a l o r d e r . H These 
points i n d i c a t e the cases which are a c t u a l l y 
regarded as posing problems i n p r a c t i c e and 
"see under section 3.2 at p. 27. 
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where, according t o Viehweg, the l e g a l system 
cannot dispense w i t h the t o p i c s . Viehweg's 
po i n t s of entry c o r r e l a t e s t r i k i n g l y w i t h the 
summary of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the hard case 
n o t i o n i n English l e g a l theory which we gave i n 
the previous s e c t i o n . 
The f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c - the vague or ambiguous 
r u l e s as a consequence of the open t e x t u r e of 
language - coincides w i t h Viehweg's e n t r y - p o i n t 
a r i s i n g from the use of common language w i t h i t s 
p l e n i t u d e of understandings t o express l e g a l 
concepts and p r o p o s i t i o n s ; the second and t h i r d 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s - c o n f l i c t i n g r u l e s and 
anachronistic r u l e s - correspond t o the process 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which f r e q u e n t l y r e q u i r e s the 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and the 
adjustment of set l e g a l f o r m u l a t i o n s t o changing 
circumstances; and the f o u r t h p o i n t - gaps i n the 
law - may c o r r e l a t e w i t h the constant need t o 
apply l e g a l r u l e s w i t h i n a l e g a l system t o new 
cases which do not f a l l under any e x i s t i n g r u l e . 
Moreover, we may note that the r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
t h i r d s i t u a t i o n as a hard case by a number of 
English t h e o r i s t s implies t h a t the judge i s able 
t o and may disregard l e g a l r u l e s i n favour of a 
s u i t a b l e decision of the case at hand. This 
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p o s i t i o n i s comparable to the t o p i c a l approach t o 
l e g a l m a t e r i a l and l e g a l r u l e s , which regards 
r u l e s as mere guidelines t h a t are persuasive but 
not as such binding i n the process of f i n d i n g and 
l e g i t i m i z i n g premises. As t h i s view c o n t r a s t s 
w i t h the f o r m a l i s t conception of some p o s i t i v i s t s 
who c l a s s i f y the s i t u a t i o n i n question as an easy 
case solvable w i t h i n a system of r u l e s , one may 
a t t h i s p o i n t note again t h a t j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
c o n t a i n an a n t i - f o r m a l i s t element which stems 
from t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to ideas of conceptual 
jurisprudence i n Germany.51 
One may conclude t h a t the s i t u a t i o n s which 
Viehweg i s o l a t e s as the points of e n t r y of the 
t o p i c a l method i n t o the l e g a l order are s i m i l a r 
t o the n o t i o n of hard cases i n English l e g a l 
t h e o r i e s . These are the cases where, according 
t o Viehweg, l e g a l reasoning i n e v i t a b l y proceeds 
t o p i c a l l y . A d d i t i o n a l l y , he claims t h a t the 
process of reasoning ought to be t o p i c a l f o r a l l 
cases and th a t i t must not be f e t t e r e d by a 
system of r u l e s and by s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning. 
I n the next chapters we w i l l examine how t h e o r i e s 
about the r o l e of the j u d i c i a r y t r e a t the process 
"see f o r an evaluation of the new r h e t o r i c ' s 
a t t a c k upon f o r m a l i s t conceptions, Goodrich, 
Legal discourse (supra n.40), p p . H 2 f f . 
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of reasoning p a r t i c u l a r l y i n hard cases, and 
whether they claim to be normative or d e s c r i p t i v e 
t h e o r i e s . 
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7 Problems concerning the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
r o l e models 
Before analysing models of the j u d i c i a l r o l e w i t h 
regard t o t h e i r d i f f e r e n t notions of a hard case 
we w i l l t r y t o c l a r i f y t o what extent these 
models may be regarded as having d e s c r i p t i v e 
content or as having normative content. I t w i l l 
be seen t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o make a c l e a r 
d i s t i n c t i o n between both accounts (under s e c t i o n 
7.1) . 
We w i l l then give a b r i e f survey of tendencies i n 
studies d e a l i n g w i t h j u d i c i a l reasoning i n hard 
cases which claim t o be e m p i r i c a l as opposed t o 
d o c t r i n a l . As we cannot f o l l o w these studies i n 
depth we w i l l r e l y on t h e i r basic f i n d i n g s , which 
i n d i c a t e t h a t no theory guiding the decisions of 
the j u d i c i a r y i s employed c o n s i s t e n t l y throughout 
the l e g a l process (under s e c t i o n 7.2). 
At the end o f the chapter we w i l l introduce the 
case of Spartan Steel and A l l o y s L td. v. M a r t i n 
and Co. (under section 7.3) f o r the purpose of 
examining the theories which are o f f e r e d by a 
number of j u r i s t s i n order t o describe the 
j u d i c i a l process and also t o p r e s c r i b e reasoning 
i n hard cases. Spartan Steel i s u s u a l l y regarded 
127 
as a t y p i c a l example of a hard case and t h e r e f o r e 
s u i t a b l e f o r the purpose of examining how 
d i f f e r e n t l e g a l t h e o r i s t s would supposedly apply 
t h e i r conceptions i n p r a c t i c e . 
7.1 D e s c r i p t i v e or p r e s c r i p t i v e theories? 
One o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d e a l i n g w i t h models of 
the j u d i c i a l r o l e i s t o f i n d out whether 
t h e o r i s t s a l l e g e t h a t l e g a l reasoning i n hard 
cases a c t u a l l y proceeds i n the way they describe 
or whether they propose t h a t i t ought t o f o l l o w 
t h e i r conception of the process of reasoning. 
We have already seen t h a t Viehweg's t r e a t i s e i s 
p r e s c r i p t i v e w i t h reference t o i t s c a l l f o r a 
problem-orientated method of l e g a l reasoning, 
whereas i t i s d e s c r i p t i v e concerning i t s a n a l y s i s 
of the c i v i l law showing the already e x i s t i n g 
p o i n t s of ent r y of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s i n t o the l e g a l 
order.. I f one consults the essays of l e g a l 
t h e o r i s t s concerning t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o provide 
a d e s c r i p t i v e or a normative theory one does not 
always get a cle a r answer.1 
lH.E. Yntema, Legal science and n a t u r a l law: 
apropos of Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz 
(1960)2 Inter-American Law Review 207, at 208 
st a t e s t h a t i t would "seem t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n 
i n question between s c i e n t i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n and 
normative p r e s c r i p t i o n turns upon the mood i n 
which statements are made". 
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Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law i s meant t o give a 
s c i e n t i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n of p o s i t i v e law.' Hart 
ch a r a c t e r i z e s h i s concept of law as a d e s c r i p t i o n 
of l e g a l thought r a t h e r than a c r i t i c i s m of law 
or l e g a l p o l i c y . 1 MacCormick, on the other hand, 
claims t h a t h i s conclusions present a normative 
and a d e s c r i p t i v e account of norms a c t u a l l y 
o p e r a t i v e w i t h i n the systems under h i s study. 4 
Dworkin a l s o aims at p r o v i d i n g a d e s c r i p t i o n of 
and a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r the s t r u c t u r e of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of a d j u d i c a t i o n . ' However, we are 
not t o l d where the d e s c r i p t i v e aspects end and 
the normative account s t a r t s , which causes a 
confusion between both aspects.' Dworkin's 
theory i s only one example of such confusion. 7 
Moreover, d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s of the process 
of l e g a l reasoning y i e l d d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s 
'H. Kelsen, Pure theory of law, Berkeley 
1967, p . l . 
'H.L.A. Hart, The concept of law, Oxford 
1961, p.V. 
4N. MacCormick, Legal reasoning and l e g a l 
theory, Oxford 1978, p.13 and 129. 
5R. Dworkin, Taking r i g h t s s e r i o u s l y , London 
1977, p.90 and 123. 
s c f . A. Hutchinson and J. Wakefield, A hard 
look at 'Hard cases': the nightmare of a noble 
dreamer (1982)2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
86 at p.87. 
'cf. H.L.A. Hart, Essays i n jurisprudence 
and philosophy, Oxford 1983, p.103. 
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according t o the p r e f e r r e d conception of a l e g a l 
order. We have already d e a l t w i t h the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of determining cases of s e t t l e d and 
u n s e t t l e d law and a r r i v e d at the conclusion t h a t 
there i s no uniform d e f i n i t i o n of a hard case. 
I n some cases (e.g. i n Riqqs v. Palmer) one 
theory acknowledges and another denies, t h a t 
there i s a hard case, and they would resolve i t 
i n d i f f e r e n t ways leading t o d i f f e r e n t decisions. 
As the d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s y i e l d d i f f e r e n t 
r e s u l t s one may say t h a t some of them must e i t h e r 
be wrong, or t h a t the j u d i c i a l process i s 
i n c o n s i s t e n t so t h a t they f i t some o f the cases 
but are not able t o describe a l l of them.' 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , they t u r n out t o be normative, 
p r e s c r i b i n g standards of a d j u d i c a t i o n where 
several theories disagree about the t r u e nature 
of j u d i c i a l reasoning. 
The l a t t e r p o i n t i s r e l a t e d w i t h the issue of the 
normative force of d e s c r i p t i o n s . I t i s said t h a t 
the d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r i s t needs the assistance of 
a general normative theory i n developing 
s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d concepts.' The pre-
conceptions of the t h e o r i s t himself are regarded 
'see under section 7.2. 
'cf. J. F i n n i s , Natural law and n a t u r a l 
r i g h t s , Oxford 1980, at pp.6-16 who r e l i e s on Max 
Weber's methodology of s o c i a l sciences. 
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as an indispensable and decisive component i n the 
s e l e c t i o n or formation of any concepts f o r use i n 
d e s c r i p t i o n of such aspects of human a f f a i r s as 
law or l e g a l order. Although d e s c r i p t i v e 
t h e o r i s t s might seek t o i d e n t i f y law on the basis 
of non-evaluative c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o n l y , they do 
evaluate a v a i l a b l e data from t h e i r viewpoint of 
what i s important and s i g n i f i c a n t when they 
s e l e c t the inf o r m a t i o n which i n f l u e n c e s the 
outcome of the d e s c r i p t i o n . Thus, d i f f e r e n c e s i n 
d e s c r i p t i o n derive from d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n 
amongst the t h e o r i s t s , about what i s important 
and s i g n i f i c a n t i n the f i e l d of data and 
experience which they have c o l l e c t e d . 1 0 An 
example may be taken from MacCormick.11 He admits 
t h a t the d e s c r i p t i v e account of h i s theory o f f e r s 
f a l s i f i a b l e hypotheses, but he r e q u i r e s a mass of 
a v a i l a b l e evidence before he accepts t h a t they 
are f a l s e , because he t r e a t s a small number of 
counter-examples as "instances of bad arguments" 
and as "cases deviant from a c t u a l l y o p e r a t i v e 
norms", r a t h e r than e v a l u a t i n g them as a 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n or m o d i f i c a t i o n of h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . 
One may conclude th a t a d e s c r i p t i v e theory can be 
regarded as having normative content inherent i n 
l 0 i b i d . , p.9. 
llMacCormick, op. c i t . supra n.4, p. 13. 
131 
the t h e o r i s t ' s viewpoints or values which 
influence h i s s e l e c t i o n of concepts t o use i n 
describing law. 
However, we w i l l see l a t e r t h a t many d e s c r i p t i o n s 
of l e g a l reasoning end w i t h the f i n d i n g t h a t 
judges have a choice and make d i s c r e t i o n a r y 
decisions i n hard cases, without s t a t i n g t o what 
kind of arguments judges r e f e r i n such a case. 
I n contrast the p o i n t of i n t e r e s t f o r our i n q u i r y 
i s e x a c tly the question of where the judges take 
premises from i n a hard case, and what normative 
guides theories of a d j u d i c a t i o n o f f e r . 
7.2 No consistent theory i n p r a c t i c e 
I n order t o demonstrate t h a t d e s c r i p t i v e theories 
of law only c o n t r i b u t e aspects t o a phenomenology 
of law and a d j u d i c a t i o n but never conta i n a 
complete or even t r u e d e s c r i p t i o n of the law, we 
w i l l . o u t l i n e tendencies i n recent analyses of the 
j u d i c i a l process which claim t o be purely 
e m p i r i c a l as opposed t o d o c t r i n a l . The claim can 
be confirmed i n so f a r as they do not attempt t o 
e s t a b l i s h f u r t h e r t h e o r i e s of law and 
ad j u d i c a t i o n , but they only s t a t e whether t h e i r 
f i n d i n g s match one theory r a t h e r than another or 
whether they contain elements of several 
t h e o r i e s . 
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Many academic lawyers 1 2 and a number o f p r a c t i s i n g 
lawyers 1' seem t o acknowledge t h a t the courts do 
not only declare the law but t h a t they a c t u a l l y 
make i t or at l e a s t p a r t i c i p a t e o c c a s i o n a l l y i n 
making the law. I t i s said t h a t i n cases of 
u n s e t t l e d law judges make d i s c r e t i o n a r y decisions 
r e f e r r i n g t o arguments supported by common sense, 
p r i n c i p l e s , and p u b l i c p o l i c y , 1 ' and t h a t t h e i r 
r o l e i n those cases may best be described as t h a t 
of the i n t e r s t i t i a l l e g i s l a t o r . 1 5 However, 
p r a c t i s i n g lawyers only seem t o concede t a k i n g 
t h i s a c t i v e r o l e concerning the f i e l d of common 
law r u l e - c r e a t i o n whereas they appear t o be 
r e l u c t a n t t o admit the same a c t i v e r o l e 
concerning s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 1 6 This view 
"see e.g. P.S. Atiyah, Judges and p o l i c y 
(1980)15 I s r a e l Law Review 346 at p.348; R. 
Stevens, Law and p o l i t i c s , London 1979; A. 
Paterson, The Law Lords, London and Basingstoke 
1982; J. B e l l , P o l i c y arguments i n j u d i c i a l 
d ecisions, Oxford 1983. 
"see e.g. S i r A.T. (now Lord) Denning, The 
changing law, London 1953; Lord Reid, The judge 
as law maker (1972)12 Journal of the Society of 
Public Teachers of Law 22; Lord Edmund-Davies, 
J u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m (1975)28 Current Legal Problems 
1. 
"Lord Reid, op. c i t . supra n.13, p.25. 
1 ! c f . Atiyah, op. c i t . supra n.12, p.348; 
B e l l , op. c i t . supra n.12, p.244 - the v a r i a t i o n s 
of the i n t e r s t i t i a l l e g i s l a t o r model w i l l be 
examined under se c t i o n 8.1. 
u c f . e.g. Lord Reid, op. c i t . supra n.13, 
p. 27 . 
133 
may derive from the f a c t t h a t common law r u l e s 
provide more sources f o r hard cases than 
s t a t u t o r y r u l e s do because the extent of 
indeterminacies i s , as we have s t a t e d , greater i n 
the f i e l d of precedent than i t i s f o r s t a t u t o r y 
r u l e s . Moreover, judges may f e e l i t more 
l e g i t i m a t e t o develop and change the common law 
than t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h parliamentary l e g i s l a t i o n . 
But t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the courts merely 
applying the law when they i n t e r p r e t s t a t u t e s 
rather than making i t i n those cases has become 
i n c r e a s i n g l y challenged as u n r e a l i s t i c by 
academics.1' Besides the increased readiness 
among the j u d i c i a r y t o accept t h a t the courts 
make law, they also express i t more openly i n 
t h e i r judgements i n the l a s t decades of j u d i c i a l 
decision-making than they d i d before. 1 8 
Nevertheless, the m a j o r i t y s t i l l argues t h a t 
j u d i c i - a l c r e a t i v i t y i s confined t o hard cases, 1' 
and as R. Stevens w r i t e s , "the idea t h a t the 
House (of Lords) makes law o n l y i n 'hard cases' 
n c f . J.A.G. G r i f f i t h , The p o l i t i c s of the 
j u d i c i a r y , 3rd. ed. , Glasgow 1985, pp.181-192 and 
B e l l , op. c i t . supra n.12, at p.92. 
" c f . Stevens, op. c i t . supra n.12, 
pp.614ff., esp. p.620. 
"so f o r example B e l l , op. c i t . supra n.12, 
p.24. 
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w i l l not d ie e a s i l y " . " The f a c t , which we have 
pointed out e a r l i e r , t h a t the n o t i o n of hard 
cases has been continuously extended by t h e o r i s t s 
and t h a t a c l e a r d i v i d i n g l i n e between easy and 
hard cases has vanished might a l s o be explained 
as a consequence of the lawyer's reluctance t o 
admit t h a t the j u d i c i a r y ' s c r e a t i v i t y i s not only 
r e s t r i c t e d t o hard cases. 
However, these are only tendencies taken from 
e m p i r i c a l studies of the j u d i c i a r y . From Alan 
Paterson's research," f o r which he interviewed 
most of the Law Lords, one may see t h a t there 
cannot be a uniform d e s c r i p t i o n of the l e g a l 
process as d i f f e r e n t Law Lords have d i f f e r e n t 
views about a d j u d i c a t i o n and d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s 
towards the treatment of hard cases." Such 
disagreements are apparent f o r instance on a 
question which m i r r o r s the Dworkin/Hart debate, 
namely^ whether there i s always one c o r r e c t 
s o l u t i o n t o a House of Lords case on the basis of 
the e x i s t i n g l e g a l r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s , or 
whether there are some cases where the Law Lords 
"Stevens, op. c i t . supra n.12, p.625. 
"The Law Lords, op. c i t . supra n.12. 
"a requirement of Paterson's research i s 
t h a t the Law Lords also act according to what 
they s t a t e , which has been doubted t o a c e r t a i n 
extent by G r i f f i t h , op. c i t . supra n.17, at 
p.186. 
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have a choice about which way the law i s t o 
develop. The answers t o t h i s question were 
di v i d e d . Though the m a j o r i t y of those 
interviewed by Paterson said t h a t there was a 
choice i n each case or i n most of the cases, some 
Law Lords argued t h a t i n every or nearly every 
case one s o l u t i o n was more i n accordance w i t h the 
law than any other d e c i s i o n . " Furthermore, 
Paterson p o i n t s out t h a t the Law Lords disagree 
as t o the existence of p a r t i c u l a r g u i d e l i n e s and 
as t o t h e i r weight i n p a r t i c u l a r cases. 1 4 
Moreover, i n the process of a d j u d i c a t i o n some 
judges are said t o be more c r e a t i v e than others." 
From the d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e s among judges which 
can lead t o d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s i n the same 
p a r t i c u l a r case, one may conclude t h a t there i s 
not one theory which c o n s i s t e n t l y describes and 
guides the decisions of the j u d i c i a r y i n 
p r a c t i c e , but several t h e o r i e s m i r r o r the process 
of a d j u d i c a t i o n from d i f f e r e n t angles." 
" c f . Paterson, op. c i t . supra n.12, pp.190-
195. 
" i b i d . , p.198. 
" c f . Stevens, op. c i t . supra n.12, p.578. 
"see f o r the argument t h a t l e g a l p r a c t i c e 
s u f f e r s from a lack of theory, P.S. Atiyah, 
Pragmatism and theory i n English law, London 
1987, p p . l 4 3 f f . esp. p.159. 
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7.3 I n t r o d u c t i o n of a case 
I n order t o provide an i l l u s t r a t i o n t o which we 
can r e f e r i n the examination of the r o l e models 
we w i l l at t h i s p o i n t i n t r o d u c e the case of 
Spartan Steel and A l l o y s L t d. v. M a r t i n and Co." 
I n the course of c a r r y i n g out road works Martin's 
employees n e g l i g e n t l y damaged and put out of 
act i o n a power cable which s u p p l i e d Spartan 
Steel. As a consequence, Spartan Steel had t o 
h a l t i t s o p e r a t i o n u n t i l the cable had been 
repaired. Spartan Steel claimed damages i n 
respect of three items of l o s s : the d e p r e c i a t i o n 
of value of the metal which was i n the smelting 
process and which they had t o damage i n order t o 
prevent i n j u r y t o t h e i r furnace; the loss of 
p r o f i t s they would have made on the sale of t h a t 
metal; and the loss of p r o f i t s from those melts 
t h a t would have taken place i n the normal course 
of business d u r i n g the pe r i o d the furnace was 
in o p e r a t i v e . The cou r t at f i r s t instance held 
t h a t the defendants were l i a b l e f o r a l l of these 
losses. On appeal counsel f o r M a r t i n conceded 
t h a t they were l i a b l e f o r the f i r s t two items of 
los s , but argued t h a t they were not l i a b l e f o r 
the t h i r d item as i t was pure economic loss as a 
consequence of damage t o another's property, but 
"[1973]1 QB 27. 
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not consequential on any physical loss of the 
p l a i n t i f f . They alleged on the a u t h o r i t y of 
C a t t l e v. Stockton Waterworks Co.," which was 
approved i n SCM (United Kingdom) L t d . v. W.J. 
W h i t t a l and Son L t d . , " t h a t i t was t h e r e f o r e too 
remote t o be recovered. Counsel f o r Spartan 
Steel argued t h a t such economic loss ought t o be 
recoverable i f i t was reasonably foreseeable, as 
i t was i n t h i s case. By a m a j o r i t y , the Court of 
Appeal held t h a t the p l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l e d t o 
the f i r s t two items of loss only. 
I n h i s judgement, Lord Denning considered t h a t 
the issue of l i a b i l i t y could not be resolved 
alone by the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n under the headings of 
the duty owed t o the p l a i n t i f f or of the 
remoteness of the damages claimed. He t h e r e f o r e 
discarded those t e s t s and p r e f e r r e d t o "consider 
the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p i n hand, and see 
whether or not, as a matter of p o l i c y , economic 
loss should be recoverable, or not"." He o f f e r e d 
various reasons i n favour of not awarding damages 
f o r economic loss independent of the phy s i c a l 
damage i n t h i s case. F i r s t l y , he considered the 
p o s i t i o n of the s t a t u t o r y undertakers which 
"(1875) LR 10 QB 453. 
" [1971] 1 QB 337. 
" a t p.37. 
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supply e l e c t r i c i t y , gas, or water. They were not 
l i a b l e f o r causing economic loss alone and he 
th e r e f o r e suggested t o adopt a s i m i l a r p o l i c y i n 
regard t o c o n t r a c t o r s . The r i s k of economic loss 
was run by everyone and should be su f f e r e d by the 
whole community r a t h e r than by the person 
i n t e r r u p t i n g the s u p p l i e s . Against the hazards 
of a breakdown i n the supply of power or water 
e i t h e r precautions were taken by e f f e c t i n g an 
insurance, or the economic loss was made up "by 
doing more work next day". 1 1 He also argued t h a t 
the claims of p u r e l y f i n a n c i a l loss were too 
d i f f i c u l t t o c o n t r o l and t h a t i n deserving cases 
of physical damage recovery was provided, so t h a t 
there was no need t o allow damages f o r purely 
economic loss i n the case at hand. 
Lawton L.J. came t o the same r e s u l t but f o r 
d i f f e r e n t reasons. He considered the law as 
s e t t l e d since C a t t l e v. Stockton Waterworks and 
any doubts there may have been about the recovery 
of consequential f i n a n c i a l damage as reconsidered 
and s e t t l e d i n SCM. He conceded t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s 
e x i s t e d between d i f f e r e n t types of cases of 
economic loss and t h a t they had arisen because of 
the p o l i c y of the law, but i t was not up t o the 
"a t p.38. 
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courts t o determine a consistent p o l i c y f o r a l l 
cases .1! 
I n a d i s s e n t i n g judgement Edmund Davies L.J. 
contested the view t h a t there was a general r u l e 
t h a t f i n a n c i a l loss i n the absence of p h y s i c a l 
damage was i r r e c o v e r a b l e . To support t h i s 
argument he r e f e r r e d t o Hedley Byrne v. H e l l e r " 
and other cases where economic loss was allowed 
independent of phy s i c a l damage. He argued t h a t 
the issue of f i n a n c i a l loss was one of the duty 
of care owed t o the i n j u r e d p a r t y and one of 
remoteness, and t h a t loss should be recovered 
where i t was foreseeable and a d i r e c t consequence 
of the act concerned. On t h i s basis of l i a b i l i t y 
he regarded the necessary requirements as 
f u l f i l l e d i n the case at hand because a breach of 
the duty of care had been admitted and the 
economic loss was a foreseeable and d i r e c t 
consequence of the defendants' admitted 
negligence. He r e j e c t e d the p o l i c y arguments put 
forward by Lord Denning as f a c t o r s not 
determinant of l e g a l p r i n c i p l e . " 
" a t p.49. 
"[1964] AC 465. 
"a t p.45. 
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In academic w r i t i n g s the Spartan Steel case i s 
u s u a l l y regarded as a t y p i c a l example of a hard 
case," and from the judgement one can see t h a t 
a l l three judges proposed t o resolve the case i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways. I n a d d i t i o n t o the discussion of 
the issue of hard cases one may analyze the 
judgements as f o l l o w s : Lord Denning regarded the 
a v a i l a b l e r u l e s d e a l i n g w i t h purely economic loss 
as i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r the r e s o l u t i o n of the case 
at hand and reconsidered them by means of 
employing contemporary p o l i c y arguments. He 
a r r i v e d at the restatement of the o l d r u l e but 
supplied i t w i t h a contemporary j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 1 5 
S i m i l a r l y t o Lord Denning, courts o f t e n r e f e r t o 
p o l i c y arguments i n order t o resolve cases of 
u n s e t t l e d law. 
I n an a n a l y s i s of the duty of care i n negligence 
Symmons reaches the conclusion t h a t "the term 
• p o l i c y ' i n the sphere of negligence can 
seemingly comprehend a l l relevant e x t r a - l e g a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the i n t e r e s t s of 
" c f . B e l l , op. c i t . supra n.12, p.57; 
Dworkin, op. c i t . supra n.5, p.83; N. MacCormick, 
Legal r i g h t and s o c i a l democracy, Oxford 1982, 
p.132; Hutchinson and Wakefield, op. c i t . supra 
n.6, p.101. 
" c f . B e l l , op. c i t . supra n.12, p.59. 
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p a r t i e s involved and the courts themselves."" 
This observation c o r r e l a t e s w i t h one of the 
t r a i t s of the t o p i c a l method. The t o p i c s draw 
a t t e n t i o n t o the f a c t t h a t no argument should be 
excluded by a system of r u l e s from the process of 
f i n d i n g premises f o r the s o l u t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r 
case, and problem t h i n k i n g r e q u i r e s the openness 
of the a d j u d i c a t i v e process t o a l l kinds of 
arguments. I t has been argued t h a t i t i s the 
task of jurisprudence t o f i n d a method which does 
not render p o l i c y decisions i n c o n s i s t e n t and 
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e but which makes apparent the 
p o l i c y considerations on which the d e c i s i o n i s , 
or ought t o be, based." However, the n o t i o n of 
the i n t e r l o c u t o r or the audience which i s 
provided by the theory of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s has not 
been recognised as a s u f f i c i e n t means t o t h i s 
e f f e c t , and i n the next chapter we w i l l examine 
whether r o l e models of the English j u d i c i a r y 
provide such guidance. 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Lord Denning, Lawton L.J. f e l t 
h imself bound by the o l d r u l e i n C a t t l e and SCM 
and considered i t as unambiguously a p p l i c a b l e t o 
"C.R. Symmons, The duty of care i n 
negligence: r e c e n t l y expressed p o l i c y elements 
(1971)34 Modern Law Review 394 and 528, at p.400. 
"M. Rheinstein, book review on Viehweg's 
Topik und Jurisprudenz (1954)3 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 597, at p.598. 
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the case at hand. As he was opposed t o a 
re c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r u l e , and regarded the law 
as s e t t l e d , one may say tha t Spartan Steel was a 
cl e a r case i n h i s eyes." 
Edmund Davies L.J. d i d not regard the r u l e i n 
C a t t l e and SCM as unambiguously a p p l i c a b l e but 
f o r him t h i s r u l e was i n c o n f l i c t w i t h the r u l e 
i n Hedley Byrne v. H e l l e r . He aimed at 
r e c o n c i l i n g both r u l e s by means of r e f e r r i n g t o 
the more general requirements of f o r e s e e a b i l i t y 
and d i r e c t n e s s which were inherent i n both r u l e s . 
I n the next chapter we w i l l t r y t o examine how a 
number o f l e g a l t h e o r i s t s would supposedly t r e a t 
the Spartan Steel case. 
"see f o r t h i s argument Hutchinson and 
Wakefield, op. c i t . supra n.6, p.102. 
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8 The r e s o l u t i o n of hard cases according t o 
models of the j u d i c i a l r o l e 
Having analyzed English l e g a l t h e o r i e s under the 
angle of the f i r s t two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , namely the aspect of problem 
t h i n k i n g (under Chapter 5) and the kinds of cases 
f o r which - premises have t o be found (under 
Chapter 6) , we w i l l at t h i s p o i n t t u r n t o the 
t h i r d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , t h a t i s t o say the question 
of how or by reference t o which a u t h o r i t i e s 
premises have t o be l e g i t i m i z e d . 
According t o the t o p i c a l method every sensible 
argument may be considered i n the process of 
f i n d i n g premises and the premise which i s f i n a l l y 
adopted f o r the s o l u t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r case has 
t o be l e g i t i m i z e d by the i n t e r l o c u t o r or the 
audience. 
I n t h i s chapter i t w i l l be examined i n how f a r 
the judge i s f r e e or r e s t r i c t e d i n the process of 
adopting premises f o r hard cases according t o 
t h e o r i e s about the English j u d i c i a r y . The 
discussion w i l l be subdivided i n t o t h e o r i e s which 
claim t h a t the judge has a c r e a t i v e r o l e and t h a t 
he makes law i n hard cases (under s e c t i o n 8.1), 
and the o r i e s s t i p u l a t i n g t h a t t o a great extent 
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the judge f i n d s and declares the law (under 
s e c t i o n 8.2). 
The subsequent examination w i l l serve the f i n a l 
a n a l y s i s (under Chapter 9) of the a f f i n i t y of the 
t h e o r i e s under discussion t o the t o p i c a l approach 
t o the problem. 
8.1 I n t e r s t i t i a l l e g i s l a t o r model 
The f o l l o w i n g theories discussed i n t h i s s e c t i o n 
have i n common the a s s e r t i o n t h a t i n hard cases 
the judge must act l i k e a l e g i s l a t o r . I t i s h i s 
task t o make new law i n those cases, and t o 
refuse t o innovate i s as much a l e g i s l a t i v e act 
as any de c i s i o n . 1 
However, i n t h i s s e ction we w i l l only deal w i t h 
t h e o r i e s which apply t o the hard case issue and 
c l a i m t h a t the judge must l e g i s l a t e 
' i n t e r s t i t i a l l y ' . We leave apart those branches 
of American realism which reduce the law t o t h a t 
which the courts l a y down.' According t o those 
'pragmatic i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t s ' the judge has always 
a choice and i s f r e e t o decide, no matter how 
'cf. P.S. Atiyah, Judges and p o l i c y (1980)15 
I s r a e l Law Review 346 at p.348. 
l c f . O.W. Holmes, The path of the law 
(1897)10 Harvard Law Review 457, and J.C. Gray, 
The nature and sources of the law, New York 1909 
at p.101 (sec.231). 
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cle a r the case i s . Thus, vested w i t h seemingly 
l i m i t l e s s j u d i c i a l c r e a t i v i t y the judge does not 
only l e g i s l a t e i n t e r s t i t i a l l y , but the lawmaking 
a u t h o r i t y as a whole i s t r a n s f e r r e d from the 
l e g i s l a t o r t o the judge. 1 However, connected t o 
t h i s observation t h a t the judge i s u n f e t t e r e d by 
a system of r u l e s i s the r e f u s a l t o s p e l l out the 
d i r e c t i o n i n which he ought t o develop the law, 
so t h a t those conceptions would not provide any 
guidance f o r the r e s o l u t i o n of hard cases. 
S i m i l a r l y , we w i l l not take i n t o account the work 
of c r i t i c a l l e g a l scholars who, b u i l d i n g on the 
work of l e g a l r e a l i s t s , have developed an 
extensive array of arguments concluding t h a t law 
i s r a d i c a l l y indeterminate, incoherent, and 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y . I f those arguments are v a l i d , 
they may r a i s e serious doubts about the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of l e g i t i m a t e , n o n a r b i t r a r y l e g a l 
systems and a d j u d i c a t i v e procedures. 4 
The i n t e r s t i t i a l l e g i s l a t o r model, i n c o n t r a s t , 
recognises t h a t judges are subject t o l i m i t a t i o n s 
which do not a f f e c t l e g i s l a t o r s . For t h i s model 
'cf. W. Friedmann, Legal philosophy and 
j u d i c i a l lawmaking (1961)61 Columbia Law Review 
821 at p.822. 
'see f o r a recent account and c r i t i c i s m of 
t h i s t h e s i s K. Kress, Legal indeterminacy 
(1989)77 C a l i f o r n i a Law Review 283. 
146 
the question a r i s e s as t o what these l i m i t a t i o n s 
are. Do they only consist of the l e g a l r u l e s and 
i s the judge f r e e when these run out, or i s he 
ob l i g e d t o r e f e r t o c e r t a i n kinds of reasons and 
arguments? Should the judge l e g i s l a t e as though 
he himself were the l e g i s l a t o r , or should he 
l e g i s l a t e as he thinks the ac t u a l l e g i s l a t u r e 
would l e g i s l a t e , or should he give e f f e c t t o a 
consensus of values i n the community at large? 
8.1.1 The complete freedom t o decide 
According t o Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law a 
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n u s u a l l y creates an i n d i v i d u a l 
norm whereas the act of the l e g i s l a t o r creates a 
general norm. The act by which the i n d i v i d u a l 
norm of j u d i c i a l d ecision i s created i s u s u a l l y 
predetermined by general norms of formal and 
m a t e r i a l law.' As f o r the judge every case i s a 
hard one both, the judge and the l e g i s l a t o r 
create, law, but the l e g i s l a t o r i s much f r e e r i n 
c r e a t i n g law then the judge, because the 
c o n s t r a i n t exercised by the c o n s t i t u t i o n upon the 
l e g i s l a t o r i s not as strong as the c o n s t r a i n t 
exercised f o r instance by a s t a t u t e upon the 
judge who has t o apply t h i s s t a t u t e . 1 
5H. Kelsen, Pure theory of law, Berkeley 1967 
at p.242. 
8 i b i d . , p.353. 
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However, there are two exceptions t o the usual 
case t h a t a court's d e c i s i o n creates an 
i n d i v i d u a l norm applying a general norm. 
F i r s t l y , courts may be authorized t o create not 
only i n d i v i d u a l norms w i t h i n the framework of the 
general norms created by the l e g i s l a t i v e organ 
but also i n d i v i d u a l norms outside t h i s framework. 
For instance, i n cases of gaps' where the court 
considers the lack of a general norm as unj u s t or 
i n e q u i t a b l e , t h a t i s , ' u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ' , i t may 
create an i n d i v i d u a l l e g a l norm whose content i s 
i n no way predetermined by a general l e g a l norm 
created by l e g i s l a t i o n or custom.' I n t h i s case 
the judge applies the norm which authorizes the 
court t o create new law. The court-created 
i n d i v i d u a l norm which i s v a l i d only f o r the 
s i n g l e , present case, i s , according t o Kelsen, 
j u s t i f i a b l e only as a p p l i c a t i o n of a non-
p o s i t i v e , general norm which the court considers 
desirable and which the p o s i t i v e l e g i s l a t o r 
f a i l e d to create. I n such a case, Kelsen 
s t i p u l a t e s , the d i s c r e t i o n of the court i s as 
u n l i m i t e d as t h a t which the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
'see also the discu s s i o n above under se c t i o n 
6.2.2 at pp.99ff. 
'Kelsen, op. c i t . supra n.5, p.244. 
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o r d i n a r i l y allows the l e g i s l a t o r i n c r e a t i n g 
general l e g a l norms.' 
The second exception i s the a u t h o r i z a t i o n of the 
court to create general l e g a l norms i n the form 
of precedential decisions. 1 0 I n those cases the 
l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n i s d e c e n t r a l i z e d so t h a t the 
courts compete w i t h the l e g i s l a t i v e organ 
established by the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 1 
I n the usual case where cou r t s apply a general 
norm, the establishment of the i n d i v i d u a l norm, 
so f a r as i t takes place w i t h i n the framework of 
the l e g a l norm t o be a p p l i e d , i s f r e e , t h a t i s , 
w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the judge. 1 1 I t i s not 
an act of c o g n i t i o n but an act of w i l l by which 
the law-applying organ chooses between the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s shown by c o g n i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Thus, every time a d e c i s i o n i s made, there has 
been a choice, an a r b i t r a r y choice, since i t 
stems d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y from the w i l l and 
' i b i d . , p.244. 
"see also under s e c t i o n 6.2.1 at p. 91. 
l lKelsen, op. c i t . supra n.5, p.251. 
l , i b i d . , p.354. 
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not from reason, as, according t o Kelsen, human 
reason does not choose. 1 1 
The judge's d e c i s i o n i s l e g i t i m i z e d by another 
norm a u t h o r i z i n g the j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n and the 
v a l i d i t y of t h i s norm can be derived from other 
r u l e s which can f i n a l l y be traced back t o the 
basic norm. As has been stated, 1' according t o 
the Pure Theory every case i s a hard case and so 
the judge must make law i n every case w i t h the 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n t h a t i f he i s authorized t o f i l l a 
gap h i s d i s c r e t i o n i s less l i m i t e d than i t i s i n 
other cases. However, Kelsen refuses t o i n d i c a t e 
the d i r e c t i o n i n which the law-making process 
should go and whether the decision should be made 
on the basis of hunch, or n a t u r a l law commands, 
or other requirements," so t h a t the Pure Theory 
provides no guidance f o r the judge i n the ac t u a l 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the law." A d d i t i o n a l l y i t has t o 
be sai d t h a t Kelsen expressly disclaimed 
"see f o r t h i s aspect A. Wilson, The 
imperative f a l l a c y i n Kelsen's theory (1981)44 
Modern Law Review 270, at p.279. 
"see under s e c t i o n 6.2.1 at p. 93. 
" c f . Friedmann, op. c i t . supra n.3, p.822. 
" c f . R.W.M. Dias, Jurisprudence, 4th. ed. ( 
London 1976, p.510. 
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p r o v i d i n g guidance i n the form of value 
considerations of one s o r t or another. 1 7 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Kelsen we l e a r n from Hart th a t a 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y d e c i s i o n i n hard cases i s not 
nec e s s a r i l y a r b i t r a r y or i r r a t i o n a l . 1 ' He claims 
t h a t : 
"cases f o r d e c i s i o n do not a r i s e i n a 
vacuum but i n the course of the 
operation of a working body of r u l e s , 
an operation i n which a m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
diverse c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are continuously 
recognized as good reasons f o r a 
d e c i s i o n . These include a wide v a r i e t y 
of i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s , 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l aims, and 
standards of m o r a l i t y and j u s t i c e ; and 
they may be formulated i n general terms 
as p r i n c i p l e s , p o l i c i e s and 
standards. "l' 
S i m i l a r l y , other s t u d i e s of r u l e s and rule-guided 
choices y i e l d the r e s u l t t h a t decisions i d e a l l y 
r e s t i n the l a s t r e s o r t upon deference t o 
p r e f e r r e d weighings between r i v a l purposes and 
p o l i c i e s although, i t i s admitted t h a t i n 
numerous instances there may be none t o defer 
t o . " 
"Kelsen, op. c i t . supra n.5, p . l . 
MH.L.A. Hart, The concept of law, Oxford 
1961, p. 124 and Problems of the philosophy of 
law, i n : Essays i n jurisprudence and philosophy, 
Oxford 1983 (Essay 3, pp.88ff.) at p.106. 
"idem., Essays (supra n.18), p.107. 
" c f . G. G o t t l i e b , The l o g i c of choice, 
London 1968, p .172. 
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However, those discussions leave open questions 
about the foundations of p r e f e r r e d weighings, and 
the only conclusion drawn i s t h a t the c r i t i c i s m 
which makes decisions sound i n hard cases i s some 
concept of what the law ought t o be. 1 1 But 
f u r t h e r i m p l i c a t i o n s as t o the r a t i o n a l i t y of a 
decision are not made and, thus, l e f t t o the 
d i s c r e t i o n of the judge, who i s f r e e t o decide 
hard cases according t o h i s choice. 
Returning t o the case of Spartan Steel and A l l o y s 
Ltd. v. Martin and Co. we are confronted w i t h the 
question as t o what r u l e or d o c t r i n e among r i v a l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s governs the case. No s t a t u t e 
applies to the matter i n hand, and according t o 
our analysis there are precedents and l e g a l 
doctrines which lead i n t o opposite d i r e c t i o n s . 
For p o s i t i v i s t s such as Kelsen or Hart the 
judge's decision i n a hard case i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
norm-ereating, since i t inv o l v e s answering the 
question 'what i s t o be the governing r u l e f o r 
such a case?' As there i s no uniquely c o r r e c t 
answer a l l three judgements given i n Spartan 
Steel are w i t h i n the permissible bound of 
j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n , and, according t o the 
theories presented i n t h i s s e c t i o n , the opposite 
n c f . H.L.A. Hart, P o s i t i v i s m and the 
separation of law and morals (1958)71 Harvard Law 
Review 593, at p.608. 
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outcome would have been as l e g i t i m a t e as the 
ac t u a l r e s u l t . 
8.1.2 Freedom of choice w i t h i n bounds 
Hart's i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the decision-making 
process i n hard cases may not be a r b i t r a r y has 
been f u r t h e r elaborated by Raz and MacCormick who 
are, u n l i k e Hart, concerned w i t h questions of the 
l i m i t s of the court's d i s c r e t i o n i n cases of 
u n s e t t l e d law. 
Raz claims t h a t j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n i s not 
a r b i t r a r y judgement and t h a t c o u r t s are never 
allowed t o act a r b i t r a r i l y , but t h a t they are 
l e g a l l y bound t o act as they t h i n k i s best 
according t o t h e i r b e l i e f s and values." Thus, 
each judge i s e n t i t l e d t o f o l l o w d i f f e r e n t 
reasons but he must believe t h a t they are the 
best, because an a r b i t r a r y judgement l i k e t o s sing 
a coin^, f o r instance, would be a v i o l a t i o n of a 
l e g a l duty. Raz derives the t h e s i s t h a t i n t h e i r 
law-making judges do r e l y and should r e l y on 
t h e i r own moral judgement from the circumstances 
under which the courts operate. Those 
circumstances impose c e r t a i n moral requirements 
" J . Raz, Legal p r i n c i p l e s and the l i m i t s of 
law (1972)81 Yale Law Journal 823 a t p.847. 
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on them which do not apply t o l e g i s l a t o r s . " Raz 
characterizes those circumstances as the f a c t 
t h a t much of j u d i c i a l law-making concerns f i l l i n g 
i n gaps w i t h i n e x i s t i n g l e g a l frameworks, and 
modifying r u l e s while preserving the main p a r t of 
t h e i r r a t i o n a l e through d i s t i n g u i s h i n g . 
Moreover, most law-making decisions are concerned 
w i t h extending e x i s t i n g d o c t r i n e s a d j u s t i n g them 
t o gr a d u a l l y changing c o n d i t i o n s , so tha t 
e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s l i m i t the range of 
considerations taken i n t o account." 
However, Raz does not s p e c i f y t h i s t h e s i s which, 
t h e r e f o r e , remains very vague. P a r t i c u l a r l y the 
argument t h a t the judge's own moral judgement 
confines the court's d i s c r e t i o n t o c e r t a i n l i m i t s 
which do not apply t o l e g i s l a t o r s may con t a i n an 
emp i r i c a l t r u t h , but i t does not lead much 
f u r t h e r concerning the det e r m i n a t i o n of bounds t o 
j u d i c i a l choice-making i n hard cases. 
Such c o n s t r a i n t s have been expressed i n a more 
concrete form by MacCormick who s t i p u l a t e s that 
j u d i c i a l decisions ought t o c o n s i s t of arguments 
"idem., Law and value i n a d j u d i c a t i o n , i n : 
The a u t h o r i t y of law, Oxford 1979, (Essay 10, 
p p . l 8 0 f f ) , at pp.199 and 200. 
" i b i d . , p.200 and Legal p r i n c i p l e s (supra 
n.22), p.846. 
154 
of consequences, of coherence, and of 
consistency. 
The requirement of consistency means t h a t no 
r u l i n g can be acceptable which c o n t r a d i c t s any 
p r e v i o u s l y established r u l e of law which i s 
bi n d i n g f o r t h a t c o u r t . " Furthermore, a r u l i n g 
must be coherent w i t h the r e s t of the system, 
which i s an attempt t o secure a value-coherence 
w i t h i n the l e g a l system and t o d e l i m i t the f i e l d 
w i t h i n which j u d i c i a l law-making i s l e g i t i m a t e . " 
To be coherent a judgement must be shown t o be 
supported by rele v a n t p r i n c i p l e s of the system, 
f o r example by means of d e r i v i n g i t from the 
e x i s t i n g body of the law by a n a l o g i c a l reasoning. 
The p r i n c i p l e s which authorize the r u l i n g and 
secure the coherence of the l e g a l system can, 
according t o MacCormick, on the one hand be found 
i n the broad statements of general norms by 
previous judges and d o c t r i n a l w r i t e r s . On the 
other hand they are made by 'making sense' of the 
r u l e s and precedents showing t h a t there i s some 
value which i s advanced by adherence t o the r u l e s 
"D.N. MacCormick, Legal reasoning and l e g a l 
theory, Oxford 1978, Ch. V I I I , p p . l 9 5 f f . and 
Legal r i g h t and s o c i a l democracy, Oxford 1982, at 
p.137. 
"idem., Legal reasoning (supra n.25), p.153 
and Legal r i g h t (supra n.25), p.137. 
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i n q u e s t i o n . " F i n a l l y , MacCormick argues, 
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t arguments do n o r m a l l y and sho u l d 
come i n t o p l a y where v a r i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e r u l i n g s 
are open t o t h e judge, because t h e y are a l l i n 
coherence w i t h t h e l e g a l system." The e v a l u a t i o n 
o f consequences comprises such concepts as 
j u s t i c e , common sense, or p u b l i c p o l i c y . At t h i s 
l e v e l o f argument t h e judge i s f r e e i n making up 
h i s mind one way o r another by r e f e r e n c e t o h i s 
c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e , common sense, o r p u b l i c 
p o l i c y . " 
Thus, MacCormick r e f u s e s t o acce p t c r i t e r i a 
p r o v i d i n g a b a s i s whereby one can judge one 
concept as b e t t e r t h a n a n o t h e r , so t h a t w i t h i n 
t h e bounds of c o n s i s t e n c y and coherence t h e judge 
i s f r e e t o e v a l u a t e which consequences are 
d e c i s i v e f o r t h e s o l u t i o n o f a h a r d case. 
I n Spartan S t e e l b o t h r u l i n g s f o r and a g a i n s t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f c o u l d be made c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h t h e 
p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s , and a l s o a d e q u a t e l y 
s u p p o r t e d by p r i n c i p l e s . S partan S t e e l whose 
s u p p l y o f power was c u t o f f c o u l d have appealed 
"idem., Legal r i g h t (supra n . 2 5 ) , p.137. 
"idem., Legal r e a s o n i n g (supra n . 2 5 ) , Ch. 
V I , p p . l 2 9 f f . and Legal r i g h t ( s u p r a n.25), 
p.138. 
"idem., Legal r i g h t (supra n . 2 5 ) , p.139. 
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t o the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t everyone ought t o 
take r e a s o n a b l e care t o a v o i d i n f l i c t i n g 
f o r e s e e a b l e harm on o t h e r s . Consequently, t h e 
defendants s h o u l d be h e l d l i a b l e f o r such harm as 
i s caused by f a i l u r e t o t a k e reasonable c a r e . 
Whereas t h e c o n t r a c t o r c o u l d have adduced 
p r i n c i p l e s which have been e n u n c i a t e d as 
r e s t r i c t i n g t h e p o s s i b l e range o f l i a b i l i t y f o r 
n e g l i g e n t a c t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
t he d u t y o f care i s owed o n l y t o those upon whom 
one's a c t s may f o r e s e e a b l y i n f l i c t p h y s i c a l 
harm. 1 0 Thus, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t h e o r i e s t r e a t e d 
i n t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e judge would be f r e e t o make 
up h i s mind on t h e b a s i s o f t h e p o s s i b l e 
consequences o f t h e outcome o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n i n 
the manner L o r d Denning d e a l t w i t h t h e case. 
8.1.3 Goals as g u i d e l i n e s 
The c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e consequences o f a 
d e c i s i o n l e a d s t o t h e q u e s t i o n whether these 
ought t o be based on g o a l s o r on r i g h t s . A 
re q u i r e m e n t i s r i g h t - b a s e d when generated by a 
concern f o r some i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t and g o a l -
based when propagated by t h e d e s i r e t o f u r t h e r 
"see f o r t h e e l a b o r a t i o n o f those 
p r i n c i p l e s , MacCormick, Leg a l r i g h t (supra n.25), 
p.138. 
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something taken t o be o f i n t e r e s t t o t h e 
community as a whole.' 1 
Goal reasons d e r i v e t h e i r f o r c e from p r e d i c t e d 
d e c i s i o n a l e f f e c t s t h a t p u r p o r t e d l y serve good 
s o c i a l g o a l s . u Good s o c i a l g o a l s a r e , f o r 
example, "general s a f e t y ' , ' p u b l i c h e a l t h ' , 
'community w e l f a r e ' such as decent h o u s i n g 
s t a n d a r d s , or 'promotion o f f a m i l y harmony'. 
Goal reasons are f u t u r e - r e g a r d i n g and v e r y 
p e r s u a s i v e as t h e y i m p l i c a t e such v a l u e s as 
s a f e t y , h e a l t h , peace, env i r o n m e n t , o r v o t e r 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
One type o f g o a l reasons a r e u t i l i t a r i a n g o a l s 
which are d e f i n e d by r e f e r e n c e t o the g r e a t e s t 
happiness o f t h e g r e a t e s t number o f p e o p l e . 
A l t h o u g h u t i l i t a r i a n g o a l s are s t i l l r e f e r r e d t o 
by t h e j u d i c i a r y and a l s o r e g a r d e d as w o r t h 
p u r s u i n g and l e g i t i m a t e i n j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s , " 
u c f . Lord L l o y d o f Hampstead and M.D.A. 
Freeman, L l o y d ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o j u r i s p r u d e n c e , 
5 t h . ed., London 1985, p.433. 
, ! c f . R. Summers, Two t y p e s o f s u b s t a n t i v e 
reasons: t h e co r e o f a t h e o r y o f common-law 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n (1978)63 C o r n e l l Law Review 707 a t 
p.717. 
n c f . K. Greenawalt, D i s c r e t i o n and j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n : t h e e l u s i v e q u e s t f o r t h e f e t t e r s t h a t 
b i n d t h e judge (1975)75 Columbia Law Review 359 
at p.393; Kress, op. c i t . supra n.4, p.283; 
Summers, op. c i t . supra n.32,p.751. 
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H a r t , s t i p u l a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s a growing 
u n p o p u l a r i t y o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and a t r a n s i t i o n 
i n m oral, p o l i t i c a l , and l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y from 
t h e f a i t h t h a t t h e t r u t h must l i e w i t h t h e 
m a x i m i z a t i o n o f average g e n e r a l w e l f a r e t o a new 
b e l i e f i n a d o c t r i n e o f b a s i c human r i g h t s . 1 4 The 
l e g i t i m a c y o f g o a l reasons and p a r t i c u l a r l y o f 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m f a c e s two main o b j e c t i o n s . 
F i r s t l y , i t i s argued t h a t goal-based t h e o r i e s 
n e c e s s a r i l y s a c r i f i c e t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o t h e 
common good, and, se c o n d l y , t h a t judges w i t h o u t 
b e i n g e l e c t e d , must n o t weigh g o a l s as those c a l l 
f o r the e x e r c i s e o f t h e demo c r a t i c w i l l which i s 
a l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n . " 
However, h a r d l y anyone adheres t o t h e e x c l u s i v e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f s o c i a l g o a l s i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y 
a d e c i s i o n . They a r e o f t e n r egarded as one t y p e 
of reason employed i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n p r o cess, 
so t h a t t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f g o a l reasons does n o t 
exclude t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f r i g h t s . " Thus, 
s o c i a l g o a l s may s e r v e as one type i n a t y p o l o g y 
o f p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t reasons which can h e l p a 
judge as a g u i d e f o r the grasp and e v a l u a t i o n o f 
" c f . H a r t , Between u t i l i t y and r i g h t s i n : 
Essays (supra n . 1 8 ) , Essay 9, p p . l 9 8 f f . 
" i b i d . , p.202; and R. Dworkin, T a k i n g r i g h t s 
s e r i o u s l y , London 1977, p p . 9 4 f f . 
" c f . Summers, op. c i t . supra n.32, p.751. 
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c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t arguments i n hard cases. How 
much f o r c e such arguments have i n the p a r t i c u l a r 
case and a g a i n s t o t h e r arguments depends on t h e 
e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e j u d g e . 
With r e g a r d t o t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f the outcome o f 
Spartan S t e e l one may argue t h a t a r u l i n g i n 
f a v o u r o f t h e r e c o v e r y o f economic l o s s would 
r e s u l t i n a f l o o d o f c l a i m s f o r economic l o s s 
c o n c e r n i n g f i g u r e s which are i n c a l c u l a b l e f o r t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s . T h i s would be t o o e x t e n s i v e and t o o 
c a t a s t r o p h i c f o r t h e economic development t o be 
a c c e p t a b l e . I n s t e a d , one may s t i p u l a t e t h a t the 
f i r m , ' o f which t h e p r o d u c t i o n has been 
i n t e r r u p t e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t , can c a l c u l a t e the 
l o s s e s i n v o l v e d more e a s i l y and t h e r e f o r e a l s o 
compensate f o r t h e d i s r u p t i o n s more e a s i l y . 
Thus, t h e l o s s o f t h e p l a i n t i f f may be regarded 
as l e s s severe f o r t h e economic development 
because economic p r o s p e r i t y as a whole w i l l be 
served b e t t e r when people t r y t o make up t h e 
economic l o s s by d o i n g more work n e x t day. Lord 
Denning s u p p o r t e d t h i s community a t t i t u d e as a 
good s o c i a l g o a l a r g u i n g t h a t , "This i s a h e a l t h y 
a t t i t u d e which the law ought t o encourage."" 
" i n : S partan S t e e l and A l l o y s L t d . v. M a r t i n 
and Co. [ 1 9 7 3 ] 1 QB 27, a t p.38. 
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8.1.4 Consensus as g u i d e l i n e 
Another model argues t h a t w h i l e i n c l e a r cases 
t h e law d e t e r m i n e s t h e r e s u l t , t he judge ought t o 
r e l y on t h e community consensus i n h a r d cases as 
an o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r t o reduce a r b i t r a r i n e s s . 
I n s t e a d o f d e c i d i n g a c c o r d i n g t o h i s own b e l i e f s 
and v a l u e s t h e judge ought t o g i v e e f f e c t t o 
those v a l u e s which most conform t o t h e consensus 
o f v a l u e s i n t h e community a t l a r g e . " 
For t h i s o p e r a t i o n , Lord D e v l i n , who i s one o f 
t h e main exponents o f t h i s view, d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
between t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s o f cases: cases i n w h i c h 
t h e view o f t h e p u b l i c i s a l l one way; s u b j e c t -
m a t t e r s on which the p u b l i c h o l d s d i f f e r i n g 
v i e w s ; and cases i n which t h e p u b l i c i s 
i n d i f f e r e n t . For t h e f i r s t c a t e g o r y o f cases he 
welcomes j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m and law-making i n t h e 
common law, b u t n o t i n s t a t u t e law, i n o r d e r t o 
p u t t h e consensus i n t o t h e law. W i t h r e g a r d t o 
s t a t u t e law L o r d D e v l i n c l a i m s t h a t judges must 
n o t do a n y t h i n g b u t i n t e r p r e t and a p p l y t h e 
s t a t u t e by means o f a b s t r a c t l o g i c , because i t 
must be presumed t h a t P a r l i a m e n t has on t h e 
" c f . Lord D e v l i n , The judge, O x f o r d 1981, 
Ch. 1 and see a l s o f o r the r o l e o f l o b b i e s , 
p r e s s u r e and m i n o r i t y groups e t c . i n a s o c i e t y 
and t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o j u d i c i a l p o l i c y - m a k i n g , 
P. W e i l e r , Two models o f j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
(1968)46 Canadian Bar Review 406. 
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s u b j e c t i t i s d e a l i n g w i t h s a i d a l l t h a t i t 
wanted t o say. As an i l l u s t r a t i o n f o r the f i r s t 
c a t e g o r y L o r d D e v l i n g i v e s t he case o f a man who 
wants t o r e c o v e r damages from a f r i e n d who has 
g i v e n bed and b r e a k f a s t t o h i s d e s e r t i n g w i f e . 
I n such a case, he argues, t h e j u d i c i a r y would 
g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e community consensus and r e j e c t 
t h e c l a i m f o r damages. I n h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
cases, such as m e r c y - k i l l i n g , he s t i p u l a t e s t h a t 
t h e j u d i c i a r y ought t o r e f r a i n from c r e a t i v i t y 
and l e a v e t h e d e c i s i o n t o t h e l e g i s l a t o r . For 
th e t h i r d c a t e g o r y , which forms t h e m a j o r i t y o f 
cases, L o r d D e v l i n assumes t h a t when t h e p u b l i c 
i s i n d i f f e r e n t on a s u b j e c t i t i s w i l l i n g t o 
le a v e t he d e c i s i o n t o t h e judges, p r o v i d e d t h a t 
" t h e y do i t i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l way", which means 
i n accordance w i t h p r e c e d e n t . " However, he does 
not i n d i c a t e i n which d i r e c t i o n j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m 
i n h a r d cases o f t h i s c a t e g o r y s h o u l d go. 
The l e g i t i m a t i o n o f the consensus model l i e s i n 
arguments about t h e n a t u r e o f a d j u d i c a t i o n and 
about t h e p l a c e o f the j u d i c i a r y i n a democracy. 
Lord D e v l i n r e g a r d s t he r o l e o f t h e judge as one 
o f an independent a r b i t r a t o r . I n o r d e r t o be 
accepted as such by a l l the p a r t i e s t o a d i s p u t e 
he must n o t t a k e s i d e s on c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s . 
" L o r d D e v l i n , op. c i t . supra n.38, p.9-11. 
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He must be i m p a r t i a l o r a t l e a s t g i v e the 
appearance o f i m p a r t i a l i t y r e q u i r e d o f an 
a d j u d i c a t o r . The j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n i s merely t o 
keep t h e l e g a l s t andards i n s t e p w i t h t h e c u r r e n t 
consensus. 4 0 The l e g i s l a t o r , i n c o n t r a s t , i s not 
bound by these l i m i t a t i o n s and may a l s o i n t r o d u c e 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l s t a t u t e s w i t h o u t an e x i s t i n g 
consensus i n s o c i e t y because t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s 
l e g i t i m a t e d by e l e c t i o n . As t h e ju d g e s a r e n o t 
e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h e i r d e c i s i o n s have t o 
be l e g i t i m i z e d by t h e law i n c l e a r cases o r by 
c o n t e n t i n ha r d cases. Once t h e judge s t e p s 
beyond consensus i n a hard case t h e r e i s no 
l e g i t i m a t i o n o f the d e c i s i o n and j u d i c i a l -
lawmaking becomes undemocratic. 
The consensus model faces t h r e e main p o i n t s o f 
c r i t i c i s m . The f i r s t concerns t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e 
judge t o be aware o f c u r r e n t a t t i t u d e s i n t h e 
community and t o seek them o u t . u 
The second major c r i t i c i s m q u e s t i o n s t h e n o t i o n s 
o f i m p a r t i a l i t y and n e u t r a l i t y o f t h e judge. 
G r i f f i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r s t i p u l a t e s t h a t judges 
have by t h e i r e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g and the 
" i b i d . , p . l . 
"see f o r a comparison the s i m i l a r c r i t i c i s m 
o f t h e t o p i c a l approach under s e c t i o n 4.3 a t 
p. 64. 
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p u r s u i t o f t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n as b a r r i s t e r s , 
a c q u i r e d a s t r i k i n g l y homogeneous c o l l e c t i o n o f 
a t t i t u d e s , b e l i e f s and p r i n c i p l e s which i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s e r v a t i v e . " Moreover, he c l a i m s 
t h a t t h e j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n i s t o s u p p o r t t h e 
i n s t i t u t i o n s o f government as e s t a b l i s h e d by law. 
T h e r e f o r e , f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r t a s k i n t h i s 
p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e t h e y cannot be p o l i t i c a l l y 
n e u t r a l , and t h u s , the n o t i o n o f i m p a r t i a l i t y i s 
o n l y a myth." T h i s c r i t i c i s m a l s o a f f e c t s t h e 
employment o f u t i l i t a r i a n g o a l s d i s c u s s e d i n t h e 
p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n . G r i f f i t h does n o t c l a i m t h a t 
judges a c t i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t o r i n t h e 
i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r c l a s s , b u t t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f what i s i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and t h e r e f o r e 
p o l i t i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e i s , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s 
a n a l y s i s , d e t e r m i n e d by t h e i r views and p o s i t i o n s 
which a r e n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s e r v a t i v e and n o t 
i m p a r t i a l . 4 4 However, besides d e s t r o y i n g t h e myth 
o f n e u t r a l i t y G r i f f i t h does n o t p r o v i d e a 
p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e s o l u t i o n o f h a r d cases. 
"J.A.G. G r i f f i t h , The p o l i t i c s o f t h e 
j u d i c i a r y , 3 r d . ed., Glasgow 1985, p.198 and 225, 
t h i s i s s u e i s a l s o a d m i t t e d by Lord D e v l i n , op. 
c i t . supra n.38, a t p.15. 
" G r i f f i t h , op. c i t . supra n.42, pp.195 and 
235. 
" i b i d . , pp.222-223. 
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F i n a l l y , the consensus model l e a v e s unanswered 
th e q u e s t i o n of how the judge ought t o d e c ide i n 
a c o n t r o v e r s i a l case t h a t comes b e f o r e c o u r t . 
The d e c i s i o n cannot always be l e f t f o r t h e 
l e g i s l a t u r e , and when t h e c o u r t has t o d e c ide a 
h ard case where t h e r e i s n e i t h e r a consensus 
a v a i l a b l e nor a c l e a r s t a t u s quo o f p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n which has p r e v a i l e d u n t i l t h e i s s u e 
became c o n t r o v e r s i a l , one may assume t h a t t h e 
judge seeks f o r t h e d e c i s i o n w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t 
p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t i n s o c i e t y . However, i t shows 
t h a t the judge cannot always escape p o l i t i c a l o r 
s o c i a l c o n t r o v e r s y . 
A c c o r d i n g t o Lord D e v l i n ' s view t h e i s s u e i n 
Spartan S t e e l would be c o n s i d e r e d as a s u b j e c t on 
which the p u b l i c i s i n d i f f e r e n t . I n such cases 
t h e consensus model does n o t p r o v i d e any 
guidance, so t h a t t h e judge i s f r e e t o d e c i d e 
s u b j e c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o "do i t i n t h e 
t r a d i t i o n a l way". 
8.2 N a t u r a l law t h e o r i e s and r i g h t s model 
As we have seen t h e r e i s always a degree o f 
d i s c r e t i o n f o r the judge i n h a r d cases a c c o r d i n g 
t o the i n t e r s t i t i a l l e g i s l a t o r model o f 
a d j u d i c a t i o n . The d i f f e r e n t n o t i o n s v a r y from 
s t i p u l a t i n g the a r b i t r a r i n e s s o f t h e d e c i s i o n and 
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th e complete freedom o f c h o i c e , o v e r n o t i o n s o f 
c o n s i s t e n c y and coherence o f r u l e s and v a l u e s , 
t o t h e advice t o employ c e r t a i n k i n d s o f 
arguments or t o i n c o r p o r a t e c e r t a i n community 
v a l u e s and views. D e s p i t e these g u i d e l i n e s and 
however s t r i c t t h e y are one may co n c l u d e t h a t 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i n t e r s t i t i a l l e g i s l a t o r model 
t h e r e i s always a f i e l d where t h e judge i s f r e e 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f arguments o r 
consequences and where t h e r e i s no c o m p e l l i n g 
s u b s t a n t i v e a u t h o r i t y t o r e f e r t o . T h i s may l e a d 
t o t h e somewhat r e s i g n e d view o f H a r r i s 4 1 t h a t i n 
h a r d cases t he judge remains c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e 
fearsome burden o f c h o i c e r e l y i n g on some 'mix* 
o f models o f l e g a l r a t i o n a l i t y . 4 ' 
D i f f e r e n t n o t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l i t y and l e g i t i m a t i o n 
o f j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s i n hard cases can be found 
among adherents o f t h e o r i e s w h i c h p r o v i d e 
s t r i c t e r guidance than t he i n t e r s t i t i a l 
l e g i s l a t o r model and l e s s o r no freedom t o 
d e c i d e . Such t h e o r i e s are e i t h e r based on 
n a t u r a l law t h e o r i e s f o l l o w i n g an o b j e c t i v e l e g a l 
45J.W. H a r r i s , Unger' s c r i t i q u e o f f o r m a l i s m 
i n l e g a l r e a s o n i n g : Hero, H e r c u l e s , and Humdrum 
(1989)52 Modern Law Review 42, a t pp.55-57 and 
62. 
"see f o r h i s f o u r models o f l e g a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y , H a r r i s , Law and l e g a l s c i e n c e , 
O x f o r d 1979, p p . l 3 2 f f . 
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o r d e r or on t h e o r i e s about d i s c o v e r a b l e r i g h t s o f 
the c o n t e s t i n g p a r t i e s . However, o n l y a few 
n a t u r a l law t h e o r i s t s p r o v i d e a t h e o r y o f 
a d j u d i c a t i o n which d e a l s w i t h t h e consequences o f 
t h e i r approach f o r the p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n . 4 7 
I n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s we w i l l b r i e f l y 
i n d i c a t e t h e unpopular b e l i e f o f t h e d e c l a r a t o r y 
t h e o r y (under s e c t i o n 8.2.1) as background t o 
contemporary t h e o r i e s w h i c h a l l o w t h e judge a 
more o r l e s s e r degree o f d i s c r e t i o n w i t h i n t h e 
bounds o f an o b j e c t i v e m o r a l o r d e r (under s e c t i o n 
8.2.2) or which o f f e r r i g h t s as g u i d e l i n e s i n 
o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e one r i g h t answer w i t h 
r e f e r e n c e t o p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e ' c r i t i c a l c u l t u r a l 
community' (under s e c t i o n 8.2.3). 
8.2.1 No freedom t o d e c i d e 
The d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y o f law i s u s u a l l y 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h B l a c k s t o n e who adhered t o t h e 
c l a s s i c a l n a t u r a l law d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e p o s i t i v e 
law d e r i v e s i t s b i n d i n g f o r c e from n a t u r a l law 
which i s w i l l e d by God and d i s c o v e r a b l e by 
ve.g. J. F i n n i s , N a t u r a l law and n a t u r a l 
r i g h t s , O x f o r d 1980 does n o t e x p l a i n t h e 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f h i s approach i n the c o n c r e t e 
case. 
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reason." Thus, t h e judge does n o t make the law 
but he merely f i n d s i t and d e c l a r e s i t l i k e a 
' l i v i n g o r a c l e ' . However, t h e d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y 
i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y d e t e r m i n e d by a d i v i n e o r 
m e t a p h y s i c a l o r i g i n . I t may a l s o be based on 
n o t i o n s such as t h a t t h e r e a r e p r i n c i p l e s o f 
n a t u r e which are immanent i n any community. I n 
any case j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s a r e regarded as 
d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n s o f e x i s t i n g law o r d e d u c t i o n s 
from some e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s , and t h e d e c i s i o n 
depends on the a b i l i t y o f t h e judge t o f i n d t h e 
law. The d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y has f a l l e n i n t o 
d i s r e p u t e t h r o u g h t h e c r i t i c i s m o f Bentham and 
o t h e r p o s i t i v i s t s . " However, we w i l l see a t a 
l a t e r p o i n t t h a t t h e r e a re n o t i c e a b l e 
s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h i s model and Dworkin's 
r i g h t s t h e s i s . 
We cannot demonstrate t h e r e s u l t o f such a t h e o r y 
i n t h e - S p a r t a n S t e e l case. However, one can say 
t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y o n l y one 
d e c i s i o n can be accepted as b e i n g i n accordance 
w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g law, and d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n s 
"W. Bla c k s t o n e , Commentaries on t h e laws o f 
England, V o l . I ; r e p r i n t o f t h e f i r s t e d i t i o n o f 
1765, London 1966, I n t r o d u c t i o n , s e c t i o n I I . 
" n e v e r t h e l e s s , A t i y a h , op. c i t . supra n . l , 
p.347 argues t h a t t h e d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y i s s t i l l 
f r e q u e n t l y 'invoked' by t h e E n g l i s h j u d i c i a r y , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n pronouncements on t h e bench. 
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can o n l y occur as disagreements about what t h e 
law i s but n o t about what i t ought t o be, because 
they can o n l y a r i s e from t he d i f f e r e n t s k i l l s and 
c a p a c i t i e s o f t h e judges t o f i n d the law. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , L o r d Denning's judgement t h a t t h e 
d e c i s i o n was a m a t t e r o f p o l i c y would be 
unacceptable f o r a d h e r e n t s o f t h e d e c l a r a t o r y 
t h e o r y . 
8.2.2 Freedom w i t h i n t h e bounds o f an o b j e c t i v e 
moral o r d e r 
N a t u r a l law t h e o r i e s do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y 
t h a t every s i n g l e d e c i s i o n i s pr e d e t e r m i n e d by an 
e x i s t i n g o r d e r as t h e d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y c l a i m s . 
A c cording t o some n a t u r a l law concepts c o u r t s can 
have d i s c r e t i o n t o r e s o l v e a hard case i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways w i t h i n t h e g u i d e l i n e s and 
l i m i t a t i o n s o f an o r d e r t h a t can be d i s c o v e r e d . 
Such a 'most moderate'" form o f a n a t u r a l law 
t h e o r y which has as i t s fundamental t e n e t an 
a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h e r o l e o f human reason has been 
developed by Lon F u l l e r . However, as F u l l e r 
never sought t o d e v e l o p a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f t h e 
n a t u r e , k i n d s , and l i m i t s o f l e g a l r e a s o n i n g , the 
" c f . L. F u l l e r , Anatomy o f the law, New 
York, Washington, London 1968, p.116. 
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i m p l i c a t i o n s o f h i s c o n c e p t i o n remain v e r y 
vague. 5 1 
F u l l e r argues t h a t a s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n between 
l e g a l and ' e x t r a - l e g a l ' m a t e r i a l s cannot be 
m a i n t a i n e d , and t h a t c o u r t s o f t e n d e c i d e on moral 
reasons." For i n s t a n c e , i f a s t a t u t e i s u n c l e a r 
or becomes o u t o f da t e F u l l e r c l a i m s t h a t one 
ought t o r e f e r t o t h e o b j e c t i v e purpose o f t h e 
s t a t u t e . " F u l l e r s t a t e s t h a t when r u l e s are 
t r e a t e d i n terms o f t h e i r purposes, ' i s ' and 
'ought' i n e v i t a b l y g e t mixed. T h i s process 
i n v o l v e s r e p l a c i n g t h e l e g i s l a t o r ' s o r i g i n a l 
i n t e n t w i t h a new o b j e c t i v e i n t e n t which depends 
on the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s n o t i o n o f what purpose t he 
r u l e ought t o s e r v e . 
However, F u l l e r argues t h a t one must n ot 
o v e r s t a t e t h e r o l e r a t i o n a l i t y can p l a y i n human 
a f f a i r ' s , and t h a t o f t e n b o r d e r l i n e cases can, 
w i t h equal r a t i o n a l i t y o r i r r a t i o n a l i t y , be 
decided e i t h e r way:" 
" c f . R. Summers, Lon L. F u l l e r , London 1984, 
p.114. 
" F u l l e r , The law i n quest o f i t s e l f , Boston 
1940, p.136. 
"idem., P o s i t i v i s m and f i d e l i t y t o law - a 
r e p l y t o P r o f e s s o r H a r t (1958)71 Harvard Law 
Review 630 a t p p . 6 6 9 f f . 
"idem., Anatomy (supra n . 5 0 ) , p.116. 
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"So on a l a r g e s c a l e when c o u r t s seem 
t o be choosing among v a r i o u s r e c o g n i z e d 
'sources o f law* - pr e c e d e n t , business 
custom, l e a r n e d t r e a t i s e s , r e c e i v e d 
c o n c e p t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y - t h e r e a l l y 
d e t e r m i n a t i v e c h o i c e may s i m p l y be: 
Which r u l e i s be s t ? Which r u l e most 
c l o s e l y r e s p e c t s t h e f a c t s o f men's 
s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e and tends most t o 
promote an e f f e c t i v e and s a t i s f a c t o r y 
l i f e i n common?"" 
F u l l e r , n e v e r t h e l e s s , r e f e r s t o some o b j e c t i v e 
c r i t e r i a i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t he ' r e l e v a n t 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' t h a t can be d i s c o v e r e d . He c a l l s 
them ' p r i n c i p l e s o f sound s o c i a l a r c h i t e c t u r e ' " 
which are " e x t e r n a l c r i t e r i a , found i n t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r s u c c e s s f u l group 
l i v i n g " , " and which f u r n i s h some s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t 
which t h e T i g h t n e s s o f a d e c i s i o n s h o u l d be 
measured. We are n o t t o l d p r e c i s e l y what t h e s e 
p r i n c i p l e s which l i e i n t h e 'nature o f t h i n g s ' 
a r e , and F u l l e r d e s i g n a t e s o n l y one such 
p r i n c i p l e o f s u b s t a n t i v e n a t u r a l law, namely 
communication as an e s s e n t i a l o f s o c i a l 
o r d e r i n g . " Thus, i n ha r d cases judges must 
d i s c o v e r and r e s p e c t t h e i n n e r o r d e r and 
i n t e g r i t y o f such b a s i c forms o f s o c i a l o r d e r i n g 
as c o n t r a c t , l e g i s l a t i o n , and a d j u d i c a t i o n 
"idem., Reason and f i a t i n case law (1946)59 
Harvard Law Review 376 a t p.381. 
"idem., Anatomy (supra n.50), p.116. 
"idem., Reason and f i a t (supra n.55), p.379. 
"idem., The m o r a l i t y o f law, New Haven and 
London 1964, p.186. 
171 
i t s e l f . Judges who f a i l t o do t h i s w i l l make 
unsound decisions. 
One may conclude t h a t , according t o F u l l e r , the 
judge has considerable freedom t o decide hard 
cases w i t h i n the bounds of the nature of things 
which provide a (very vague) scale of ' r e l a t i v e 
r a t i o n a l i t y " . " 
The conception of s o c i a l o r d e r i n g has been 
elaborated f u r t h e r and provided w i t h a theory of 
a d j u d i c a t i o n by Beyleveld and Brownsword who 
s t i p u l a t e t h a t conceiving s o c i a l o r d e r i n g i n 
terms of p r a c t i c a l reason presupposes moral 
reason." They define moral reason i n terms of 
Gewirth's 'moral absolutism' c l a i m i n g t h a t anyone 
who acts i s committed t o a supreme moral 
p r i n c i p l e s p e c i f y i n g absolute human r i g h t s . 6 1 
This o b j e c t i v e and absolute r a t h e r than r e l a t i v e 
p r i n c i p l e i s r e f e r r e d t o as the ' P r i n c i p l e of 
Generic Consistency (the PGC)'. I t s t a t e s t h a t 
one should act i n accord w i t h the generic r i g h t s 
of one's r e c i p i e n t s as w e l l as one s e l f . " Generic 
"idem., Anatomy (supra n.50), p.117. 
6,D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Law as a 
moral judgement, London 1986, p.126. 
" i b i d . , p.129. 
" i b i d . , p.133. 
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r i g h t s are the r i g h t s to freedom and w e l l - b e i n g , 
and every agent must hold these r i g h t s because 
they are the necessary conditions of hi s ac t i n g . " 
Front t h i s i t follows t h a t : 
"Every agent, on pain of c o n t r a d i c t i n g 
h i s status as an agent and hence of 
i r r a t i o n a l i t y , must accept the PGC as 
governing a l l h i s i n t e r p e r s o n a l 
a c t i o n s . The PGC i s a p r i n c i p l e t o 
which every agent i s l o g i c a l l y 
committed, i r r e s p e c t i v e of h i s 
purposes, of what he a c t u a l l y happens 
t o t h i n k i s good or r i g h t ( i n e i t h e r 
moral or amoral senses), simply by 
conceiving of himself as a prospective 
agent w i t h purposes. I t i s thus the 
p r i n c i p l e against which the moral 
s t a t u s of a l l a c t i o n i s to be judged. 
A l l actions are morally o b l i g a t o r y 
which, given the circumstances, are 
required by the PGC. A l l actions are 
morally wrong i f they c o n t r a d i c t the 
PGC; and a l l actions are morally 
o p t i o n a l i f they are n e i t h e r required 
by, nor c o n t r a d i c t what i s required by, 
the PGC."" 
For the a d j u d i c a t i v e process t h i s means that the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s attempt s i n c e r e l y and s e r i o u s l y t o 
produce the correct legal-moral determination of 
the issue as d i c t a t e d by the PGC." I n order t o 
be v a l i d , however, a decision need not 
n e c e s s a r i l y be the r i g h t one, but i t must be 
" r a t i o n a l l y defensible' i n accordance w i t h the 
SSA. Gewirth, Human r i g h t s , Chicago 1982, 
p. 20. 
"Beyleveld and Brownsword, op. c i t . supra 
n.60, p.133. 
" i b i d . , p.390. 
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PGC, which requires reasonable competence and a 
serious attempt to apply the PGC." Thus, i n 
cont r a s t toDworkin's superhuman judge, Hercules, 
the concept of a judge according t o Beyleveld and 
Brownsword i s one where the judge attempts t o 
emulate Hercules." The judge must apply the PGC 
as a guiding moral p r i n c i p l e e q u a l l y f o r easy and 
hard cases," which implies t h a t he i s authorized 
t o r e j e c t 'unjust' r u l e s , namely r u l e s not i n 
compliance w i t h the PGC." 
Beyleveld and Brownsword assert t h a t the PGC can 
resolve d i r e c t l y the problem of which actions are 
o p t i o n a l , or o b l i g a t o r y , or p r o h i b i t e d , but i t 
cannot resolve d i r e c t l y the problem of which of 
o p t i o n a l , but incompatible, behaviour i s t o be 
pursued. I n order t o resolve such c o n f l i c t s the 
PGC delegates a u t h o r i t y . Thus, t i t l e t o decide 
what i s o p t i o n a l , or o b l i g a t o r y , or p r o h i b i t e d i s 
not t i t l e t o invent what f a l l s i n t o these 
categories. I t i s only t i t l e t o attempt t o f i n d 
the r i g h t answer t o these questions. Whereas 
t i t l e t o decide which of two or more o p t i o n a l 
courses of behaviour i s t o be made o b l i g a t o r y i s 
" i b i d . , pp.386 and 387. 
" i b i d . , p.436, note 27. 
" i b i d . , p.436. 
" i b i d . , p.439. 
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'strong d i s c r e t i o n ' , because there i s no r i g h t 
answer, deducible from the PGC, t o the question 
of which i s t o be pursued." This does not mean 
t h a t the judge i s fr e e t o p o s i t any r u l e 
whatsoever, but he i s f r e e w i t h i n the options 
l e f t open by the PGC. 
Returning t o our example we must examine how t o 
decide Spartan Steel i n accordance w i t h the PGC. 
This confronts us w i t h d i f f i c u l t i e s i n an 
economic loss case l i k e Spartan Steel because one 
cannot e a s i l y reduce the issue i n question t o the 
generic r i g h t s of freedom and w e l l - b e i n g , and 
der i v e a concrete s o l u t i o n from an abs t r a c t 
p r i n c i p l e belonging to the f a m i l y of e g a l i t a r i a n 
p r i n c i p l e s , such as 'Love Thy Neighbours as 
T h y s e l f ; 'Treat others as you would have them 
t r e a t you', or Kant's Categorical Imperative -
'Act only on t h a t maxim through which you can at 
the same time w i l l t h a t i t should become a 
u n i v e r s a l l a w . , n 
However, one may say t h a t arguments such as the 
r i s k of f i c t i t i o u s claims and expensive 
l i t i g a t i o n , or the d i f f i c u l t i e s of d i s p r o v i n g the 
alleged cause and e f f e c t which were made by Lord 
" i b i d . , p.179. 
n c f . i b i d . , p.141. 
Denning would not be i n accordance w i t h the PGC, 
as they are not r e l a t e d t o the generic r i g h t s of 
the p a r t i e s , but r a t h e r r e f e r t o t h e i r 
e n f o r c e a b i l i t y and the e f f i c i e n c y of the courts 
and the j u d i c i a l machinery. Whereas arguments of 
the kind t h a t the consequences of a successful 
economic loss claim may s p e l l d i s a s t e r f o r the 
negligent p a r t y , so t h a t i t should be s u f f e r e d by 
the whole community (which was a l s o put forward 
by Lord Denning) seem t o be more i n accordance 
w i t h the generic r i g h t s of a r e c i p i e n t . I n any 
case one can say t h a t the d e c i s i o n i s r a t i o n a l l y 
defensible i n s o f a r as the judges i n Spartan Steel 
s i n c e r e l y and s e r i o u s l y believed t o be i n l i n e 
w i t h the PGC.71 
8.2.3 Rights as g u i d e l i n e s 
According t o Dworkin's r i g h t s t h e s i s judges do 
and ought t o decide hard cases" according t o the 
r i g h t s , of the c o n t e s t i n g p a r t i e s . ' 4 I n contrast 
t o goals which are taken t o be of i n t e r e s t t o the 
community as a whole, r i g h t s are generated by a 
7 ! c f . the discussion of Dockers' Labour Club 
and I n s t i t u t e Ltd. v. Race Relations Board (1976) 
i n : Beyleveld and Brownsword, op. c i t . supra 
n.60, pp.404-406. 
"as we have pointed out above under section 
6.3 at p. B9clear and hard cases are according to 
Dworkin decided i n the same fas h i o n . 
"Dworkin, Taking r i g h t s (supra n.35), 
pp.90ff. 
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concern f o r some i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t . So, f o r 
example, the r i g h t to freedom of speech and, most 
important, the r i g h t t o equal treatment and 
respect. According t o Dworkin, r i g h t s are 
generated by p r i n c i p l e s whereas goals are 
generated by p o l i c i e s . " He claims t h a t judges 
are not expected t o consider p o l i c i e s and weigh 
u t i l i t a r i a n goals about the c o l l e c t i v e welfare 
when deciding points of unestablished law. 
Value-judgements of t h i s k i n d are f o r the 
l e g i s l a t u r e and executive alone, but not f o r 
courts which consist of a non-elected body of 
judges. Their f u n c t i o n i s t o p r o t e c t and enforce 
r i g h t s . Deciding according t o p o l i c i e s i n s t e a d , 
i s i n e f f e c t l e g i s l a t i n g r e t r o a c t i v e l y . 
Therefore, r i g h t s are also c h a r a c t e r i z e d as past-
regarding or present-regarding, and goals as 
f u t u r e - r e g a r d i n g . " 
Moreover, Dworkin takes r i g h t s t o be 'trumps' 
which i n d i v i d u a l s hold over decisions of p o l i c y . " 
They can outplay arguments based on the 
c o l l e c t i v e welfare and p r o t e c t m i n o r i t y groups 
against m a j o r i t y a c t i o n and pressure. While 
" i b i d . , p.90. 
" c f . Summers, Substantive reasons (supra 
n.32), p.721. 
nR. Dworkin, Law's empire, Cambridge, Mass. 
1986, p.223. 
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elected r e p r e s e n t a t i v e bodies determine what i s 
good f o r the community as a whole, allowing 
judges to decide cases according t o c o l l e c t i v e 
welfare considerations would jeopardize the 
p r o t e c t i o n by means of r i g h t s . 
The l e g a l r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s which coincide 
w i t h what the law i s i n the p a r t i c u l a r dispute 
are ascertainable by applying p r i n c i p l e s 
belonging t o the theory of p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y 
which provides the best j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the 
s e t t l e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s . Thus, r i g h t s 
are discoverable from the body of e x i s t i n g law 
according t o notions of 'law as i n t e g r i t y ' and 
' i n s t i t u t i o n a l f i t ' . This means t h a t p r i n c i p l e s 
may be decisive i n some cases, but not i n others, 
depending on t h e i r weight. One such p r i n c i p l e 
i s , f o r example, t h a t 'no person s h a l l p r o f i t 
from h i s own wrong.' These p r i n c i p l e s cannot be 
explained by reference t o formal source-
o r i e n t a t e d c r i t e r i a of v a l i d i t y , and Dworkin 
refuses t o accept such a r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n . " 
"According to law as i n t e g r i t y , 
p r o p o s i t i o n s of law are t r u e i f they 
f i g u r e i n or f o l l o w from the p r i n c i p l e s 
of j u s t i c e , f a i r n e s s , and procedural 
'!R. Sa r t o r i u s , I n d i v i d u a l conduct and s o c i a l 
norms, Encino and Belmont 1975, pp.181-210 has 
developed a theory which i s very s i m i l a r t o 
Dworkin's r i g h t s t h e s i s , but he seeks t o i d e n t i f y 
the relevant p r i n c i p l e s by something q u i t e l i k e 
Hart's u l t i m a t e r u l e of r e c o g n i t i o n . 
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due process t h a t provide the best 
c o n s t r u c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
community's l e g a l p r a c t i c e " , " and 
i n t e g r i t y "demands t h a t the p u b l i c 
standards of the community be both made 
and seen, so f a r as t h i s i s p o s s i b l e , 
to express a s i n g l e , coherent scheme of 
j u s t i c e and f a i r n e s s i n the r i g h t 
r e l a t i o n . 
This also authorizes the judge t o t r e a t some of 
the s e t t l e d law as mistaken." Thus, Dworkin does 
not s t i p u l a t e t h a t r i g h t s e x i s t o b j e c t i v e l y being 
generated by an o b j e c t i v e order of values. 
Instead r i g h t s are created by people who have the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o f i t the p a r t i c u l a r judgements 
on which they act i n t o a coherent program of 
a c t i o n . " 
I n hard cases, Dworkin's theory r e q u i r e s the 
judge to work out a coherent p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y 
which j u s t i f i e s the r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s of law. 
This ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l m o r a l i t y ' , which i s 
presupposed by the law and i n s t i t u t i o n s of the 
community, i s then applied t o the r e s o l u t i o n of 
the case. 
"Dworkin, Law's empire (supra n.77), p.225. 
" i b i d . , p.219. 
"idem., Taking r i g h t s (supra n.35), pp.118-
123. 
" i b i d . , p.160. 
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Problems a r i s e when both p a r t i e s before the 
c o u r t have r i g h t s and when these r i g h t s 
c o n f l i c t . I n such a case the judge has t o weigh 
r i g h t s and t o decide which one ' p u l l s strongest'. 
However strong the r i g h t s of each p a r t y are, 
according t o Dworkin there i s always one r i g h t 
answer 8 1 t o every problem, and the c o r r e c t l e g a l 
answer i s the one which provides the c l o s e s t f i t 
w i t h e x i s t i n g r u l e s and the whole e x i s t i n g body 
of law. Of course, only Hercules can f i n d t h i s 
answer, but ordinary judges ought t o t r y t o f i n d 
i t . Thus, judges do not have 'strong' 
d i s c r e t i o n , such th a t there i s no b i n d i n g 
m a t e r i a l i n play, i n what they decide, but they 
o n l y have d i s c r e t i o n i n a 'weak' sense t o judge 
what the law comes t o . " Consequently judges do 
not and must not l e g i s l a t e . Dworkin's a t t a c k on 
(strong) d i s c r e t i o n and h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t the 
law i s a seamless web have u s u a l l y been 
i n t e r p r e t e d as being reminiscent of the 
d i s c r e d i t e d d e c l a r a t o r y theory as according t o 
" i b i d . , pp.104 and 115 and i n : No r i g h t 
answer?, i n : Law, m o r a l i t y , and s o c i e t y , ed. by 
P. Hacker and J. Raz, Oxford 1977, pp.58ff., at 
p. 84. 
"idem., Taking r i g h t s (supra n.35), pp.68ff. 
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both models judges should merely act on what they 
t h i n k the law already i s . 8 5 
The main o b j e c t i o n t o Dworkin's r i g h t s t h e s i s 
concerns the weakness of i t s d e s c r i p t i v e account. 
I t has been argued th a t judges a c t u a l l y do decide 
according t o p o l i c i e s and not only according t o 
p r i n c i p l e s . " However, t h i s c r i t i c i s m does not 
a f f e c t the normative account of Dworkin's 
theory." 
Furthermore, i t has been argued t h a t Hercules i s 
unreal and thus can never e x i s t , so t h a t the 
r i g h t s t h e s i s does not provide much guidance f o r 
the o r d i n a r y every-day judge. , ! Moreover, c r i t i c s 
" c f . Hart, Essays (supra n.18), p.154; Lord 
Lloyd of Hampstead and M.D.A. Freeman, op. c i t . 
supra n.31, p.1129; A. Hutchinson and J. 
Wakefield, A hard look at 'Hard cases': the 
nightmare of a noble dreamer (1982)2 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 86, at p.90; but Dworkin 
seems t o r e f u t e t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n Law' s 
empire (supra n.77), at p.225: "So law as 
i n t e g r i t y r e j e c t s as u n h e l p f u l the ancient 
question whether judges f i n d or invent law; we 
understand l e g a l reasoning, i t suggests, o n l y by 
seeing the sense i n which they do both and 
n e i t h e r . " 
, 8 c f . Beyleveld and Brownsword, op. c i t . 
supra n.60, p.428; Atiyah, op. c i t . supra n . l , 
p.351; J. B e l l , Policy arguments i n j u d i c i a l 
d e c isions, Oxford 1983. 
" c f . Beyleveld and Brownsword, op. c i t . 
supra n.60, p.430. 
8 a c f . H a r r i s , Unger' s c r i t i q u e (supra n.45), 
p.63. 
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claim that i t i s p e r f e c t l y possible t o construct, 
as MacCormick has done, a p o s i t i v i s t theory of 
law and a d j u d i c a t i o n which incorporates 
p r i n c i p l e s and notions of coherence and 
consistency without denying the existence of gaps 
i n the law." 
F i n a l l y , although they have been regarded as one 
important type of reasons i n j u d i c i a l d ecision, 
the exclusive c o n s i d e r a t i o n of r i g h t s has been 
r e j e c t e d , because i t only takes the f a c t s of the 
p a r t i c u l a r case i n t o account, whereas i t neglects 
general f a c t s of s o c i a l c a u s a l i t y , and does not 
provide any ' c a l c u l a t i o n a l r a t i o n a l i t y ' such as 
an economic c o s t - b e n e f i t analysis of a decision.' 4 
Dworkin claims t h a t a case l i k e Spartan Steel 
ought to be decided according t o p r i n c i p l e s and 
not on p o l i c y grounds which had been favoured by 
Lord Denning i n h i s judgement." Hence, one has 
t o ask what r i g h t s do the p a r t i e s involved have? 
E i t h e r the p l a i n t i f f or the defendant has a r i g h t 
t o be granted a d e c i s i o n i n h i s favour. Spartan 
Steel can appeal t o the p r i n c i p l e t h a t everyone 
8 9 c f . Lord Lloyd of Hampstead and Freeman, 
op. c i t . supra n.31, p.413. 
" c f . Summers, Substantive reasons (supra 
n.32), p.765. 
nDworkin, Taking r i g h t s (supra n.35), p.84. 
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ought to take reasonable care t o avoid i n f l i c t i n g 
foreseeable harm on others, and t o be held l i a b l e 
f o r such harm as i s caused by f a i l u r e to take 
reasonable care, so t h a t one may say t h a t Spartan 
Steel has a r i g h t not t o be harmed and i f t h i s i s 
v i o l a t e d a r i g h t t o damages. M a r t i n , on the 
other hand, can adduce p r i n c i p l e s which have been 
enunciated as r e s t r i c t i n g the p o s s i b l e range of 
l i a b i l i t y f o r negligent acts, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t the duty of care i s owed only t o 
those upon whom one's acts may foreseeably 
i n f l i c t p h y sical harm. Thus, M a r t i n has a r i g h t 
t o f r e e a c t i o n as long as he does not i n t e r f e r e 
p h y s i c a l l y w i t h well-being and p r o p e r t y of others 
and t h e r e f o r e he has a r i g h t t o be absolved from 
l i a b i l i t y . As those r i g h t s c o n f l i c t , they must 
be weighed. Dworkin assumes t h a t there i s always 
one r i g h t which outweighs the other, so t h a t one 
r i g h t can be upheld i n preference t o the other. 
I t i s -the judge's task t o f i n d out which of the 
underlying p r i n c i p l e s p u l l s stronger according t o 
the community's i n s t i t u t i o n a l m o r a l i t y . 
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9 Comparison w i t h the t o p i c a l method 
Under Chapter 6 we have examined the d i f f e r e n t 
notions of hard cases i n English l e g a l theory and 
concluded t h a t they coincide s t r i k i n g l y w i t h what 
Viehweg c a l l e d 'points of entry' of the t o p i c s 
i n t o the l e g a l order. At t h i s p o i n t we w i l l give 
a b r i e f restatement of the t o p i c a l approach t o 
the r e s o l u t i o n of such cases i n order t o compare 
i t w i t h the English models of the j u d i c i a l r o l e . 
According to j u r i s t i c t o p i c s the judge i s free i n 
h i s choice of arguments f o r the r e s o l u t i o n of a 
hard case as long as the argument i s o r i e n t a t e d 
to the problem and u s e f u l f o r i t s s o l u t i o n . He 
ought to be guided by catalogues of t o p o i which 
support the i n t u i t i o n f o r the f i n d i n g of 
premises, so t h a t he i s not dependent on the 
hunch.- I n order t o r a t i o n a l i z e the process of 
reasoning and t o l e g i t i m i z e the d e c i s i o n the 
f i n a l premises have to be adopted by the 
i n t e r l o c u t o r . 
This very vague not i o n of an i n t e r l o c u t o r or a 
l e g a l audience can on the one hand be i n t e r p r e t e d 
as r e f e r r i n g to the d i s c u r s i v e process of 
a d j u d i c a t i o n before court and t o the p a r t i e s 
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which are involved. On the other hand i t may 
comprise the consensus among the wise, such as 
judges, j u r i s t s e t c . , or r e q u i r e a general 
consensus i n the community. As the community or 
l e g a l audience c o n t r i b u t e s t o the j u d i c i a l 
d e cision i n t r o d u c i n g t h e i r views and knowledge 
i n t o l e g a l discourse, the top i c s and new r h e t o r i c 
are c a l l e d theories of p r a c t i c a l reasoning. They 
assert t h a t , besides e m p i r i c a l proof and l o g i c a l 
deduction, l e g a l discourse can be r a t i o n a l by 
means of such a p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of reason. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g sections we w i l l look at the 
English models of the j u d i c i a l r o l e w i t h 
reference t o which arguments they admit f o r the 
r e s o l u t i o n of hard cases (under s e c t i o n 9.1) and 
how the decision i s l e g i t i m i z e d (under section 
9.2). Moreover, we w i l l examine the a f f i n i t y of 
j u r i s t i c t o pics t o l e g a l p o s i t i v i s m and n a t u r a l 
law t h e o r i e s , and consider to what extent they 
i n i t i a t e d contemporary trends i n a n a l y t i c a l 
jurisprudence (under se c t i o n 9.3). 
9.1 L i m i t a t i o n of to p o i 
I n a recent essay Joseph Raz d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
between a d e l i b e r a t i v e and an executive stage of 
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p r a c t i c a l reasoning. 1 I n the d e l i b e r a t i v e stage 
the question what i s t o be done i s open t o 
argument based on a l l s o r t s of considerations, 
and i t i s o f t e n dominated by reasons of a moral 
character. So long as the argument i s fr e e the 
executive stage has not been reached. At the 
executive stage d e l i b e r a t i o n i s excluded and only 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e p o s i t i v i s t considerations are 
admitted. For instance, when we are considering 
whether 'to do X' should be an o b l i g a t i o n , we are 
at the d e l i b e r a t i v e phase of p r a c t i c a l reasoning. 
Once an a u t h o r i t a t i v e d e c i s i o n i s taken t h a t 'to 
do X' i s o b l i g a t o r y , f u r t h e r d e l i b e r a t i o n i s 
excluded. According to Raz courts are guided by 
considerations belonging t o both stages and 
usually decisions are not made on a 'pure' 
d e l i b e r a t i v e or executive stage. 2 I n cases where 
the law i s s e t t l e d courts act as law-appliers 
employing a u t h o r i t a t i v e and p o s i t i v i s t 
considerations on the executive stage, whereas, 
according to Raz's a n a l y s i s , they act as law-
makers i n cases of u n s e t t l e d law. 
'J. Raz, The problem about the nature of law 
(1982)3 Contemporary Philosophy 107, at pp,119ff. 
2 i b i d . , p.121; - a s i m i l a r analysis has been 
made by P.S. At i y a h , Judges and p o l i c y (1980)15 
I s r a e l Law Review 346, at p.353; " A d m i n i s t r a t i v e , 
and p o l i t i c a l and j u d i c i a l decision-making a l l 
involve s i m i l a r l i m i t e d terms of reference." 
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This d i s t i n c t i o n between d e l i b e r a t i v e and 
executive stages which according t o Raz underlies 
a l l personal actions as w e l l as s o c i a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n corresponds w i t h the t o p i c a l method. 
When there i s no problem because a case can be 
solved by means of s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning from 
e x i s t i n g l e g a l p r o p o s i t i o n s there i s hardly 
d e l i b e r a t i o n and the case can e a s i l y be solved on 
the executive stage. However, i n cases where 
there i s a problem the d e l i b e r a t i v e stage i s 
dominant and may be equated w i t h t o p i c a l 
reasoning. Every argument has t o be considered 
and there i s no l i m i t a t i o n of t o p o i u n t i l the 
premises are accepted by the i n t e r l o c u t o r . 
However, according t o one versio n of the 
i n t e r l o c u t o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n on the d e l i b e r a t i v e 
stage may already be r e s t r i c t e d t o arguments 
which are supported by a community consensus. 
This arises because according t o t h i s version the 
community does not d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
evaluation and choice of premises (e.g. i n form 
of opinion p o l l s ) , r a t h e r the community a t t i t u d e 
must be respected by those who choose the 
premises from the a v a i l a b l e t o p o i . 
Some t h e o r i s t s such as Kelsen and Hart do not 
provide a concept of r a t i o n a l i t y f o r decisions i n 
hard cases. There i s no l i m i t a t i o n of arguments 
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and t h e j u d g e i s f r e e i n h i s d e c i s i o n . D e c i s i o n s 
b e y o n d t h e g u i d a n c e o f r u l e s a r e r e g a r d e d as 
c o n s i s t i n g o f a r b i t r a r y v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t s . 
J u r i s t i c t o p i c s and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e new r h e t o r i c 
r e j e c t t h i s n o t i o n o f a r b i t r a r i n e s s i n f a v o u r o f 
a r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n . 
A c c o r d i n g t o MacGormick l e g a l a r g u m e n t i n h a r d 
c a s e s o u g h t t o be v a l u e - c o h e r e n t . Thus, i t must 
n o t c o n t r a d i c t o t h e r v a l u e s o f t h e l e g a l o r d e r 
w h i c h may be e x p r e s s e d i n u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s 
and w h i c h c an be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s by 
means o f a n a l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g . The t o p i c a l 
a p p r o a c h t r e a t s l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s and a n a l o g i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g as t o p o i t h a t s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d 
among o t h e r s . M o r e o v e r , v a l u e - c o h e r e n c e may be 
a s t r o n g and p e r s u a s i v e t o p o s , b u t j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s do n o t r e q u i r e v a l u e - c o h e r e n c e w i t h i n a 
l e g a l s y s t e m , b e c a u s e i t i s t h e p r i m a c y o f t h e 
p r o b l e m w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t o p i c a l a rgument i n t h e 
f i r s t p l a c e . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , a d h e r e n t s o f t h e t o p i c s w o u l d r e g a r d 
b o t h g o a l s and r i g h t s as t o p o i . B ut as t h e y do 
n o t p r o v i d e a p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y f o r t h e 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f d e c i s i o n s , t h e r e i s no 
r e s t r i c t i o n o f a r g u m e n t s t o e i t h e r g o a l s o r 
r i g h t s . On t h e c o n t r a r y t h e t o p i c s t r y t o 
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p r o v i d e a t y p o l o g y o f p o s s i b l e a r g u m e n t s f o r 
l e g a l d e c i s i o n . 
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n f o r s u c h a t y p o l o g y o f 
p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t r e a s o n s , a n d , hence, an 
i l l u s t r a t i o n f o r a k i n d o f c a t a l o g u e o f t o p o i , 
one may c o n s i d e r R o b e r t Summers' e s s a y : 'Two 
t y p e s o f s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s ' . 1 Summers aims t o 
' l o c a t e s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s ' and t h e ' p l a c e o f 
s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s ' w i t h i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
p r o c e s s . ' He t h e r e f o r e d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n 
d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e a s o n s , s u c h as ' a u t h o r i t y 
r e a s o n s ' and ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l r e a s o n s ' , i n o r d e r 
t o c o n c e n t r a t e on ' s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s ' w h i c h he 
c o n s i d e r s t o be t h e most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l r e a s o n s 
i n common-law c a s e s . He c h a r a c t e r i z e s 
s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s as r e a s o n s t h a t d e r i v e t h e i r 
j u s t i f i c a t o r y f o r c e f r o m m o r a l , e c o n o m i c , 
p o l i t i c a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r o t h e r s o c i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 5 I n c o n t r a s t t o t h a t , a u t h o r i t y 
r e a s o n s c o n s i s t p r i m a r i l y o f a p p e a l s t o 
p r e c e d e n t , s t a t u t e s , and o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s , s u c h 
as t r e a t i s e s , o r l a w r e v i e w a r t i c l e s . H a v i n g 
made t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n Summers examines t h e 
'R. Summers, Two t y p e s o f s u b s t a n t i v e 
r e a s o n s : t h e c o r e o f a t h e o r y o f common-law 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) 6 3 C o r n e l l Law Review 707. 
4 i b i d . , p.714. 
' i b i d . , p.716. 
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c o n s t r u c t i o n , e v a l u a t i o n , and l e g i t i m a c y o f 
s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s , s u c h as ' g o a l r e a s o n s ' , 
' r i g h t n e s s r e a s o n s ' , and ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e a s o n s ' . 
Summers' t e r m i n o l o g y i s n o t c o m p e l l i n g and t h e 
o p p o s i t e s g o a l r e a s o n s and T i g h t n e s s r e a s o n s 
c o u l d have been l a b e l l e d w i t h o t h e r p a i r s o f 
t e r m s s u c h as ' f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g ' and ' b a c k w a r d 
l o o k i n g ' o r ' m o r a l i t y - r e g a r d i n g ' and ' w e l f a r e -
r e g a r d i n g ' . 6 These t e r m s may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as 
t o p o i w h i c h a r e e m p l o y e d i n o r d e r t o examine t h e 
t y p e s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a r e i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r o c e s s 
o f j u s t i f y i n g a j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
t h e e x a m i n a t i o n i s a s s i s t e d by o t h e r t o p o i , s u c h 
as d e f i n i t i o n s , f u r t h e r c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s ( e . g . o f 
g o a l r e a s o n s i n t o ' n o n r i g h t n e s s - r e g a r d i n g ' and 
' r i g h t n e s s - r e g a r d i n g ' ) , c o m p a r i s o n s t o e a c h 
o t h e r , and numerous e x a m p l e s . Summers' e s s a y i s 
e x p l i c i t l y a d d r e s s e d t o j u d g e s i n o r d e r t o 
p r o v i d e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 
a f i e l d i n w h i c h r e a l i s t t h e o r i s t s have " l e t t h e 
j u d g e s down".' 
Summers' t y p o l o g y o f r e a s o n s i s n o t n o r m a t i v e and 
t h e r e a s o n s w h i c h a r e f i n a l l y a d o p t e d t o s u p p o r t 
a d e c i s i o n d e p e nd on t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e j u d g e 
and h i s j u d g e m e n t as t o t h e p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o f 
8 i b i d . , p .718, n.35. 
' i b i d . , p . 7 1 1 . 
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r e a s o n s and t h e i r w e i g h t a g a i n s t e ach o t h e r ( e . g . 
t h e w e i g h t o f a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l g o a l ) . I n 
o r d e r t o make such a j u d g e m e n t a j u d g e must 
p o s s e s s t h e p r o f i c i e n c y t o e v a l u a t e each e l e m e n t 
o f a p o t e n t i a l r e a s o n p r o p o s e d by c o u n s e l , f e l l o w 
j u d g e s , l a w c l e r k s e t c . 8 T h u s , Summers' e s s a y 
aims a t t h e same p u r p o s e as a c a t a l o g u e o f t o p o i , 
n amely t o back t h e j u d g e ' s i n t u i t i o n and t o 
p r o v i d e r e l e v a n t v i e w p o i n t s f o r t h e j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n . 
As f a r as t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n i s c o n c e r n e d t h e c o n s e n s u s model o f 
a d j u d i c a t i o n i s s i m i l a r t o t h e v e r s i o n o f t h e 
t o p i c a l a p p r o a c h w h i c h aims t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e 
w h o l e c o m m u n i t y i n t o t h e a u d i e n c e . ' A c c o r d i n g t o 
b o t h n o t i o n s l e g a l a r g u m e n t i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e 
community c o n s e n s u s . However, as m a i n t a i n e d by 
t h e c o n s e n s u s model t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n a p p l i e s o n l y 
t o the- p o l i t i c a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l c a s e s , whereas 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t o p i c a l v e r s i o n e v e r y h a r d c a s e 
r e q u i r e s t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e a u d i e n c e . N e i t h e r 
t h e o r y g i v e s an answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n s o f how 
j u d g e s s h o u l d d i s c o v e r t h e r e l e v a n t c o m m u n i t y 
c o n s e n s u s and o f how t h e y s h o u l d d e c i d e when 
t h e r e i s no c o n s e n s u s a t h a n d . 
' i b i d . , p.743. 
'see u n d e r s e c t i o n 3.4 a t pp. 3 9 f f . 
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I n s t e a d o f l i m i t i n g l e g a l a rgument i n h a r d c a s e s 
by c o n c e p t i o n s o f v a l u e - c o h e r e n c e o r c o m m u n i t y 
c o n s e n s u s F u l l e r l a y s s t r e s s on a n o t h e r n o t i o n . 
He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t s h o u l d be 
o r i e n t a t e d t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s . H i s v i e w i s 
t h a t "when c o u r t s seem t o be c h o o s i n g among 
v a r i o u s r e c o g n i z e d ' s o u r c e s o f l a w ' ... t h e 
r e a l l y d e t e r m i n a t i v e c h o i c e may s i m p l y be: Which 
r u l e i s b e s t ? W h i c h r u l e most c l e a r l y r e s p e c t s 
t h e f a c t s o f men's s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e and t e n d s 
most t o p r o m o t e an e f f e c t i v e and s a t i s f a c t o r y 
l i f e i n common." 1 1 T h i s comes c l o s e t o V i e h w e g 1 s 
i d e a o f how t o f i n d j u s t i c e i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . 
However, t h e a n g l e i s a d i f f e r e n t one. W h i l e 
t o p i c a l a r g u m e n t i s o r i e n t a t e d t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
p r o b l e m , F u l l e r i n t e n d s t o o r i e n t a t e a r g u ment t o 
t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s . B o t h n o t i o n s may c o m p r i s e 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g t o p o i . 
However, because o f t h e vagueness o f t h e 
c o n c e p t i o n s one c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e s i m i l a r i t i e s and 
d i f f e r e n c e s o f t h e s u b s t a n c e o f a r g u m e n t s w h i c h 
b o t h n o t i o n s may f a v o u r . 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o G e w i r t h and t o 
B e y l e v e l d and B r o w n s w o r d , t h e a v a i l a b l e t o p o i 
" F u l l e r , Reason and f i a t i n case l a w 
( 1 9 4 6 ) 5 9 H a r v a r d Law Review 376 a t p . 3 8 1 . 
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must be o r i e n t a t e d t o and r e s t r i c t e d by t h e 
P r i n c i p l e o f G e n e r i c C o n s i s t e n c y . C o u r t s have 
t h e c h o i c e b e t w e e n s e v e r a l t o p o i when t h e y d e c i d e 
c ases i n w h i c h t wo o r more o p t i o n a l c o u r s e s o f 
b e h a v i o u r a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e as t h e s e p r o b l e m s 
c a n n o t be r e s o l v e d d i r e c t l y b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e 
PGC. On t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e g e n e r i c r i g h t s o f an 
a g e n t and r e c i p i e n t do n o t l e a v e a c h o i c e o f 
t o p o i c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a c t i o n s 
w h i c h a r e m o r a l l y o b l i g a t o r y o r m o r a l l y w rong. 
F i n a l l y , t h e v i e w o f t h e d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y and 
o f D w o r k i n ' s r i g h t s t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e i s a l w a y s 
one r i g h t answer t o a l e g a l p r o b l e m , and t h e i d e a 
o f f r e e l e g a l a r g u m e n t a r e m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . 
When t h e y have no ( s t r o n g ) d i s c r e t i o n j u d g e s 
a l w a y s d e c i d e i n t e r m s o f Raz's a n a l y s i s on t h e 
e x e c u t i v e s t a g e as t h e y a r e n o t supposed t o 
i n c o r p o r a t e t h e i r own c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and v a l u e s 
i n t o t h e p r o c e s s o f r e a s o n i n g . Thus, a c c o r d i n g 
t o t h e r i g h t s t h e s i s j u d g e s do n o t have a c h o i c e 
o f t o p o i and t o p i c a l r e a s o n i n g i s e x c l u d e d . 
9.2 L e g i t i m a t i o n o f t h e d e c i s i o n 
T r a d i t i o n a l l y , t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f j u d i c i a l 
d e c i s i o n s i n h a r d c a s e s c a n be t r a c e d back t o a 
r u l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n o r t o r u l e s o f n a t u r a l l a w . 
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A c c o r d i n g t o K e l s e n , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e j u d g e i s 
a u t h o r i z e d t o make a d i s c r e t i o n a r y d e c i s i o n by a 
r u l e w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g o r g a n . 
T h i s norm o r i g i n a t e s w i t h t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n w h i c h i n t u r n may have 
been c r e a t e d on t h e a u t h o r i t y o f an e a r l i e r 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h c a n , i n t h e 
e n d , be t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e G r u n d n o r m . 
N a t u r a l l a w t h e o r i e s , on t h e o t h e r hand, o f t e n 
d e r i v e t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f a d e c i s i o n f r o m an 
e x i s t i n g o b j e c t i v e o r d e r o f v a l u e s . T h i s o r d e r 
may be o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o r i g i n , s u c h as 
B l a c k s t o n e ' s d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y , o r c o n s i s t o f a 
supreme m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s u c h as G e w i r t h ' s m o r a l 
a b s o l u t i s m . 
Hence, l e g a l t h e o r i e s t r a d i t i o n a l l y l e g i t i m i z e 
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w i t h o u t p a y i n g t r i b u t e 
t o a p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i t y w h i c h i s 
a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 
J u r i s t i c t o p i c s and t h e new r h e t o r i c p r o p o s e a 
d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y p a r t i c u l a r l y 
c o n c e r n i n g v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t s i n h a r d c a s e s . 
V a l u e - j u d g e m e n t s a r e no l o n g e r r e g a r d e d as 
a r b i t r a r y o r as d e t e r m i n e d by an o b j e c t i v e o r d e r , 
b u t t h e y a r e a t t h e c o m m u n i t y ' s d i s p o s a l o r a t 
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t h e d i s p o s a l o f t h e p a r t i e s b e f o r e c o u r t . T h e i r 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e l e g i t i m a c y 
o f a d e c i s i o n i n a h a r d c a s e . The j u d g e m e n t must 
be a c c e p t e d by t h e a u d i e n c e i n o r d e r t o be 
l e g i t i m a t e . 
Even a p a r t f r o m t h e t o p i c a l a p p r o a c h and t h e new 
r h e t o r i c one may o b s e r v e a c h a n g e i n c o n t e m p o r a r y 
l e g a l d o c t r i n e w h i c h p a y s i n c r e a s i n g l y a t t e n t i o n 
t o t h e i d e a t h a t l e g a l d e c i s i o n s d e r i v e t h e i r 
l e g i t i m a c y f r o m an a c c e p t a n c e by t h e w h o l e 
community and t h a t t h i s f a c t m ust be t a k e n i n t o 
a c c o u n t by t h e j u d i c i a r y . 
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n one may t a k e MacCormick's 
c o n c e p t i o n s o f a r u l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n . 1 1 He 
b e l i e v e s t h a t what c o n s t i t u t e s c r i t e r i a o f 
r e c o g n i t i o n f o r a l e g a l s y s t e m i s s h a r e d 
a c c e p t a n c e by t h e j u d g e s o f t h a t s y s t e m t h a t 
t h e i r d u t y i s t o a p p l y r u l e s i d e n t i f i e d b y 
r e f e r e n c e t o them. J u d g e s a r e j u d g e s b ecause 
t h e r e a r e r u l e s t h a t make them s o , and t h o s e 
r u l e s a r e r u l e s o f l a w b e c a u s e t h e j u d g e s 
r e c o g n i z e them as s u c h . However, c o u r t s a r e n o t 
i n s t i t u t i o n s endowed w i t h l e g i t i m a c y by t h e i r own 
say s o . "They a r e i n s t i t u t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d 
U N . MacCormick, L e g a l r e a s o n i n g and l e g a l 
t h e o r y , O x f o r d 1978, pp.54-55. 
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(however i n f o r m a l l y o r f o r m a l l y ) by a w i d e r 
c o m m u n i t y f r o m w h i c h t h e y d e r i v e t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y 
and a u t h o r i t y as d e t e r m i n e r s o f c o n t r o v e r s i e s . " 1 8 
B u t MacCormick does n o t d e r i v e f r o m t h i s t h e v i e w 
t h a t i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l c a s e s t h e j u d g e must 
d i r e c t l y g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e c o m m u n i t y c o n s e n s u s 
o r a b s t a i n f r o m a d e c i s i o n i n o r d e r n o t t o l o o s e 
h i s l e g i t i m a c y as an i n d e p e n d e n t a r b i t e r . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s one can f i n d a s i m i l a r n o t i o n i n 
MacCormick's d i s c u s s i o n o f c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t 
a r g u m e n t s . He a r g u e s t h a t i n h a r d c a s e s t h e 
j u d g e o u g h t t o t a k e t h e common s e n s e i n t o a c c o u n t 
w h i c h he c h a r a c t e r i z e s as " i m p l y i n g t h e s o r t o f 
r o u g h c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n s e n s u s on s o c i a l v a l u e s " . 1 ' 
T h i s i s r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h e p o s i t i o n o f J o s e f 
E s s e r , one o f t h e m a i n e x p o n e n t s o f j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s who a d h e r e s t o t h e same v i e w . " 
One may a l s o i d e n t i f y t h i s t e n d e n c y o f t a k i n g 
c o m m u n i t y v a l u e s o f some s o r t d i r e c t l y o r 
i n d i r e c t l y i n t o a c c o u n t i n D w o r k i n ' s r i g h t s 
" i b i d . , p.55; J . Raz, The c o n c e p t o f a l e g a l 
s y s t e m , 2nd. ed., O x f o r d 1980, a t p.199 i s more 
r e l u c t a n t t h a n MacCormick: "Hence o n l y t h e 
b e h a v i o u r o f t h e o f f i c i a l s and n o t t h e b e h a v i o u r 
o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r 
t h e r u l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n e x i s t s . " 
"MacCormick, L e g a l r e a s o n i n g ( s u p r a n . l l ) , 
p .149. 
"see u n d e r s e c t i o n 3.4 a t p. 34. 
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t h e s i s . A c c o r d i n g t o D w o r k i n j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s 
i n a h a r d c a s e s h o u l d be l e g i t i m i z e d by r e f e r e n c e 
t o t h e r i g h t s p e o p l e h a v e . These a r e d e r i v e d 
f r o m p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e 
' c r i t i c a l c u l t u r a l m o r a l i t y ' o f a c o m m u n i t y . As 
we have a l r e a d y s e e n 1 1 t h i s i s a s e t o f r a t i o n a l 
m o r a l b e l i e f s w h i c h may p l a u s i b l y be a t t r i b u t e d 
t o t h e c o m m u n i t y as norms w h i c h m i g h t be e m p l o y e d 
i n an a t t e m p t t o j u s t i f y t h e e x i s t i n g r u l e s and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s b y means o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a t h e o r y o f 
p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y . A l t h o u g h t h i s t h e o r y does 
n o t i n c o r p o r a t e a c o m m u n i t y a t t i t u d e d i r e c t l y , i t 
g i v e s e f f e c t t o t h e i r v a l u e s i n d i r e c t l y by 
c o n s i d e r i n g p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h embody c o m m u n i t y 
v a l u e s . 
These e x a m p l e s f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y l e g a l t h e o r y 
r e p r e s e n t a t e n d e n c y i n l e g a l r e a s o n i n g t o w a r d s 
r a t i o n a l i z i n g j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n i n h a r d c a s e s by 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e c o m m u n i t y as an a u d i e n c e w h i c h 
must a c c e p t t h e d e c i s i o n . T h i s t e n d e n c y has been 
r e i n t r o d u c e d i n t o l e g a l r e a s o n i n g b y j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s and t h e new r h e t o r i c . 
9.3 J u r i s t i c t o p i c s b e t w e e n p o s i t i v i s m and 
n a t u r a l l a w 
see u n d e r s e c t i o n 8.2.3 a t p. 178. 
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A t an e a r l i e r p o i n t 1 8 i t was s t a t e d t h a t j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s a r e open t o w a r d s s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t 
c o n c e p t s o f l a w and t h a t t h e y n e i t h e r b e l o n g t o 
n o r d e r i v e f r o m p o s i t i v i s t o r n a t u r a l l a w 
t h e o r i e s . I n t h i s s e c t i o n t h i s s t a t e m e n t w i l l be 
e x p l a i n e d and i t w i l l be shown t h a t t h e t o p i c s 
a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h many t r a i t s o f l e g a l 
p o s i t i v i s m and i n d i f f e r e n t t o w a r d s most 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f n a t u r a l l a w . 
I n o r d e r t o g r a s p t h e v a r i o u s meanings o f l e g a l 
p o s i t i v i s m we r e f e r t o H a r t ' s e n u m e r a t i o n o f i t s 
main i m p l i c a t i o n s : 1 ' 1) Laws a r e commands. 2) 
T h e r e i s no n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n l a w and 
m o r a l s , b e t w e e n l a w as i t i s a c t u a l l y l a i d down 
and as i t o u g h t t o be. 3) The a n a l y s i s o f l e g a l 
c o n c e p t s i s w o r t h p u r s u i n g , b u t d i s t i n c t f r o m 
s o c i o l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l i n q u i r i e s , and f r o m 
c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n . 4) A l e g a l s y s t e m i s a 
c l o s e d l o g i c a l s y s t e m i n w h i c h c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n s 
can be d e d u c e d l o g i c a l l y f r o m p r e d e t e r m i n e d r u l e s 
w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o s o c i a l a i m s , p o l i c y o r 
m o r a l i t y . 5) M o r a l j u d g e m e n t s c a n n o t be 
e s t a b l i s h e d o r d e f e n d e d , as s t a t e m e n t s o f f a c t 
c a n , by r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t , e v i d e n c e , o r p r o o f . 
" u n d e r s e c t i o n 4.3 a t p. 65. 
"H.L.A. H a r t , P o s i t i v i s m and t h e s e p a r a t i o n 
o f l a w and m o r a l s ( 1 9 5 8 ) 7 1 H a r v a r d Law Review 
593, a t p . 6 0 1 , n.25. 
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The l a s t o f t h e f i v e m e a n i n g s o f l e g a l p o s i t i v i s m 
has a l r e a d y been c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g 
s e c t i o n and t h e d i f f e r e n t n o t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y 
e m p l o y e d by j u r i s t i c t o p i c s w i t h r e g a r d t o v a l u e -
j u d g e m e n t s has been s t a t e d . M o r e o v e r , i t has 
been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e t o p i c s o b j e c t t o t h e 
i d e a o f a c l o s e d l o g i c a l s y s t e m o f l a w and 
s i m i l a r n o t i o n s o f c o n c e p t u a l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , a t h e o r y o f l a w as commands i s 
i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t s t a t u t e s and 
o t h e r l e g a l r u l e s a r e n o n - b i n d i n g t o p o i . The 
v i e w t h a t l e g a l r u l e s a r e mere g u i d e l i n e s a l s o 
makes a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e law as i t 
i s a c t u a l l y l a i d down and as i t o u g h t t o be 
i m p o s s i b l e . 
T h us, one may c o n c l u d e t h a t j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
r e j e c t many o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t r a i t s o f l e g a l 
p o s i t i v i s m . 
I n o r d e r t o e x a m i n e t h e a f f i n i t y o f t h e t o p i c s t o 
d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s o f n a t u r a l law one may r e f e r 
t o f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i d e n t i f i e d by D i a s : 1 ! 1) 
The c o n t e n t i o n o f i d e a l s w h i c h g u i d e l e g a l 
d e v e l o p m e n t and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 2) A b a s i c m o r a l 
\ 
18R.W.M. D i a s , J u r i s p r u d e n c e , 4 t h . e d . , 
London 1976, p.653. \ 
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q u a l i t y i n l a w w h i c h p r e v e n t s a t o t a l s e p a r a t i o n 
o f t h e ' i s ' f r o m t h e ' o u g h t ' . 3) The method o f 
d i s c o v e r i n g p e r f e c t l a w . 4) The c o n t e n t o f 
p e r f e c t l a w d e d u c i b l e by r e a s o n . 5) The 
c o n d i t i o n s s i n e q u i b u s non f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f 
l a w . 
J u r i s t i c t o p i c s do n o t a d h e r e t o an o b j e c t i v e 
o r d e r o f m o r a l v a l u e s , so t h a t t h e r e i s no 
a f f i n i t y t o c o n c e p t i o n s o f p e r f e c t l a w and t h e 
methods o f i t s d i s c o v e r y . I n P e r e l m a n ' s , b u t n o t 
V i e h w e g ' s , t h e o r y one c a n f i n d t h e n o t i o n o f a 
c o n s t a n t f o r m a l e l e m e n t t h a t ' l i k e p e r s o n s be 
t r e a t e d a l i k e ' 1 5 w h e r e a s ' l i k e n e s s ' must be 
s p e c i f i e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f 
v a l u e . T h i s c o n s t a n t f o r m a l e l e m e n t may be 
r e g a r d e d as an i d e a l o f n a t u r a l l a w o r i g i n . As 
f a r as j u r i s t i c t o p i c s a r e c o n c e r n e d t h e o n l y 
s i m i l a r i t y t o n a t u r a l l a w t h e o r i e s stems f r o m t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e t o p i c a l m e t h o d does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h 
b e t w e e n t h e l a w as i t i s and as i t o u g h t t o be. 
As we have a l r e a d y shown t h i s l e a d s t o an 
a f f i n i t y b e t w e e n t h e t o p i c a l a p p r o a c h and 
F u l l e r ' s 'most m o d e r a t e ' f o r m o f n a t u r a l l a w , b u t 
as i t i s n o t a m a j o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t o p i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g i t does n o t t u r n t h e t o p i c s i n t o a 
method o f n a t u r a l l a w . 
"see u n d e r s e c t i o n 4.1 a t p. 56. 
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U s i n g R o b e r t Summers' t e r m i n o l o g y one may 
c h a r a c t e r i z e j u r i s t i c t o p i c s as a method o f 
s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n i n g i n c o n t r a s t t o f o r m a l 
r e a s o n i n g , w h i c h l a y s s t r e s s on a r g u m e n t s o f 
s u b s t a n c e i n s t e a d o f a p p e a l i n g t o a u t h o r i t y 
r e a s o n s . " An a u t h o r i t y r e a s o n c o n s i s t s , f o r 
exa m p l e , o f an a p p e a l t o p r e c e d e n t . A c c o r d i n g t o 
j u r i s t i c t o p i c s , however, p r e c e d e n t o n l y 
c o n s t i t u t e s a s t r o n g and p e r s u a s i v e t o p o s b e c a u s e 
o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s b e h i n d t h e p r e c e d e n t 
and b e c a u s e o f t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f f u r t h e r 
s u b s t a n t i v e r e a s o n s t h a t s u p p o r t t h e d o c t r i n e o f 
p r e c e d e n t . 
J u r i s t i c t o p i c s and t h e new r h e t o r i c have 
r e i n t r o d u c e d a k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g i n t o t h e l e g a l 
d i s c o u r s e w h i c h i s opposed t o t h e C a r t e s i a n 
t r a d i t i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c r e a s o n i n g and 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n by means o f d e d u c t i o n . I n s t e a d , 
s t r e s s i s l a i d on t h e i d e a o f p r a c t i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g . 2 1 The t e r m p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g 
c o m p r i s e s s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s and 
c o n c e p t i o n s and i t s most g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n w o u l d 
ucf. Summers, op. c i t . s u p r a n.3, p.724. 
" s e e u n d e r s e c t i o n 4.1 a t p. 56. 
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be t h e n o t i o n o f g i v i n g r e a s o n s f o r a c t i o n 8 2 i n 
o r d e r t o j u s t i f y t h e a c t i o n and a v o i d 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s w h ere d e d u c t i o n i s n o t p o s s i b l e . 
Thus, i t i s t h e a i m o f t h e o r i e s o f p r a c t i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g t o e x c l u d e , f o r e x a m p l e , a c t i o n s o r 
d e c i s i o n s on p s y c h o l o g i c a l g r o u n d s s u c h as w i l l . 
I n t h e w o r k o f MacCormick, Raz, and F i n n i s one 
c a n f i n d more o r l e s s p r e c i s e c o n c e p t i o n s o f 
p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n and d i s c o u r s e w h i c h i n a b r o a d 
sense c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e n o t i o n s o f l e g a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y o f j u r i s t i c t o p i c s and t h e new 
r h e t o r i c . The i d e a o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g has 
been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e o r i e s o f b o t h p o s i t i v i s t s 
and n a t u r a l l a w y e r s . 
A c c o r d i n g t o MacCormick p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n as a 
f o c a l i s s u e f o r t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a w grows o u t 
o f t h e c o n c e r n f o r q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f and t h e l i m i t s on l e g a l 
k n o w l e d g e . 2 1 From t h i s one may draw t h e p a r a l l e l 
t o j u r i s t i c t o p i c s w h i c h c l a i m t h a t t o p i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g s t a r t s where c e r t a i n l e g a l k n o w l e d g e i n 
f o r m o f l o g i c a l d e d u c t i o n f r o m p r e m i s e s c o n t a i n e d 
n c f . D. B e y l e v e l d and R. B r o wnsword, Law as 
a m o r a l j u d g e m e n t , London 1986, p.124. 
n N . Ma c C o r m i c k , C o n t e m p o r a r y l e g a l 
p h i l o s o p h y ( 1 9 8 3 ) 1 0 J o u r n a l o f Law and S o c i e t y 1 , 
a t p.14. 
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i n a l e g a l s y s t e m ends. M o r e o v e r , MacCormick 
s t i p u l a t e s t h a t p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g i m p l i e s t h a t 
t h e r e i s no s i n g l e d e t e r m i n a t e s o l u t i o n u n i q u e l y 
r i g h t o r r e a s o n a b l e f o r h a r d c a s e s , b u t t h a t 
t h e r e may be e q u a l l y r e a s o n a b l e v i e w s b e t w e e n 
w h i c h c h o i c e s must be made i n s p e c i a l i s e d 
p r o c e d u r e s o f d i s c o u r s e . " He p o i n t s o u t t h a t 
p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g i n s u c h p r o c e d u r e s has 
n e c e s s a r i l y a s o c i a l c o n t e x t . " The r o l e o f 
r e a s o n i s a d d r e s s e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , when s o c i a l 
change t a k e s p l a c e by means o f t h e a d j u s t m e n t and 
c o r r e c t i o n and a n a l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f an 
i n h e r i t e d s y s t e m o f r u l e s . I n s u c h c a s e s a p p e a l 
t o p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n s must be made and t h e r e a s o n s 
o f f e r e d must be j u d g e d by t h e i r soundness and 
w e i g h t . 2 ' T h i s c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h t h e t o p i c a l 
method w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a l l 
r e l e v a n t v i e w p o i n t s f o r t h e s o l u t i o n o f h a r d 
c a s e s and t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n and l e g i t i m a t i o n b y 
t h e l e ' g a l a u d i e n c e . 
Raz's p u r s u i t o f r e a s o n s f o r a c t i o n i s i n t e n d e d 
t o d i r e c t a t t e n t i o n t o t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s w h i c h 
a r e a d d r e s s e d when j u s t i f y i n g a d e c i s i o n and 
w h i c h a r e i n h e r e n t i n a c o n c e p t o f l a w and l e g a l 
" i b i d . , p.8. 
" i b i d . , p.13. 
" i b i d . , p p .12-13. 
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norms.2' This c o n s t i t u t e s a break i n l e g a l 
thought as such reasons f o r a c t i o n were u s u a l l y 
regarded as e x t e r n a l and subject to s o c i a l 
pressure once a r u l e had been established 2 1 
whereas Raz d i s t i n g u i s h e s between r u l e s or 
o b l i g a t i o n s to act and reasons f o r a c t i o n . " His 
d i s t i n c t i o n between what has already been decided 
and what reasons there are f o r deciding one way 
or the other causes problems t h a t are as yet not 
s e t t l e d and does not e s t a b l i s h a theory of 
j u d i c i a l reasoning. However, i t i s comparable 
wi t h one of the basic f i n d i n g s of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s 
concerning the question of where t o p i c a l thought 
s t a r t s . " 
According t o F i n n i s ' concept of n a t u r a l law 
p r a c t i c a l reasonableness i s one of several basic 
forms of human good. I t comprises the capacity 
of b r i n g i n g one's own i n t e l l i g e n c e t o bear 
e f f e c t i v e l y on the problems of choosing one' s 
actions and l i f e - s t y l e and shaping one's own 
"see mainly: J. Raz, P r a c t i c a l reason and 
norms, London 1975. 
" c f . H.L.A. Hart, The concept of law, Oxford 
1961, pp.85-88. 
"Raz, op. c i t . supra n.27, pp.53-58; see 
also MacCormick's e v a l u a t i o n of Raz i n : 
Contemporary l e g a l philosophy (supra n.23), p.5 
and 6. 
"see the di s c u s s i o n of t h i s issue under 
section 9.1 above at pp. 184-186. 
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character. 1 1 A basic requirement f o r p r a c t i c a l 
reasonableness i s t h a t a person i s both f r e e and 
responsible, so t h a t he has the choice between 
commitment t o conc e n t r a t i o n upon one value and 
commitment t o others, and between one p r o j e c t and 
another. I n order t o make such a choice one 
basic form of the good of p r a c t i c a l 
reasonableness i s not t o leave out of account any 
good reason f o r the guidance of one's commitments 
and the s e l e c t i o n of one's p r o j e c t s . S ! 
Consequently, F i n n i s claims t h a t p r a c t i c a l 
reasonableness involves a coherent plan of l i f e , 
no a r b i t r a r y preferences amongst values, and no 
a r b i t r a r y preferences amongst persons." 
According to Finnis law i s a primary requirement 
of the common good and thus a requirement of 
p r a c t i c a l reasonableness. Legal r u l e s and 
ad j u d i c a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s are d i r e c t e d t o resolve 
reasonably any of the community's c o - o r d i n a t i o n 
problems f o r the common good of t h a t community, 
according t o a manner and form i t s e l f adapted to 
that common good, e.g. by features of s p e c i f i c i t y 
and minimisation of a r b i t r a r i n e s s J* Hence, 
n J . F i n n i s , Natural law and n a t u r a l r i g h t s , 
Oxford 1980, p.88. 
" i b i d . , p.100. 
" i b i d . , pp.103-108. 
" i b i d . , pp.276-277. 
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F i n n i s s t i p u l a t e s t h a t l e g a l reasoning p a r t l y 
complies w i t h the requirements of the basic good 
of p r a c t i c a l reasonableness. 
From the idea of p r a c t i c a l reasonableness and i t s 
e f f e c t on l e g a l reasoning the s i m i l a r i t i e s t o 
t o p i c a l reasoning become obvious. P a r t i c u l a r l y , 
the notions t o consider every reasonable argument 
and t o r a t i o n a l i z e value-judgements i n order t o 
minimize a r b i t r a r i n e s s i n l e g a l procedures are 
equivalent i n both t h e o r i e s . 
I n t h i s section i t has been shown t h a t the t o p i c s 
r e j e c t many of the t r a d i t i o n a l t r a i t s of l e g a l 
p o s i t i v i s m and t h a t they are i n d i f f e r e n t towards 
most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of n a t u r a l law. More recent 
trends i n a n a l y t i c a l jurisprudence seem t o 
supersede the s t r i c t d i f f e r e n c e between l e g a l 
p o s i t i v i s m and n a t u r a l law" i n c o r p o r a t i n g the 
idea of p r a c t i c a l reason and discourse which i s 
also inherent i n the t o p i c a l method and the new 
r h e t o r i c . 
" c f . N. MacCormick, Natural law reconsidered 
(1981)1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 99, at 
p p . l 0 7 f f . , and Contemporary l e g a l philosophy 
(supra n.23), p.8. 
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10 Conclusion 
From the presentation of j u r i s t i c t o p i c s we l e a r n 
t h a t there were two versions of the t o p i c s i n 
a n t i q u i t y . The A r i s t o t e l i a n Topics were mainly 
concerned w i t h a theory of d i a l e c t i c a l reasoning 
f o r the u n i v e r s a l examination of problems, i . e . 
reasoning from g e n e r a l l y accepted opinions 
(endoxa) , whereas Cicero's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
A r i s t o t l e ' s Topics r e s u l t e d i n a v e r s i o n which 
supports the process of argumentation by means of 
r h e t o r i c a l i n v e n t i o n . 
Viehweg's l e g a l r e c e p t i o n incorporates both 
versions of the t o p i c s . While the aspect of 
problem t h i n k i n g which prescribes t h a t a l l 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s of a p a r t i c u l a r case ought t o be 
considered has more i n common w i t h Ciceronian 
r h e t o f i c a l i n v e n t i o n , the concept of l e g a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y of the t o p i c a l approach seems t o 
f o l l o w A r i s t o t e l i a n d i a l e c t i c a l reasoning. From 
the t o p i c s discussion i n Germany one may draw 
three main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r s t l y , the t o p i c s 
are a method of problem t h i n k i n g as opposed t o 
system t h i n k i n g . They intend to consider a l l 
rele v a n t viewpoints f o r the s o l u t i o n of a 
p a r t i c u l a r case. Secondly, they are a method of 
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f i n d i n g premises by means of catalogues of t o p o i , 
and, t h i r d l y , they provide a concept of l e g a l 
r a t i o n a l i t y . This concept of the i n t e r l o c u t o r i n 
a discussion takes i n t o account the views of the 
community which i s a f f e c t e d by the de c i s i o n -
making process. 
The topics discussion has t o be looked at on the 
background of a counter-movement against 
Cartesian thought. One of the main theories of 
t h i s counter-movement i s Perelman's new r h e t o r i c . 
This movement argues th a t r a t i o n a l decisions can 
also be achieved i n cases where the s o l u t i o n 
cannot be demonstrated s y l l o g i s t i c a l l y by means 
of l o g i c a l proof. Thus, decisions which y i e l d 
p l a u s i b l e or probable r e s u l t s are not necessarily 
f a l s e or a r b i t r a r y , but they may produce r a t i o n a l 
r e s u l t s as w e l l . 
Conventional views of the d i f f e r e n c e s between 
common law and c i v i l law l e g a l thought i d e n t i f y 
the former to a c e r t a i n extent w i t h problem 
t h i n k i n g and regard the l a t t e r as systematical. 
More recent accounts, however, claim t h a t the 
differences are d i m i n i s h i n g , and tha t c i v i l law 
systems do not take less arguments i n t o account 
than the common law. Moreover, the c o n f l i c t 
between j u s t i c e according t o ru l e s and j u s t i c e i n 
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the p a r t i c u l a r case, which r e f l e c t s one issue of 
the topics discussion, i s also subject of 
discussion i n common law l e g a l t h e o r i e s . 
Concerning the second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s , the examination of the hard case notions 
i n English l e g a l theory, which broadly coincide 
w i t h Viehweg's po i n t s of e n t r y of the t o p i c s i n t o 
a l e g a l order, shows the kinds of cases f o r which 
a f u r t h e r concept of r a t i o n a l i t y i s needed, 
because deduction from e x i s t i n g premises i s 
impossible i n these cases. The sources of hard 
cases are vague or ambiguous r u l e s as a r e s u l t of 
the use of common language; the c o n f l i c t of 
r u l e s , and anachronistic r u l e s , and gaps i n the 
law. 
For the s o l u t i o n of such hard cases there i s no 
theory which i s employed c o n s i s t e n t l y throughout 
the p r a c t i c e of English c o u r t s , and d i f f e r e n t 
judges have d i f f e r e n t views about a d j u d i c a t i o n 
and the treatment of hard cases. English l e g a l 
theories describe and pr e s c r i b e methods f o r the 
r e s o l u t i o n of hard cases and thus c o n t r i b u t e t o 
a phenomenology of law and the process of 
ad j u d i c a t i o n . 
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Concerning the t h i r d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of j u r i s t i c 
t o p i c s , i . e . the question of l e g i t i m a t i o n and 
r a t i o n a l i t y i n hard cases, models of the English 
j u d i c i a l r o l e vary from concepts which leave the 
judge the complete freedom t o decide t o theories 
which do not allow any d i s c r e t i o n . On the one 
hand there are conceptions which do not deal w i t h 
l e g a l decisions beyond the guidance of r u l e s and 
refuse to s p e l l out notions of r a t i o n a l i t y i n 
hard cases. On the other hand, there are views 
which intend t o bind the court's d e c i s i o n t o an 
o b j e c t i v e order of values from which the r i g h t 
s o l u t i o n can be deduced i n most cases. 
In the Anglo-American l e g a l f a m i l y there i s no 
reception of the t o p i c s which i s equivalent to 
the l e g a l r e c e p t i o n i n c o n t i n e n t a l and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y German law. However, the trend 
towards another form of l e g a l r a t i o n a l i t y besides 
the dichotomy of t r u e and f a l s e , or l o g i c a l 
deduction and a r b i t r a r y decision also f i n d s 
expression i n English l e g a l theory. At l e a s t 
some theories i n c o r p o r a t e the approval of the 
i n t e r l o c u t o r or the consensus among the l e g a l 
audience i n t o t h e i r concept of r a t i o n a l i t y i n 
some way or another. This may be embodied i n 
notions about a rough contemporary consensus on 
s o c i a l values, or i n a m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n , or by 
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reference t o basic values of the community which 
are not at the d i s p o s a l of the opinion of the 
day. 
This tendency i n contemporary l e g a l theory seems 
to supersede the Cartesian t r a d i t i o n of 
reasoning, which i s inherent i n Kelsen's r e f u s a l 
to s p e l l out notions of r a t i o n a l i t y i n hard 
cases. Instead, s t r e s s i s l a i d on the idea of 
p r a c t i c a l reasoning which aims at p r o v i d i n g 
analysis of and guidance f o r the reasoning 
involved i n the r e s o l u t i o n of hard cases. 
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